






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THE FIGHTING INSTINCT



THE FIGHTING INSTINCT

BY

PIERRE BOVET, LITT. D.

*Professor at the University of Geneva,
Director of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, Geneva*

AUTHORISED ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

J. Y. T. GREIG, M.A.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

"THE secret of being a bore is,—Say everything."

If the converse were true, and, to be interesting, it were enough not to exhaust a subject, I should have been well assured of the reception to be given by the public to this little book.

The chapters composing it constituted in the first instance the material of a course in moral psychology which I gave in the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute at Geneva during the winter of 1915-16. In the preceding years I had investigated, in some detail, first, the falsehoods of children, and questions bearing on the apprenticeship to truth, and then, the sexual life of young people and the highly controversial problems of this special sphere. Those two courses were not published. Why, then, it might be asked, did I have this one printed? Well, perhaps because its contents seemed to me somewhat fresher. There are some books, obviously, from which I have been able to borrow extensively; yet I think it will be admitted that I have now and again touched on subjects that have been little studied up to the present. It may be that the book owes something of the attraction of originality to this circumstance; to it also, however, it owes a certain fragility and lack of assurance in many places. Many of the lacunæ are due to the fact that the materials necessary for such a structure as I have attempted to build up have not yet been gathered together.

But I published it, imperfect as I saw it to be, in the main because I looked upon it as something other than a contribution to pure science. I tried to point out to educationists what advantage they might take of the facts I had observed and arranged. I wanted the book

to serve, as best it could, for the orientation of men's minds and the clarifying of their ideas on the topics of which it treats, and, still more, for the dissipation of certain current sophisms. The complete study of the fighting instinct can wait. But it is urgent to provide a conducting thread for those in whose hands lies the heavy task of bringing up the rising generation, and who are puzzled to know what attitude they ought to adopt towards the aggressive tendencies that were thrown into such vivid relief by the European War.

When, in August and September 1914, men began to recover from their first stupor, each one felt the need of getting an explanation for the war. For the most part they took the only course open to them, and found their explanation by dipping, sometimes profoundly, sometimes superficially, into diplomatic or economic history. But certain among them, especially in neutral countries, thought it their duty to renounce this eager search after *immediate* causes. Some had a bias towards panlogism, and were reluctant to ascribe so gigantic a cataclysm to *accidents*; others were too charitably disposed to load other people with such crushing responsibilities; all sought the explanation of the events that were unrolling before their eyes, not in the actions of men, but in a *state of affairs*—as if a *state of affairs* could ever be an efficient cause!

The result was an epidemic of aphorisms. In a short time these became at once so current and so seldom contested that for many people they assumed the intangible authority of common sense.

At least three of the *truisms* of this sort, that were in circulation in and around Geneva, touched upon child psychology, in one way or another, and on that account caught my attention. They belonged to different environments. One might suspect them of having emanated from different sources. None the less, taken at their face value, they did not appear to be contradictory, for they treated of wholly distinct topics.

The first gave it out, in a resigned and sceptical tone, that "War was eternal; man was born pugnacious; so long as children fought, peoples were bound to make war".

The second was put forward under a more learned front. Its tendency was not so much to make us form our conclusions about war in general, as to explain the European War in particular as something fated to happen. "Political States," it said, "have a soul, which is subject to the same vicissitudes as the individual's. The individual knows times of arrested development, and even of reversion towards infantile forms of behaviour; grown men, if they are gainsaid, may be so carried away as to slap a child or kick over an occasional table. In the same way, certain political States, cramped in their expansion, let themselves go in outbursts of destructive anger. Such crises are to be regarded as regression of the collective or group soul towards infantile mentality".

The third thesis was more naïve. It was put before educationists with a touching conviction. "Ah!" we were told, "you do well to concern yourselves with education! The future depends on pacifist teaching!"

These three propositions form the starting-point of this book. Since we, in the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, professed to study childhood, it seemed incumbent on us to verify affirmations so widespread, and to dissolve out whatever of error might be mixed with their seeming truth.

I have tried to treat as a whole the questions put before us in this way.

In the following pages will be found, first, an analysis of the fighting instinct in the child, taking for its starting-point a large number of abstracts from narratives, written by schoolboys, and describing tussles in which they or their acquaintances were involved; then, a study of how the fighting instinct evolves and alters under the pressure of social needs; and, finally, some reflections on the practical conclusions educationists may draw from such a collection of facts.

Ought I to attempt justification of myself for having spoken on such a topic as this in the tranquil tone of an academic discussion, during a winter when others were suffering and dying in order that their children might not be driven to fight later on? I think not. I hope that, by bringing facts to light which are still badly understood, even I, in my small way, may do my part towards confirming the faith of some people in the final triumph of right over might. Is it not to work towards that end, if it can be shown that this ideal is possible, that it does not have everything against it, that more is to be taken into account than just the accumulated powers of our heritage of barbarism, and that he who is clear of sight and resolute of will, and who is determined that the future shall be prepared for now, may be able to turn even the powers of barbarism to splendid advantage?

I dedicated the French edition of this book to the memory of two men very dear to me who died while I was engaged in its writing: a brother, Ernest Babut, Professor of the History of Christianity at the University of Montpellier, who died for France in the flower of his manhood, willingly making the sacrifice of a life that was beautiful and rich in all things; and a father, Pastor C. E. Babut, of the Reformed Church at Nîmes, who continued until the end in a ministry which, every day for half a century, had been a gift of himself and a labour in the cause of peace. Masters in the art of writing they both were, and, however unworthy of them this book may be in its style and composition, I know at least that they would not disavow its inspiration.

PIERRE BOVET.

GENEVA

April 1923.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

THE circumstances in which *The Fighting Instinct* came to be written, and the object which the author had in writing it, have been fully explained in the preface. Is the catastrophe of war between civilised peoples inevitable? If not, what is the best method of preventing it? These were the two questions, the one theoretical and the other practical, which M. Bovet set himself to answer, not, as so many other inquirers had done before him, on the plane of history or economics, but through a detailed and searching analysis on the plane of psychology.

If these questions were urgent in 1917, when M. Bovet published the French original of this book, they are even more urgent now, when more than four years have elapsed since the conclusion of hostilities. In 1917, it was still possible to believe in "The war to end war". Does any one believe in that politician's phrase now?

M. Bovet's answers are clear and decisive. It is of the nature of man to fight; the fighting instinct is part of the equipment with which he faces the world. And it is well that it should be so, for the fighting instinct is a potential source of much that is best in human life. But there is nothing in the nature of things compelling man to direct this instinct everlastingly to the wholesale slaughter of his fellows. On the contrary, the instinct of the fight may be, and has been, sublimated towards ends that are socially constructive.

But the book speaks for itself.

Let me say a word about the author, and the institution of which he is the Head.

M. Bovet is Director of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute in Geneva. This is an "Institute of the Sciences of Education", a kind of Teachers' College, but different in many important respects from such Training Colleges and Education Departments in the Universities as we are accustomed to find in England. Its founders claim that it is the first of its kind to be established in Europe. It has four objects: to train teachers (especially head masters and head mistresses), inspectors of schools, and directors and secretaries of education; to conduct educational research; to provide a bureau of information on educational matters; and to spread the gospel of education among the general public.

The Institute was founded in 1912. How has it succeeded during its eleven years of existence? It is difficult for us, at a distance, to form any opinion on this question, except indirectly. Fortunately, however, even we have something concrete on which to base our judgment. We have the admirable series of publications which have been issued from the Institute, the *Collection d'actualités pédagogiques*, which was founded by M. Bovet in 1906, which is still under his general editorship, and which has become, as it were, an organ of the Institute. "I do not think", wrote M. Bovet in 1917, "that we shall be accused of blowing our own trumpet too loudly, if we say that our *Collection* has deserved well of the French-speaking public by being the first to bring to its notice educationists of such high standing in their different ways, as Foerster, Baden-Powell, Mme. Montessori, and John Dewey". Besides these translations into French, however, the *Collection* has contained several original works of note. Foremost among these have been the present work on *The Fighting Instinct*, and the two books of M. Charles Baudouin, which have already achieved such a success in English translations, namely, *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, and *Studies in Psychoanalysis*. It is not too much to say that many psychologists in England and America have already learned to look forward eagerly to every fresh publi-

cation bearing on its cover that charming woodcut entitled *Discat a puero magister*, which is the significant mark of the Institute.

The present translation has been revised in manuscript by the author, who has taken the opportunity to make certain small additions to it, here and there, which do not appear in the French original. These are, however, balanced by certain omissions, especially in Chapter XIII, which has been recast.

With the consent of the author, I have added certain footnotes. I hope these will add to the usefulness of the book for English readers. They are enclosed in square brackets, and marked TRANS. The author must not be held responsible for them.

Wherever possible, existing English translations have been used for quotations from French and German works. The main exception to this rule has been the alleged English translation of Oskar Pfister's *The Psycho-analytic Method*.

The work of translation has been made easy and pleasant by the unfailing kindness and co-operation of M. Bovet, and by his full and accurate knowledge of English. I am much indebted also to Mr. Norman Wood, who has read most of the manuscript and the whole of the proofs, and who has made many valuable suggestions.

J. Y. T. GREIG.

ARMSTRONG COLLEGE,
NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE.

April 1923.

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The Fighting Instinct

CHAPTER I

CHILDREN'S QUARRELS

CHILDREN fight. It is this fact, so easy to observe, that we would first examine a little more closely. The study of it offers no difficulty. Events in school playgrounds, in the street, and in the home circle, are directly accessible to our observation, and have often been described. Going no further afield than books—autobiographies, reminiscences of childhood, school stories—we shall come across many a tale of a quarrel, very well told. Nor can I resist the pleasure of quoting at once, from a masterpiece of this kind, *Le Livre de Blaise* by Philippe Monnier, the account of a dispute among Genevan schoolboys.

HAPPENINGS ON THE PROMENADE.

MONNARD (*getting up angrily*). Cheat!

MARTIN. Who're you calling cheat?

MONNARD. It's you I'm calling cheat.

MARTIN. Why cheat?

MONNARD. Well, didn't I see you shove my cousin Nourisson with your elbow, on purpose to keep him back, you cheat, you!

MARTIN. It's a lie!

MONNARD. It's a lie, is it? If I stick my fist in your face, you'll tell me if it's a lie or not!

TORCAPEL (*intervening*). Leave him alone, Monnard. You can see he's only a kid.

MONNARD. Who's talking to you?

TORCAPEL. I am talking to you.

MONNARD. All right! What I've got to say to you is—Go to blazes!

TORCAPEL. What's that?

MONNARD. My dear, good sir, I said to you—Go to blazes!

TORCAPEL. I'll bang your head for you.

MONNARD. Bang away . . . I'm not afraid of you, if you want to come on. . . . Dirty coward, protecting cheats!

TORCAPEL. If you say, "Go to blazes" again, I'll bang your head for you.

MONNARD. Go to blazes!

(TORCAPEL cuffs MONNARD, and MONNARD hurls himself on TORCAPEL. They collar each other, strike out, assail each other with their fists, roll in the dust. The school-boys stop their games and form a ring. Shouts, hoots, clamour, vociferations. The bell rings.)

MONNARD (*getting up*). Till the interval, then, when we get out.

CHORUS OF SCHOOLBOYS (*chanting*). You've caught it! You've caught it! You've caught it!

TORCAPEL. Come on, Martin.

CHORUS OF SCHOOLBOYS. You've caught it! You've caught it!

A BIG BOY (*picking up the forgotten cornelian*). A bit o' luck!

AN INQUIRY.

But the psychologist has still other resources than books. The most fruitful of the methods open to him here is no doubt the inquiry or questionnaire. Thanks to the kindness of two colleagues,¹ in the autumn of 1915 I collected some 500 schoolboy compositions on the subject, "When children fight, why do they fight? Tell the story of a fight you have seen". These are the reports which are to serve as the starting-point for our study.

Psychological inquiries in class are, I know, a little discredited in certain circles. There are two sorts of prejudice against them. First, it is reckoned that their interest is not in proportion to the amount of material collected. After having gathered together hundreds and thousands of documents, each one of which represents a slice of life, one too often ends in nothing but great tables of statistics, suggestive of boredom and death. This criticism obviously has in view, not so much the

¹ MM. L. Goumaz, Director of the Nyon Schools, and J. Rochat, a teacher at La Chaux-de-Fonds, whom I am anxious to thank again here..

actual inquiries, as the reports condensing their results. Others, again, raise a more serious objection, and that to the very process of the questionnaire. They are afraid that the method distorts the facts. In their opinion, pupils treating a subject in writing always pose a little. M. de Buffon, in order to write his *Histoire naturelle*, used to put on his cuffs and his dress-coat; and it is to be feared that the child will put on a borrowed face for his schoolmaster, and, being too much preoccupied with what he is expected to say, will fail to say quite simply what he thinks and knows.

The reading of our documents quickly reassures us. It is evident the subject has inspired our small authors. They have not had to search for what they are to say nor how they are to say it. The sincerity of these schoolboy compositions is patent. The energy of their style would be witness enough for that. But there is more. Many acknowledge having been in the wrong, and, what is more remarkable, admit their defeats in all frankness.

"When I fight", writes a Joseph Prud'homme of thirteen, "it is because someone has hurt me or stolen something from me. And sometimes when I hurt someone else".

"On Saturday", writes a youngster of twelve, "I fought . . . but I couldn't stand that battle. This boy waited for me to hit me because I had thrown stones at him. He was right, for I had done nothing to him".

"I have already fought with boys. When I fight, I try to win, but I lose also. I fight with my chums too to see which is the strongest. When I fight I try to give him a couple of good smacks to take it out of him a bit, but there are times when I miss, and then it is he that gives it me" (eleven and a half years).

"I fought with a boy called Ernest Chalet. He had teased me when I was playing with my chums. I said to him, 'Come on and play the goat now', and he came. He hit me a punch, and then I told him to stop" (twelve years).

It stands to reason that the sincerity of the child is not always expressed in the avowal of defeat. More often, on the contrary, we find the evidence of it in a naïve pride.

This is from a boy of fourteen :—

" . . . when I saw all the band would jump on top of me, I set my back against the house. The big fellow, who was the bravest, wanted to play the ass, but I dealt him a blow in the teeth, and he cried. He went off home to wash. The others were stupefied, and did not dare to come on. So I made a way for myself through them, and they went into the cellars to hide. . . ."

To quote again from an author of eleven and a half :—

" As for me I am quite a little fighter. I wrestle with my brothers and put them on their backs. I never care where I plant my punches. Most often I plant them on the shoulders or in the middle of his face. I know how to kick better still than to punch. One day I had a quarrel with a boy bigger than me. . . . I gave him an awful kick on the knee. . . . He says when he sees me he is going to give me the same back. ' When he sees me'. . . . I have already seen him, but he's done nothing to me, he is too afraid of me".

FIRST GROUPING.

Now that we have recognised the value of our documents, let us begin to take toll of them.

The quarrels they tell us about are very varied. Let us try to classify them. For this, we shall have to consider them from several successive points of view.

A first grouping can be based on the number of the adversaries. There are *single combats* and there are *army battles*.

The distinction is important. The two classes mark very different stages in the development of pugnacity ; while the single combat is primitive, the set, organised, army battle is far from being so. Individual scuffles seem spontaneous, and are in several respects still of the nature of the physiological reflex. In set battles, on the contrary, we often see the influence of tradition and society. While natural history is enough to account for the former, to understand the latter we must investigate what the children may have come to know, through narratives, lessons, or their reading, of ancient and modern war and of its customs.

There are transitions from the single combat to the army battle. There are contests of several against several, which are not yet the shock of two organised groups. A combatant who succumbs calls a comrade to his help; his adversary does likewise; a third and fourth ally come up on one side or the other; the uncertain or unfortunate issue of a fight may suggest to one of the parties the ideas of its renewal or of retaliation. If this is prepared for in advance, the little troop, merely by working in concert, will adopt unawares the behaviour of a society organised for conflict, that is, of an army.

THE STAGES OF INDIVIDUAL FIGHTS.

But it is manifestly with the study of the single combat that we ought to begin. Let us therefore for the present examine the tussles which bring only two adversaries face to face.

We shall first set ourselves to watch these from the outside, without seeking, yet awhile, to penetrate either the intentions or the feelings of the combatants. We distinguish without difficulty several successive stages.

(i) First, *verbal provocation*—so well set forth in the narrative by Philippe Monnier.

(ii) Then, *first assaults*. The two adversaries are still separated. After having pitched stones at each other, they "pitch into each other", as they put it, aiming blows with a stick, kicks, and punches.

(iii) That releases *the scuffle*, the real struggle. The combatants grapple and seek to overthrow each other.

(iv) While they are striving in this way, *anger* most frequently seizes one of the adversaries. Then the nature of his effort changes; he begins once more to strike out, sometimes blindly. (He may perhaps allow himself to scratch and bite.) And his opponent does likewise.

(v) Pain forces one of the combatants to let go his hold. The other disengages, too. Thereafter occurs a *respite*, during which each takes stock of blows given

and received, and makes up his mind whether to renew or abandon the fray.

Let us pass in review these various stages, one after another.

VERBAL PROVOCATION.

Verbal provocation is extremely frequent.

Verbal teasing—the shouting of insults, the ascription of nasty motives, the calling of names—is sometimes the opportunity for the quarrel, more often the actual beginning of hostilities.

“When there is a scrap”, writes a child of eleven years and three months, “it lasts a good while. Before it starts there is a lot of chatter, and once the chatter is over the scrap begins”.

“To start with, there are arguments, and afterwards the battle starts”, writes another (eleven years, six months).

The *chatter* and the *arguments* ought to be considered as already forming part of the quarrel. Properly speaking, insults are already blows. A child who is treated, for example, as a thief and a liar, and who thereupon stretches out his arm and puts his fist in his opponent's face, is not conscious of being the aggressor.

“The last time I fought it was because a youngster of my own age told me I was a fool” (fourteen years).

Among the contents of the remarks exchanged may be distinguished :—

(a) The *threats*—by which the aggressor seeks to impose his will without combat. “Hold your tongue, or I'll box your ears”.

(b) The *ultimatum*—which aims at giving a certain solemnity to the actual opening of the combat. Sometimes this is a direct question, calling for a precise answer.

“He was going to hit someone smaller than himself. So his brother came and said to him, ‘Haven't you had enough?’ and the other one said, ‘No’, so he punched him and knocked him down. He said to him, ‘Have you had enough now?’ and he answered, ‘No’, so he kicked him in the face. . . .”

Again, the ultimatum is sometimes an invitation to repeat, with full knowledge of the consequences, an insult originally levelled *ab irato*. This is the case recounted by Philippe Monnier (p. 16).

"The other boy said to him, 'You're a thief'. 'Say it again'. 'Yes, you *are* a thief'. The other boy kicked him" (nine years, three months).

(c) Finally, what one might call the *Homeric challenge*—an exchange of words during the course of which each shows himself preoccupied in exalting his own strength and at the same time belittling his adversary's.

Here is a sketch, vigorous in its very sobriety, by a boy of nine and a half:—

"I saw two children fighting whose names I don't know. They were playing policeman and thief. Soon one child said, 'I'm not going to play any more, you cheat so'. 'Shut up, it's you that cheats, and if you want a hiding come here and you'll jolly well get it'. And the boy came, they punched each other, the recreation bell rang, and they made it up".

At the finish, as one of our small authors says, very neatly, "a bad 'word angers one of the two children and the trouble begins".

Generally, the tongues stop wagging at this point. But there are times when the battle of insults continues parallel with the other.

"Once I fought with a boy who gave me the pip. He shouted at me, 'Flabby Face, always boozed!' when he was a good distance off. One day he was going a message, and I got the chance to stop him. I said to him, 'You know, you've made me tired a long while'. I said to him, 'Put your basket down and come on'. I hit him a smack, and made his cheek all red. He gave me one back but it didn't hurt me much. He pushed me sideways and I hopped on one leg. I got waxy and I jumped at him and knocked him down. I said to him, 'My lad, if you worry me any more it'll be the worse for you'. He swore at me, but I did not listen. I said to him once more, 'Are you going to call me names again?' He answered in a trembling voice, 'No'. He was half crying, for I had given him a punch on the eye, and he'd got a black eye. I let him go, and he went off home taking his basket. Since then he's been polite to me, and has never

called me nasty names. What irritated me was when he shouted at me, 'Flabby Face, always boozed'. After the battle he was polite to me, and I was too for I had never done anything to him. Afterwards we were good pals" (ten and a half years).

Very often, after the first bout, and when the adversaries disengage, a fresh exchange of words prepares for its renewal. Thus, insults habitually coincide with a combat that has just finished, the combatants accusing each other of treachery and cowardice.

What is the meaning of these oratorical preliminaries? There is nothing to astonish us in the threats, their purpose being identical with that of the actual fighting. But the ultimatum and the challenge are mainly effective in delaying the combat; at first glance it is not easy to see what interest the adversaries can have in doing that. If we should come to discover that it is of the essence of fighting to be displayed before a gallery, these preliminaries would take on a precise significance; without the antagonists themselves being aware of it, the rite would then have the function of warning the spectators, giving them time to form a ring.

FIRST ASSAULTS.

We do not intend to describe the *first assaults* in detail. How the quarrel opens, naturally depends on circumstances. Let us state it as a general rule, however, that the adversaries approach each other only gradually; after insults come stones, then blows with a stick, and then the scuffle, starting with kicks and punches and leading up to the moment when the adversaries hurl themselves on each other, grapple, and throw each other down. The different points in this programme do not figure in every tussle, but the order remains always the same. (See, for example, the complete narrative we give later, p. 35.)

We said a moment ago that invectives were sometimes the opportunity for, and sometimes the actual beginning of, hostilities. The same may be said of the flinging of stones. The child experiences an intense pleasure in

throwing any sort of projectile. "All studies of children that have given attention to this subject", writes President Stanley Hall, "show that many boys pass through a stage in which throwing is a passion which even their respect for property and person is unable to control, and they must throw at anything and anyone in sight".¹ The temptation is invincible. We have here an extraordinarily powerful instinct.²

The projectile is, *par excellence*, the weapon of the chase, of the offensive contest. Nor need we be astonished if living marks are naturally preferred by the child to inanimate targets. Apart from every hostile motive, from every thought of hate or vengeance, the child feels an instinctive pleasure in bombarding a comrade or an animal. He flings stones for fun, without bothering about the consequences.³

Our small authors themselves take note of the large number of occasions when a stone flung without hostility is the signal for a scuffle. The child who is struck or threatened takes it for an act of aggression, whereas to the other child it is nothing but play.

It is by the flinging of stones, which so often forms part of the quarrels, that these are linked up with the hunting instinct.

The stick has the same attraction for the child as the stone. "An infant under a year", says Hall elsewhere, "is prone to strike with almost anything in its hand that can be used for that purpose, but towards and after puberty the passion becomes so strong that Acher thinks that when it culminates boys are almost powerless to resist the impulse to strike animals, mates, weeds, flowers, posts, pictures, to pound objects. . . . Gulick lists many games, such as baseball, tennis, hockey,

¹ "Recreation and Reversion", in *Pedagogical Seminary*, xxii. 1915, p. 513.

² The variety of "throwing games" would be enough to prove this. Cf. Karl Groos, *The Play of Man*, English translation, pp. 103 ff.

³ Jacquiard, a precocious assassin, inaugurated his misdeeds by drawing a revolver on the passers-by, almost without thinking any harm of it, apparently. *Vide* Rouma, *Pédagogie sociologique*, p. 185.

cricket, etc., in which the chief charm consists in hitting or striking".¹

Thus, it often happens that it is a blow with a stick or a switch which starts off a fight.

But this stage of the combat, like the preceding one, is short. Soon the only weapons the adversaries use are the natural ones. The attack is very often a punch and the counter-attack a kick. These two actions are of quite a different order from the foregoing. They do not belong to the chase. They are primitively defensive, and tend to keep off an opponent and put him to flight.

THE SCUFFLE.

The aims of the scuffle, in which the adversaries quickly engage, are different again. It is a question now of downing the adversary and immobilising him, so as to be able to deliver the decisive blows which will knock him out. For this purpose, as every boy knows, it is necessary to begin by throwing his enemy down on the ground. In the scuffles of our schoolboys this is most often achieved by a sudden push or a trip. Thereafter the winner installs himself on top of the other, before he has time to get up; the weight of the body being enough to keep the latter on the ground and render him almost motionless, the former's hands are free to deliver what blows he chooses.

THE FIGHTER ENRAGED.

The beast of prey obtains the same result by other means, pinning his adversary down by implanting his claws and his fangs in the flesh. Biting and scratching appear from time to time in the narratives of our schoolboys, when anger has broken out under the spur of imminent defeat or pain. These actions are not considered "good form" in war. That is because they have a new significance in the young *human* who has recourse to them deliberately. They seem to be dictated

¹ "A Synthetic Genetic Study of Fear", in *Amer. Journ. Psychology*, xxv, 1914, p. 340.

simply by cruelty or by the thirst for vengeance; the one who has suffered aspires to make others suffer, too. But they are no doubt equally well explained by a defensive preoccupation of mind. They constitute the instinctive jiu-jitsu of the weak. The enemy must be induced to let go.

THE RESPITE.

So, after a first bout, the combatants are face to face once more in the same situation as at the beginning. After this *respite* they resume their mutual insults, or set to again without delay, belabouring each other, or grappling hand to hand. In this way they may condense one or two of the stages we have distinguished in our account.

THE FIGHT AS A WHOLE.

Let us now consider as a whole this series of incidents that constitutes a schoolboy quarrel. One thing strikes us. The various forms of combat, to which the adversaries have recourse in succession, follow on in exactly the inverse order to that in which they appear in the individual. The earliest weapons of the child, or, it would be better to say, the earliest of which he makes use, are his nails and his teeth. To defend himself, he scratches and bites. Then, before knowing how to make play with his fists, he kicks.¹ In this period, when he does take his fists to his adversary, it is to seize him by the hair. Later on comes the stick, which extends the action of the arm, and later still, the stone. Now, if one starts with invective—about which Senet says nothing—or with stone-throwing, it is to be observed that each succeeding phase in our schoolboy quarrel represents a regression in relation to the one that precedes it. From squabbling, it goes on to stones and

¹ Cf. Senet, "Periodo belicoso en la evolucion psicologica individual", *Archivos de Psiquiatria*, iv. 1905. We shall return to this important study later on (Chapter XI). *Vide* also an example, p. 18.

blows with a stick, then to fisticuffs, then to kicks,¹ and finally to the scuffle and biting. From beginning to end, all this is a retreat along the road the development of the individual child has had to follow. It is a reversal of ontogenesis.

The boy of from ten to twelve years of age is himself aware of this regression, as soon as anyone descends below the scuffle. Scratching and biting are, for him, fighting *like babies or girls*. His own particular way of fighting is characterised by his knowledge how to use his fists and how to fling stones. Babies and girls do not know how to do either.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIGHT

On the conclusions and the results of the fight we have but little to say.

It comes to an end when one of the adversaries shuns the renewal of hostilities, by a retreat which is often a flight; or again—as is very often the case with our schoolboys—when some external intervention occurs, the intervention of parents, teachers, or the police.

From the point of view of their *effects*, the quarrels of children differ widely. Yet it is evident that our authors spread themselves complacently on the resulting wounds. Bleeding noses—"bleeding teeth", as they put it—broken teeth—black eyes—broken legs—clothes dirtied—overalls in holes—caps lost and torn—we have here all the elements of certain famous pages of Rabelais.

Let us note also that, according to the children's account, these quarrels are punished with extreme severity. Teachers and parents by no means make light of them. To be made a prisoner for Sunday afternoon, or kept in for a whole day, is what happens at school. Chastisement still more striking and poignant is reserved for paternal authority!

¹ [By convention, mostly due to the traditions of boxing, kicks are hardly less "bad form" among English schoolboys than biting and scratching. But the very difficulty found in enforcing this convention goes to show how artificial, or at least *nurtural*, it is.—TRANS.]

CHAPTER II

THE CAUSES OF QUARRELS

So much for a view of the facts. Let us attempt now to discover the cause of them. Why does the child fight?

This time we are to enter into the minds of our school-boys, seeking to classify the tussles they indulge in, according to the motives that stir them to action. This is more difficult than it appears at first.

No doubt the current distinction between offensive and defensive battles might be transferred over into this sphere, and the cases in which a child delivers the first blows separated from those in which he receives them. But little profit would accrue from this classification. The distinction is very difficult to draw in concrete cases.

It is striking, indeed, to notice how often our school-boys themselves ascribe the origin of a tussle to a stone clumsily thrown, a blow unintentionally given, or a gesture misinterpreted. The victim reacts with a movement intended to be defensive; and this in turn provokes on the other's part a counter-reaction equally intended to be defensive. The result is that the two adversaries are at grips without either having thought at any moment that he was attacking. The paradoxical case of a struggle which is offensive on neither side is not rare in this form.

It is still less rare, if we consider the quarrel, such as is described in the preceding chapter, as a whole. From the psychological point of view, the first phase of the contest, verbal provocation, can no more be detached from the succeeding phases, than can the second or the third. They are all integral parts of the same

whole. Invective almost always precedes punching. Now, if it is sometimes difficult to decide the intention behind a movement of the foot or arm, it is still more so to estimate with certainty what is behind a word or a gesture. Here especially misunderstandings are frequent.

It even seems as though nature took an interest in making children fight, at so many pains does she appear to be to multiply opportunities for misunderstanding. The little boy, spontaneously and without premeditation, performs acts of which he does not himself see the bearing. He "calls names", flings stones, brandishes his stick, without thinking any harm, without even thinking at all, and merely "for fun". And he is sometimes greatly surprised at the counter-strokes his behaviour provokes.

We accordingly give up the classification of children's contests into offensive and defensive.

Like the schoolboy himself, we might distinguish the occasions when he fights "in earnest" from those when he does not. "We sometimes pick a quarrel, and sometimes fight in fun" (nine years, three months). The distinction is not so easy, however, as one might think. The character of the fight at the beginning is not necessarily the same for both adversaries; one may go at it in earnest, while the other is fighting in fun. Nor does it always present the same aspect throughout all its phases; after a particularly painful blow it sometimes abruptly assumes a seriousness it did not have at all at first. From the battle "to the death", bringing exasperated adversaries to close quarters—this case is very rare—there are many transitions to the wholly friendly contest between two schoolboys who decide to "try their strength". Nature often deceives our fighters. They think themselves only playing, and, in vying with each other, pursue ends more remote; or they persuade themselves they have a grievance against each other, a grievance they have stirred up merely to furnish them with the opportunity for surrender to their pugnacious mood.

Moreover, when they struggle for fun, the temperaments of children differ. While play is "only play" to some, others give themselves up to it completely, and, helped out by their vanity, set about it in very earnest, whole-heartedly.

THREE GROUPS OF FIGHT.

We shall nevertheless retain the dominant idea of this childish classification by grouping fights according to the ends the adversaries are conscious of pursuing. At the same time we shall offer more precise definitions of "quarrels in earnest" and "quarrels in fun".

In the first group—let us call it *contests of hostility*—are to be found contests dominated by the adversary's thought of *striking*. He fights to hurt his enemy.

In the second—*play contests*—the fight is for the sake of the fight. Should one say that here the thought of the contest itself predominates in the minds of the combatants? Strictly, yes. In any case, there is no other thought. Yet what is specially striking now is how unconscious the springs of action are in the combatants. They fight "for nothing".

Besides these two classes, it appears we shall have to find room for *contests for possession*. The fight now is for some object. It is the thought of this object which is in the foreground.

Let us take each of these classes separately, leaving till later the study of their mutual relations.

CONTESTS OF HOSTILITY.

The idea of battle evokes at once the idea of hostility. Why do children fight? One is tempted to reply, Because they do not like each other.

The reply is good, but only partly good. There are certainly occasions when the contest breaks out because at least one of the two antagonists wishes the other ill.

"When people are angry with each other, it seems it is necessary to fight and give each other a good drubbing" (ten years, four months).

Yet such occasions are rare, even on the evidence of the children. As we have already said, the more or less conscious and deliberate wish to do the adversary harm springs up often enough in the course of the fighting under the influence of pain; but it is unusual at the outset of an encounter. And when it is to be found at that stage it is noticeably not primitive; rather is it a craving for retaliation, or for vengeance, presupposing an earlier collision of which it is the effect.

We have to lay it down as a general rule that feelings of hostility are by no means the cause of quarrels. They are their effect. The quarrel does not arise from hatred, but gives rise to it.

The immense majority of the contests which we should be tempted at first to consider as contests of hostility belong in fact to one of the other two groups we have distinguished. It is not the adversary's thought of *striking* which dominates them.

Take scuffles engendered by teasing. To these we shall devote a special study later on, the results of which will show that the teaser nurses no hostile feeling towards his victim. It is not the idea of his enemy, or of the harm to be done him, which is in the foreground of his thought. He is thinking merely of his actual joke. But, it will be asked, what of the teased? In the battle he wages in his own defence, does not he at any rate feel hatred for his persecutor? This may very well come about if the teasing is repeated, as in the case to which we alluded a moment ago in speaking of revenge. But, at the beginning, the teased enters the contest caring for nothing but the contest itself, and just to show that he is not so weak as the teaser thinks him.

Among the most frequent causes of schoolboy quarrels, however, there is one form of hostility of which one cannot say—as one can of the wish for revenge—that it is the effect of previous conflicts. This is envy. The children themselves remark upon it often.

“Children fight because they are jealous. They pick quarrels about nothing and from envy” (ten years, eleven months).

Yet, obviously, these quarrels are intimately related to contests for possession, in which the dominant thought is less that of the adversary himself than of the goods coveted. And so we may hold to our assertion that contests of hostility as a whole are not primitive but derivative.

The most interesting contests for moral psychology are those in which the hurt it is desired the adversary should suffer has, to the child's way of thinking, the import of an expiation. Revenge takes on the aspect of retribution. If the avenger is disinterested and generous, the fight, in which he engages of set purpose, has the character of a punitive expedition. He is by way of chastising a guilty person. Naturally, there are many nuances in all this. The child does not always express his feelings in very clear fashion, and what he expresses is not necessarily what makes him act. We shall see this clearly in the sequel of our study. Meanwhile, let us quote some examples of these contests generously inspired. Here is one from a child of eleven :—

"As for me, I am not a fighter. When I fight it is because the other boys are saying things about Italy and the Italians. Also when I am protecting my small brother. Before Italy declared war on Austria I fought because my chums said the Italians were robbers and wanted to be in with the Germans, etc. Then I got angry and jumped on one of them who had more to say than the others and gave him a good licking he will always remember. That boy was stronger than me, but this time I won, because pride in my own country gave me strength. That kid doesn't say things about Italy and the Italians any more now. He respects them".

Another boy, of twelve years, three months, begins in these terms :—

"Once there were two boys who fought about cowage. And one of these boys had thrown some at a little girl, and one of these boys said, 'No, don't throw it', and he threw it all the same, and that's the way it began".

Cases are frequent, especially towards the age of thirteen, in which boys undertake the protection of their

brothers and friends with conviction, and in which they hasten to the help of younger children.

Alongside of these generous and moral contests we have to put quarrels, which are very numerous at ten or eleven years of age especially, and which originate in the course of games through one child's seeking to evade the rules and to cheat.

"Last night there was a game of hide-and-seek. A boy called Fernand wouldn't be 'it', and there was a fight about that. He cried and shouted for his mother. She told him he would have to be 'it', so we got on with the game. And afterwards another one wouldn't come and look for us, and we fought with stones and his legs bled, and the other one's forehead" (eleven years, three months).

The rules of the games children play are, for them at any rate, rules which are socially established; and they resemble in more than one respect those which the child will come across in life later on. The spirit of anarchistic independence, the qualities of initiative in the leader, and the tendency towards docile submission, are manifested already in the school playground. Fights with unfair players are an anticipation of political struggles for the maintenance of good order.

There comes a time when social feeling is strong enough for good order to be accepted naturally. Such quarrels then disappear.

At the same time, it is to be feared that the order schoolboys like to see reigning in a class is not always the same as that which the master strives to establish. Sometimes it does no more than assure to each boy the right to be lazy. Yet the conventions established with this aim—like other conventions—imply sanctions which will take shape in a battle if excess of independence urges anyone to show initiative in such a way that the group as a whole counts on suffering by it.

Masters rarely suspect this state of affairs. The following narrative by a schoolboy of thirteen will interest them:—

"As it often happens at X College that half of Class IV have not done their home-work, and the others have taken a little

more trouble and have got to the point of understanding some of the difficulties in it, so to speak, then the lazy pupils crowd round the others, saying, 'If you show your work to the . . . (I shall not set down the nickname of one of the teachers, out of respect for those who will read this composition!) . . . we'll put you through it'. Naturally no one dare go against the orders of the idlers for fear of getting hit. What brought on this squabble was just a case of this kind".

CONTESTS FOR POSSESSION.

These are extremely frequent. Sometimes the object in dispute belongs to neither of the adversaries but is coveted by both. I shall quote *in extenso* the account of a tussle which took place in open class and the origin of which the master has no doubt never guessed.

"I fought with Charles Bourquin one morning going into school. It was last week. I was going to look for the key of the class-room and Bourquin was following me, for he wanted it too. All the same I got it but this fellow Bourquin had already got behind the door in front of me, it was to get in ahead of me and go and tear off the calendar slip. I said to him, 'Get out of the road and let me open the door', and he said he wouldn't, and then I shoved him so as to be able to get the door open. When the door was opened I went in, but he tripped me and I fell and my chums walked over me. In a minute I got up and punched Bourquin and sent him spinning to the other end of the room. He did not say anything more after that. We both sat down at the same time at our desks. I wasn't watching and he hit me a punch on the neck, and which hurt me a great deal. In a minute I caught him a good punch behind the jaw. I hit so hard it scratched him. The master came up and asked, 'Who began it?' and I answered, 'Both of us'. The master gave Bourquin a bad mark because he hit me a punch on the nose and which hurt a great deal. In two hours we had made it up" (twelve years, four months).

It is obvious that the possession need not be a material thing. Anything that is of value to a child, and can be secured by force, may furnish grounds for a contest of this kind. Children will fight for a good position on the pavement when a procession is about to pass, or when the machinery of a printing-shop is in motion and they wish to see it better.

Often, again, it is a question of some object they both claim as belonging to them. Each then considers the other as the aggressor. Games of marbles, more than anything else, release this type of quarrel. So also, naturally, do fights over an object that has been lost and that the owner reclaims from the finder, as well as fights over objects lent, or disposed of without the consent of the owner, who is anxious to recover them.

Finally, occasions are not uncommon on which a schoolboy undertakes, knowingly and voluntarily, to appropriate other people's goods by force. "I fight to get marbles", declares a little man of prey, nine years old.

PLAY CONTESTS.

It will be recollected that we have given this name to all those contests in which the child, more or less consciously, seeks nothing more from the fight than the pleasure of fighting.

And the fight certainly brings the child great satisfaction. By flinging stones, handling a stick, vigorously moving his arms and legs, and stretching all the muscles of his body in a close bout of wrestling, he experiences, as we have said, an elementary and immediate pleasure which is enough to explain a great number of attacks that are accompanied by no feeling either of hostility or of covetousness.

But to this delight in action, which crowns every natural unfolding of physical powers, there is soon added a mental element—joy in self-assertion, pride in the feeling and knowledge of strength. Henceforward the child will feel the desire to affirm his strength, to test the whole range of it, and to measure it against that of others. He will fight with his companions "to see which is the stronger".

Yet in so doing he quickly comes to perceive that this display of strength wins for him an enviable prestige. Hence a third motive inciting him to do battle, even without a specific object in view. He sets about fighting to show off his strength and to get himself admired.

"I fought to protect myself", we read in one of our accounts, "but as for him, he fought to make people think he was stronger than me, and that I was quite a little shaver in comparison between him and me".

In short, quarrels answer admirably to the need certain children feel of attracting notice at all costs to their own small persons. Provided they are watched, the actual issue of the quarrel matters very little to them.

We shall transcribe *in extenso* an account by a small boy of ten years and four months, in which, among other things, this wish to be in the lime-light is evident.

"I fought with a boy from our house. We fight every month to please several youngsters. Ernest lashed out at me with a good punch, but I gave him back one still harder. It all began with punches and kicks and then at last he and I tumbled flat and the youngsters clapped and shouted, 'Hurray!' and laughed a lot, and told us to go on again. But we said to them, 'Show us how strong you are', and the two smallest youngsters went for each other at once. For a start the youngest jerked the other one's leg away and he fell down. So he took the chance and sat on him and slapped him and pulled his hair and nipped his ears. But at last they got very angry and scratched and bit, so we had to separate them. It was rather an awful fight".

THE INTERRELATIONS OF THE THREE GROUPS OF CONTEST.

The existence of play contests—fights into which the child enters solely for the satisfaction of fighting—is a fact of great import, for the special pleasure that is the *raison d'être* and the characteristic of such contests is certainly also the explanation of the two other categories of quarrel.

Take contests of hostility. What at first sight unduly enlarge the number of such contests are the quarrels brought about by teasing. Now in studying teasing we shall see that the hostility shown therein can be traced back to another tendency, which is still deeper, and which is the very one originating play contests. To say, "Children fight because they tease each other", is

to express only half a truth, which finds its complement in the same proposition turned the other way round, "Children tease each other in order to come to grips". "A 'tease'", says one of our schoolboys, "is a person who wants a fight". His saying is exact and profound. Children who tease—and almost all do—enjoy quarrels. Quarrels are play to them.

The same remark must be made about contests for possession. How slight is sometimes the value of the objects children fight about! How can a leaf from a calendar awaken so inflamed a covetousness in the heart? We are astonished that they will risk wounds and punishment for such a trifle. On the other hand, everything is explained, immediately we understand that the object in dispute is very often not the final cause of the contest, but merely a pretext to tease one's neighbour; and consequently that, here again, the end which is more or less consciously pursued is the fight itself. It is pursued for the pleasure the child takes in it.

Thus we would reduce our schoolboy contests to two fundamental classes. We have, on the one hand, true contests for possession, engendered by acquisitiveness, that is, the tendency in man to appropriate something of value to him, so as to be able to dispose of it at his pleasure. On the other hand, we have play contests, including those which are derived from teasing and which at first appeared to us to be contests of hostility.

During the course of both these classes of contest, new feelings spring up, namely, a hostile interest in the adversary, the wish to make him suffer, and enjoyment in his suffering. These feelings may become, later on, the starting-point for fresh contests, contests of hostility.

In the chapters which follow, we shall first devote particular attention to play contests—those in which the child fights for the pleasure of fighting. This will bring us to the study, first of teasing, and then of cruelty.

Contests for possession, and the tendencies and feel-

ings related thereto—acquisitiveness, envy, and so on—did not seem to us to require special study in this context. It will be seen, nevertheless, that we have never lost sight of their existence, nor of their primordial importance.

CHAPTER III

PLAY CONTESTS AND INSTINCT

FROM the evidence classified in our first two chapters it would be an exaggeration to conclude that schoolboys, when they fight, always fight *for fun*. There are times, as we have seen, when they join battle to obtain possession of some object or to do hurt to some person. It remains none the less true that children who fight take pleasure in doing so, and, further, that the thing coveted, or the bad turn to be done to someone, very often appears desirable to the child because of the opportunity he sees in it for conflict.

Of course, it is not every schoolboy who fights. The oldest pupils of elementary schools sometimes propound pacifist aphorisms; in their compositions there is often to be found personal reproof of fighters. But this attitude is very unusual before the age of thirteen or fourteen. And, further, the very reasons put forward by the non-fighters to explain their abstention corroborate our first observation—that children take pleasure in fighting. For these reasons are all external. Either the boys invoke the prohibitions their parents have laid on them, and the punishments they would incur; or else they advance the unpleasant consequences of certain quarrels, being preoccupied with the idea of having to pay the doctor, should they happen to break their opponent's leg or tooth! Considerations of this kind almost amount to an acknowledgment that, were they left to themselves, they, too, would take pleasure in fighting.

PLAY AND INSTINCT.

Nothing, then, prevents us from formulating the main result of our early chapters, thus: "The great majority

of children of 9-12 years of age pick a quarrel for the pleasure it brings them; in other words, fighting is *play* to them".

This is no new discovery. By following an inverse route, that is to say, by taking the thousand and one forms of child's play for his starting-point, Karl Groos, in those admirable books of his from which we shall have to make numerous borrowings, has thrown into clear light the existence and extreme variety of fighting play.

Play fights and *fighting play*—we pass from one to the other by imperceptible transitions. To show this, let us quote the lines in which Groos has marked what, in his view, distinguishes fighting play from serious fighting. He is admirably lucid.

"We have to do with play, not when someone fights because he has had a quarrel, but, on the contrary, when someone picks a quarrel because he wants to fight, because he has a liking for the fight itself".¹

"So it is with the *Bestimmungsmensuren* of German students; so also when, in the middle of the night, some young *Fuchs* stops the first passing student to make him admire the beauties of a house-front, all the shutters of which are fast shut, and holds him in hand until the latter demands his card. This is play, however serious may be the wounds with which the affair will end".²

Though not new, our observation—that children's battles are essentially play—has great significance. To speak of *play* is to speak of *instinct*.

The bringing of these two notions together has been one of the most fruitful discoveries in child psychology. It dates from 1896, and is due, strictly speaking, to Groos. But no one has done more to make it known, and to show all its applications, than my scholarly friend Ed. Claparède.³

No doubt play had been already studied before Groos.

¹ Groos, *Spiele der Menschen*, p. 229. [This passage is differently translated by Miss Baldwin, p. 183.—TRANS.]

² *Ibid.* [The passage is omitted from Miss Baldwin's English translation.—TRANS.]

³ I seize this opportunity to thank him for the valuable assistance he has given me in the composition of this book.

With Schiller,¹ followed by Herbert Spencer² and Grant Allen,³ the idea of play had evoked those of surplus energy and superabundance of strength. Steinthal⁴ and Lazarus⁵ had associated the concept with that of lowered tension and recreation. But both these doctrines made the mistake of considering play from an adult point of view. For Groos, on the contrary, true play is the play of the young animal and the child.

"The play of youth depends on the fact that certain instincts, especially useful in preserving the species, appear before the animal seriously needs them".⁶

"All youthful play is founded on instinct. These instincts are not so perfectly developed, not so stamped in all their details on the brain, as they would have to be if their first expressions were to be in serious acts. Therefore they appear in youth, and must be perfected by constant practice".⁷

"The animals do not play because they are young, but they have their youth because they must play".⁸

We shall therefore look for the explanation of children's quarrels in the existence of a *fighting instinct*. Do these words take us any further on? Is this not just *soporific virtue*, invoked by those whom Auguste Comte called "metaphysicians", to account for the effects of opium? Is speaking of instinct not just taking refuge in utter mystery? "When we speak of instinct", wrote Ribot in 1873, "the first difficulty is to understand what we mean". Have matters changed since? Perhaps. While we are far from coming to an understanding about how the thing is to be explained, it seems to me we can agree well enough to-day what the word means.

¹ "The animal works when some want is the motive for his activity, and plays when a superabundance of energy forms this motive—when overflowing life itself urges him to action". Schiller, 27th Letter on *The Æsthetic Education of Mankind*, quoted by Groos, *The Play of Animals*, p. 2.

² *Principles of Psychology*, II. Pt. VIII. ch. 9.

³ *Physiological Æsthetics*, especially ch. 3.

⁴ *Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie*, Vorträge und Abhandlungen, new series, Berlin, 1895.

⁵ *Ueber die Reize des Spiels*, Berlin, 1883.

⁶ Groos, *The Play of Animals*, author's preface, p. xx.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

INSTINCT.

The following are some definitions of instinct.

First, from the great constructors of syntheses¹ :—

Ed. von Hartmann: "Instinct is the conscious willing of the means towards an end unconsciously willed".²

Herbert Spencer: "Instinct may be described as—compound reflex action. I say described rather than defined, since no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between it and simple reflex action. . . ." ³

Then, from the psychologists :—

Wundt: "We are accustomed to call *instinctive acts* such acts of will as proceed from a single impulse ruling consciousness without any admixture of intellectual motives".⁴

William James: "Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance".⁵

Claparède: "All the biologists are agreed, I think, in defining as an instinctive act an act that is *adapted*, and that is accomplished, without having been learned, in a uniform way by all the individuals of the same species, and without knowledge of the end to which it tends, or of the relation there is between this end and the means taken to reach it".⁶

William McDougall: "Among professed psychologists there is now fair agreement as to the usage of the terms 'instinct' and 'instinctive'. By the great majority they are used to denote certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of species to their environment, and that can be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of which they are innate elements nor acquired by individuals in the course of their lifetime".⁷

Lloyd Morgan: "Instinctive behaviour is that which is, on its first occurrence, independent of prior experience; which tends

¹ I have not found any actual definition in the excellent chapters devoted to instinct in M. Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. Is that because definition is an operation of intelligence, and intelligence cannot grasp that which is essentially foreign to it?

² Quoted by Groos, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³ *Principles of Psychology*, I. Pt. IV. ch. 5.

⁴ *Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie*, 6 Aufl., 1911, III, p. 226.

⁵ *Principles of Psychology*, II. ch. 24.

⁶ "Théorie biologique du sommeil", *Archives de psychologie*, IV, p. 279.

⁷ *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, fifteenth edition, pp. 22-3.

to the well-being of the individual and the preservation of the race; which is similarly performed by all the members of the same more or less restricted group of animals; and which may be subject to subsequent modification under the guidance of experience. Such behaviour is, I conceive, a more or less complex organic or biological response to a more or less complex group of stimuli of external and internal origin, and it is, as such, wholly dependent on how the organism, and especially the nervous system and brain centres, have been built through heredity under that mode of racial preparation which we call biological evolution".¹

Comparing these definitions one with another, we easily observe that they all contain a number of common elements, which we may detail thus:—

1. The term *instinct* denotes ways of acting, acts, activities.

2. The acts it denotes are complex, and can be broken up into a series of movements. We are concerned with something more than a cough or a wink, which are simple reflexes.²

3. These acts have a utility, an end, for the individual or for the species.

4. These acts have not been taught to the individual by the experience he has been able to go through in the course of his own life. The impulse which leads him to accomplish them is to some degree innate.

5. The question of deciding whether these acts are conscious or not, and, if conscious, to what degree, is left open by the fact of our qualifying them as instincts. In speaking of instinct we cross over from the province of psychology into that of biology.

This last observation is particularly big with consequences. It compels us to make abstraction from what

¹ [*Instinct and Experience*, p. 5. This is perhaps the most famous recent definition in English, though it has been urged against it that it confuses the standpoints of biology and psychology. Cf. also the scholarly work, *Instinct in Man*, by James Drever, and, as representative of a very different school of thought, *The Original Nature of Man*, by E. L. Thorndike.—TRANS.]

² They are also more *inclusive* than reflexes. They take possession of the *whole* individual at the moment when he gives himself up to them. Vide Claparède, "Théorie biologique du sommeil", in *Archives de Psychologie*, iv. 280.

the individuals themselves think about the motives that have flung them into battle. Children's contests are not to be accounted for by the advantage one child or the other may hope to gain from them. The moment we recognise the presence of an instinct in their acts, we have to look in the contest for a meaning, a finality, that goes beyond the individual. This complicates our task. In return, we shall benefit by the results already obtained in other spheres, and, being now concerned with the race and its ends, we shall find valuable indications in the study of animal species, and specially in the study of fighting play among animals.

ANIMAL FIGHTING PLAY.

We come across fighting play in a very large number of animal species, notably among birds—sparrows, wrens, wagtails, partridges, cockatoos, toucans—and the mammals—ornithorhynchi, otters, racoons, bears, weasels, cats, lion cubs, hyenas, wolf cubs, dogs, chamois, wild goats, kids, the bovidæ, solipeds, baboons, and apes in general.

In reading the descriptions which naturalists give of such contests, and which Groos has arranged in groups, we are struck from the first with the close resemblance between them and those presented by the human race.

First of all, we meet with fighting play in the young animal especially. It often persists in the adult, it is true, but in the young it is almost universal. Similarly, it is boys whom we see fighting every day in the street, and it is but rarely we are present at a scuffle between adults.

Then again, the behaviour in an animal fight often resembles that in children's quarrels at all points. We were enlivened to find our schoolboys so loud-mouthed. This is how a naturalist describes a bird fight :—

“ When no marauder disturbs them they find means to torment one another, chasing and fighting with loud cries. They have a peculiar game of climbing, during which they sometimes get into the most ridiculous situations and scream constantly. . . . The

amusing feature in it lies in the contrast between the extravagantly threatening aspect of the aggrieved bird and his trifling efforts at defence. The wide-open beak, the constantly varying cries, 'Kroau! Krau! Krau!' etc., the flaming eyes, red and flashing with rage, the wings raised so threateningly, the head alternately drawn back and protruded, the extraordinary contortions of the whole body, the erection of the head and neck feathers—all this leads one to expect a life and death struggle, and behold! they scarcely do more than touch each other with the tips of their wings, very rarely with the beak. They rage and storm like Homeric gods, but with no result".¹

And in reading what Brehm has to say of fights among baboons and ibises, we might think ourselves transported to a school playground on the day new boys arrive.

"These baboons, like all of their kind, were most jovial fellows, and took the greatest delight in teasing and tormenting the apes, which crouched close together, clinging to one another. The baboons flew at them, tore them apart, poked them in the ribs, pulled their tails, and tried in every way to break up their devoted friendship. They climbed over them, tugged at their hair, forced themselves between the inoffensive pair, until the frightened creatures sought refuge in another corner, only to be followed by their tormentors and maltreated afresh".²

And of the ibis: "Those that I have known lived in comparative peace with all the birds that share their quarters, but assumed a certain authority over the weaker ones and seemed to take pleasure in teasing them. The flamingoes especially they could not let alone, and took the strangest way to torment them. As they were sleeping with head buried in their feathers, the ibis softly stole up and pecked at their web feet, with no intention of hurting them, but from pure mischief. When a flamingo felt this annoying tickling he moved off, gave a startled glance at the ibis, and tried to get another nap, but his tormentor was soon after him and at the old game".³

Like schoolboy quarrels, fights between bear cubs sometimes degenerate. And so the father, who keeps near by, comes up growling to egg the adversaries on to further efforts.⁴

¹ Baldamus describing the night heron, as quoted by Groos, *The Play of Animals*, p. 150.

² Brehm, as quoted by Groos, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁴ Cf. Groos, *op. cit.*, p. 144; cf. also: "Many of the games of young animals are preparations for fighting. . . . When young carni-

What is the significance of this fighting play? That of all play. Play is always training the young animal beforehand for a form of activity which the necessities of his life will demand from him later on. Play is rehearsal, without immediate utility, which exercises the young animal for tasks he will have to fulfil as an adult. Life will impose conflicts upon him. He has therefore to practise fighting in his youth.¹

But we may go a step further. For what contests does nature wish to rehearse the animal? Let us avoid a possible misunderstanding at this point. Fighting play in the animal is clearly distinct from hunting play. The aim of the latter is to rehearse the young animal for the securing of his food. This is not the aim of fighting play. "Peaceful animals, which oppose their adversaries only in case of need . . . give themselves up to fighting in their youth, just like beasts of prey". Species which nature has provided with no weapons—the horse, the ass, the zebra, and the inoffensive ruminant—are as ardent fighters in their youth as the others. Fighting play, therefore, prepares the young animal, not to attack feebler species which are to serve as his food, nor to resist stronger which covet him as prey, but, above all, to measure himself against other individuals of his own species.

FIGHTING AND SEX.

When will the young animal have the opportunity to take his own measure in this way? The two great and fundamental instincts of the animal, nutrition and repro-

vores are playing too roughly with their mother, she teaches them a lesson by cuffing them, but I have never seen her interfering to stop a quarrel in her family. . . ."—P. Chalmers Mitchell, *The Childhood of Animals*, p. 249.

¹ [The whole of the *biological* aspect of the Groos theory of play may be summed up in the sentence, "Play is rehearsal". It is well to remember, however—which is not always done by critics of Groos—that he insists on the *psychological* aspect as well. The psychological criterion of play, he says, is that it is activity performed for its own sake. "I cannot recognise any activity as playful in the most complete sense which does not exhibit the psychological criterion as well". Groos, *The Play of Man*, p. 383.—TRANS.]

duction, may both give rise to contests for possession—contests for food and contests for the female. In order to live and to perpetuate his kind, the individual must be ready to dispute both of these with his congeners. It is to struggle for a female, rather than for food, that the young are being unconsciously rehearsed, when they provoke and seek to *down* each other.

As early even as 1891, several years before one began to hear of the theories of Freud—who gives the sexual instinct a preponderant place in originating the great human activities—Schäffer wrote:—

“Fighting and the impulse to kill are so universally attributes of the male animal that we cannot doubt the connection between this side of the masculine nature and the sexual”.¹

This link between the fighting and the sexual instincts may be understood in two ways. The first way is suggested by certain facts of animal life, by various customs among primitive peoples—marriage by capture, for instance—and by metaphors in ancient and modern languages; in erotic contests, the female to be conquered is herself the opponent of the male. Schäffer, again, speaks of “the fundamental sexual impulse to close and complete contact with a companion, with a secondary, more or less clearly defined, thought of conquest”.²

“Courting may be looked upon as a refined and delicate form of combat. . . . Courting and combat shade into one another, courting tending to take the place of the more basal form of combat”.³

Havelock Ellis is continually stressing the fact that the union of the sexes can take place only through and after struggle; and the everyday speech of all ages has compared the embraces of love to the phases of a fight.

¹ *Zeitschrift f. Psych. u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane*, vol. ii. 1891, p. 128, as quoted by Groos, *The Play of Animals*, pp. 135 f.

² Schäffer, as quoted by Havelock Ellis, *The Sexual Impulse, etc.*, second revised edition, p. 70 n.

³ Colin A. Scott, “Sex and Art”, in *Amer. Journ. Psychol.*, vii. 215, as quoted by Ellis, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 and 171.

On this showing, then, fighting play is, in principle, copulation play.

In spite of the arguments it advances, this conception has only a secondary importance in the eyes of Groos. "My idea", he says, "is that teasing and fighting are closely connected with the sexual life from the fact that they furnish practice for the contest of courtship",¹ in which, under the eyes of a female, two males have the chance to compete for her favours. "Among many animals that play in this way, the female yields to the victor without resistance".² Thus, for Groos, the female is not so much the partner, as the stake, in the struggles we are considering.³

Both hypotheses equally well explain why fighting play is so especially the prerogative of the male sex. According to the first, it is to be recognised that nature does not exercise the female for the contests she will have to undergo, because it is important for the continuance of the race that she should be regularly overcome by the male. According to the second, the female, being at once the judge of the field and the reward of the conqueror, does not have to train herself to enter the lists; it is enough that nature has implanted in her the inclination to act as spectatress of the fights joined on her account, and the faculty of estimating the prowess of her suitors.

I borrow from a newspaper a description the like of which might be found in many narratives by ethnographers.⁴ The Sudan *mobadonah* in question, ritualised and preserved through many a stage in society, might be taken as the contest-type of the primitive human race.

"One of the barbarous customs still vigorous in the Sudan is the tourney in which two lovers have to engage when they dispute

¹ *The Play of Animals*, p. 136.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ [It is only fair to Havelock Ellis to add that he does full justice to this hypothesis, and in *The Sexual Impulse, Love and Pain, etc.*, takes up practically the same position as Groos.—TRANS.]

⁴ *Vide*, in Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, ch. viii, the part played by fights in courtship.

the favours of the same young girl, a tourney known by the name of *mobadonah*. The two rivals hurl mutual defiance at each other, and then, in the presence of the object in dispute, of her relatives, and of invited guests, set about bestowing blows on each other with a *courbache*, or rod, until such time as one of them utters a groan. This one is declared beaten, and the other is allowed to pay court officially to the fair charmer.

"Although the *mobadonah* has disappeared from the towns, it still exists in the villages, where it is practised on a great scale.

"The *Sudan Times*, which gives these details, reports in this connexion, that there was a ceremony of this kind the other day in the neighbourhood of Khartoum North. The performance lasted unreasonably long, for the adversaries held out well. In the end one of them received a blow on the spine, threw up his hands, and fell stone dead.

"The women then surrounded the conqueror with shouts of joy; but the police arrested him, and he is soon to be brought to justice".¹

THE SPECTATOR INSTINCT.

Without intending to make a final decision as between two explanations which, for the matter of that, may very well be added together—victory achieved over the rival male does not absolve the suitor from having still to overcome the resistance of the female he is pursuing—I would rather draw attention to this *spectator instinct*, if so it may be called, this instinct to watch and to act as judge of the field. It accords very well with the hypothesis preferred by Groos.

It is worth while to insist upon it, for it may well be a crucial fact. Intimate love contests seek solitude. Hand to hand conflicts demand broad day and a public place. No shame conceals them from the eyes of the crowd. On the contrary, spectators are an indispensable element in all fighting play. This is true of animals in a very large number of cases; it is true of primitive man; and it is true of the child.

The existence of a spectator instinct, which appears

¹ From the *Tribune de Genève*, of June 23 and 24, 1916. The remark at the end brings very clearly to light the conflict between the biological interests of a "state of nature" and the moral requirements of a "state of society".

so clearly in our schoolboy narratives,¹ is the more remarkable in that it runs counter to the ideo-motor laws so deeply embedded in the human organism. Let two schoolboys begin to run, all the class runs; let them begin to throw stones into a lake, or climb trees, and all those who see them will promptly do the same. But let them come to grips, and their companions, so far from imitating them, will solemnly form a ring to watch them at it. It is not from indifference, "moral neutrality", or concern for impartiality. They are not prevented from taking sides with one or other of the adversaries, nor from encouraging and applauding them by gesture and voice. But they do not themselves descend into the fray. They refrain from intervening as scrupulously as if it were an ordeal, or a case in which Providence must be left to pronounce judgment in complete freedom. They are, in fact, watching a kind of sacred rite. In default of the god of battles, another divinity, the race, or nature, is about to indicate her favourite; and it is important that her award should be clearly heard. All unwitting, it is to secure this verdict that small boys are for ever being incited by nature to fight with one another.

Only in two cases will the spectators intervene naturally. Then it will be with good right, for in these two cases the struggle has nothing more to teach them about the respective qualities of the combatants. The race is no longer interested. These cases are, first, when a big boy attacks a small one, and secondly, when the fight has been already decided, and the spectators come forward to put an end to it and separate the adversaries. It is useless for the victor to maltreat the vanquished.

ANIMAL FIGHTS WITHOUT SEXUAL SIGNIFICANCE.

We shall hardly have another opportunity to speak of animal psychology. Before closing this chapter, there-

¹ "It was very funny to watch them", says one. "It was as good as the cinema", writes another.

fore, it is proper to call to mind the existence, among certain species, of fighting play which has no apparent relationship with the sexual instinct, and which may thus seem to invalidate the explanations we have arrived at.

There are first of all the contests among ants, of which Huber¹ and Forel² have given such curious descriptions.

"Huber", says the latter author,³ "speaks of a sort of gymnastics, or rather of single combats, in which ants from the same ant-hill engage, when they are in the quietest and most prosperous condition. Despite the accuracy with which he described this fact, I had difficulty in believing it before seeing for myself. But a *pratensis* ant-hill gave me examples of it on several occasions, when I approached it with caution. Workers would seize each other by the feet or mandibles, roll each other over, then let go, drag each other into the holes in their dome, only to emerge again the moment after, etc.; all this without fury or rancour, and obviously in a purely friendly spirit. I admit this fact may appear imaginary to anyone who has not seen it, when one thinks that sex attraction cannot be the cause of it".

Then there are the fights among cows to select a "queen". These have been described in the last instance by M. D. Baud-Bovy.⁴ We abridge his account.

"The fight among cows is one of the most curious incidents of pastoral life in the Valais. This solemnity coincides with the *enalpage* of the cattle, that is to say, with the arrival of the herds in the high pasturage. These cow fights have very great importance. At each fight the beast which emerges victorious is proclaimed 'queen'—not only by the mountaineers, but in some sort by the cows themselves. The queen, whose functions last a whole year, has the privilege of walking at the head of the herds, and this privilege extends even to the herd to which she belongs, which takes the lead, when the cattle are on the move, and consequently deflowers the pasturage, taking the best of the grass. When the great day comes round, there is an assembly on the pasturage. . . . On all sides appear the herds. The cows, with distended nostrils and tossing heads, utter hurried and unwonted

¹ *Recherches sur les fourmis indigènes*, 1810, p. 170.

² *Les fourmis de la Suisse*. Romain Rolland has arranged Forel's observations on the fighting instinct of ants in an interesting article in the *Revue mensuelle*, Geneva, August 1918.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 367.

⁴ *Archives de Psychologie*, II. 297. See also Groos, *The Play of Animals*, p. 144.

bellowings. To avoid too serious wounds the cows' horns are slightly docked. This operation once over, the beast, knowing the rite and feeling the time for it approaching, sends grass and earth flying with the ends of her horns. The bystanders retire, leaving a large open space; some of the cows rush into it; the rest of the herd, mingled with human spectators, form a ring, hundreds of horned heads stretching towards the arena".

After smart engagements, which compel the young beasts who have overestimated their strength to return to the ranks, the serious competitors alone remain in the field, and among them last year's queen. Finally, it is all decided in one last single combat, the story of which M. Baud-Bovy relates in very lively fashion. "Suddenly the first cow pulls herself together, and puts more stiffening into the fight, and the overthrown queen slips down on to her knees, picks herself up, and retreats . . . slowly at first, then in leaps and bounds. Once again she comes to a standstill. The other cow attacks her in flank, follows up the assault, and harasses her. At length the old queen yields, and quits the field, while the other hurls her proud challenge anew".

Neither in the case of the ants nor in that of the cows does the sexual instinct play any part. But it is very striking to observe that on both occasions we are concerned with conditions of life and, so to speak, a state of society, which, however solidly established, have not always existed. The worker ants are derived from insects primitively sexual, whose place they have taken. The cows have not always lived in domesticated herds, and their *queen* plays a part which must obviously have belonged to a bull among wild bovidæ.

This is the part played by the old ram beloved of Polyphemus :—

Not ever before wast led by the others,
Nay but afar in the front didst graze fresh blooms of the meadows
Mightily striding, and first didst come to the streams of the rivers ;
First too ever 'tis thou who at eventide to the homestead
Longst to return.¹

There has therefore been both transformation and conservation of the instinct. The acts have remained the same, in spite of domestication; but in passing

¹ *Odyssey*, Cotterill's translation, IX. xi. 448 ff.

from one sex to the other they have lost something of their primitive significance.

So much for alterations of the fighting instinct in the animal kingdom. We shall find many of them in man too. It will be worth while to follow them up attentively.

CHAPTER IV

TEASING

WE have brought play contests, in which children engage *for fun*, into association with battles brought about by teasing. We said, "Children do not fight because they are teased, they tease in order to fight".

The teasing spirit is thus allied to the fighting instinct, and is, indeed, a manifestation and an instrument of it. Sometimes, also, certain forms of teasing are substituted for the actual tussle; invectives take the place of blows, doing their work. At all events, whether teasing prepares for, and leads up to, the scuffle, or replaces it, a study of its processes and origins is imposed on whoever wishes to understand childish pugnacity.

THE TEASING SPIRIT.

Teasing has so far given rise, to my knowledge, to two works, both interesting, an article by Frederick L. Burk, entitled *Teasing and Bullying*,¹ and a little book by Fernand Nicolay, entitled, *L'esprit de taquinerie*.² Burk's study comprises a very extensive inquiry, which enabled him to gather together more than a thousand cases of teasing. These he classified as he could. There is not the lucidity in this monograph that one would like to find, but it is interesting from the facts it groups. It adheres to a theory of instinct as the survival of an obsolete condition of society, a theory advanced and rendered popular by Stanley Hall.³

As for the book by Nicolay—author of an amusing

¹ In *Pedagogical Seminary*, iv. 1897.

² *The Spirit of Teasing*, Paris, 1911.

³ [Most fully developed in *Adolescence*, 2 vols., 1905.—TRANS.]

miscellany on *Les enfants mal élevés*—it will be seen that I have dipped into it not a little. It first studies teasing in general, then teasing in the child, man, and woman, in sailors, peasants, workmen, old men and priests, teasing in deaf mutes and hunchbacks, and finally teasing in all countries of the world, from Holland, *via* Turkey, to China and Japan. Nothing in it all has gone very deep, but the book is pleasant to read.

Teasing, like pugnacity, has all the characters of an instinct. One may call it innate. Burk quotes the case of a little girl of 18 months who took pleasure in knocking her brother down. When he cried, she looked at him with a triumphant smile.

The spirit of teasing is *general*, just like an instinct.

However, it is as well to be forearmed against errors of interpretation. Everything is not teasing which a child's companions complain about, and which leads to counter-strokes and a fight. Children often read teasing into behaviour which does not have this significance at all. Our narratives bring us into touch with a very large number of quarrels caused by such misunderstandings. Like ourselves, some of our schoolboys are struck with this fact.

"One boy saw a swing set up by another. He used it without meaning any harm, and it broke. . . . The other one promptly thought his work had been destroyed on purpose".

Adults are not more just.

"Many a time acts by young children are set down as teasing, which do not belong to this category at all, if they are examined with the psychological sense, instead of being taken simply at their face-value. . . .

"For example, a child of three seeks to gain possession of a toy in the hands of one of his brothers or sisters. He tip-toes up, snatches it unawares, and runs off with it.

"Another one pounces on the sweet or the cake a companion is eating, and gulps it down. . . . Relatives and servants intervene on the cries of the child who has been dispossessed, scolding and punishing the young ravisher for his *naughty teasing*.

"The phrase is inexact.

• *Badly Brought-up Children.*

"In point of fact, the baby on such an occasion primarily obeys the natural instinct that urges him, either to lay hands on the toy he covets to play with, or greedily to snap up the sugar-plums he instinctively craves for".¹

Yet it must be admitted that appearances are sometimes very strong, as may be judged from the following authentic instance :—

A mother and daughter, after delivering washing, were returning with the large empty linen basket, carried between them. A student, noticing the couple, and the basket dangling between their two hands, conceived the sudden idea of jumping over it. But he missed his "take-off", and fell plump into the basket. All three, carriers and jumper, fell sprawling on the ground.

Must we put this incident down to wicked teasing, as the old washerwoman did not fail to do? By no means. We see quite easily that this jump was suggested to the young man by nothing more than a wholly animal impulse to leap over a perceptible obstacle. The idea of playing a trick on the two women had nothing to do with it.

In spite of what one might think at first, these errors of interpretation, these misunderstandings, show how general is the scope of the teasing spirit. Adults and children see teasing where none is. But for every once they deceive themselves in this way, there have been a thousand earlier times when they have tested the strength of the teasing impulse, in other people, and, above all, undoubtedly, in themselves. It is worth noting.

It may be said of teasing also that it is absolutely unconscious of the ends it serves. From the outside it is defined by the annoyance it causes to others; and yet the true teaser is sincerely free from all feeling of hostility towards his victim; he wishes him no harm. Question him on the motive of his action, and he will have little enough to say; during the greater part of the time his behaviour has been wholly impulsive.

"In spite of my half hundred years", writes Mantegazza, "I cannot resist the impulse from time to time to indulge in innocent teasing, *although I feel incapable of rancour, and from head to foot am charged with a well-wishing feeling.* Some years ago I went

¹ Nicolay, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-4.

one evening to the room of my best and oldest friend, and there I saw his shoes. I could not resist the temptation to throw one of them upon the neighbouring roof. Not for treasure would I have missed the joy which I thereby received! As an eager psychologist I then thought of my grandmother, who advised her daughter-in-law to rub her hands with thistle leaves to make them white. I had inherited the same blood in my veins and was no degenerate descendant".¹

This unconsciousness on the part of the teaser does not contradict the proposition in our second chapter, "Whoever picks a quarrel wants to fight"; for, as we have seen, the final aim of the fight is itself unconscious, and further, this desire for a fight, which the spectators discern so well, may be unconscious in the subject himself.

THE PURPOSE OF TEASING.

Allied to natural pugnacity by everything that marks its instinctive character, teasing is as closely linked to fighting by the ends it pursues.

As we have already said, teasing either prepares for and leads up to the contest, or replaces and is substituted for it.

In the first case, the object of teasing, under whatever form it be presented, is to bring about the scuffle, and so allow the teaser to show off his superiority over his opponent. The only infallible means of bringing this about is to irritate the opponent and make him angry. The movements of anger, as we have seen, represent an abridgment of the behaviour appropriate to contests of very long ago. If every battle is a regression, anger promptly transports to the last term of this regression whoever will let himself go.

Hence the thousand and one forms of teasing, all of which have for their common trait the effort they constitute to drive the opponent to lose control of himself and fly into a rage. Moreover, as we shall see, the mere fact of making the other person do something he does not want to do is already a success; it is an assertion

¹ *L'odio*, as quoted by Burk, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

of power, and, at need, will enable the teaser to forego any other assertion of power in a victorious contest.

This brings us to the second case we spoke of, that in which the object of teasing is, not to bring about the scuffle, but to dispense with it by obtaining the same result without a blow having to be struck. The teaser eludes the powerless fury of his victim. Teasing has achieved his aim without his having come to grips. Yet, here again, the aim achieved was the aim of the contest itself, namely, to enable the teaser to bring to light his own strength and the other's weakness.

To be convinced of this, let us pass in rapid review some classic types of teasing.

FOOLING THE TEASED.

A characteristic *joke* of the schoolboy tribe consists in pushing a companion by his shoulders so as to send him *spinning* in some direction in which he did not want to go. This case comprises all those in which the will of him who teases imposes upon his victim movements the latter did not wish to make.

And the more it appears that he did not wish to make them—by his falling in the mud or the fire, or his bumping against some venerable person to whom he has to apologise—the better the trick has succeeded.¹

The dragging of a chair away from underneath someone about to sit down produces the same effect.

Often trickery secures what we saw a moment ago was the purpose of a sharp attack. To make people

¹ Claparède (*Psychologie de l'enfant*, fifth edition, p. 468) asks why teasing is comic. It is because the victim is like a dancing jack in the hands of the teased. Bergson (*Laughter*, pp. 37 *et passim*) has shown that the comic emerges every time "the mechanical is encrusted on the living". We are trying to show that all the varied forms of teasing are attached by natural transitions to that which we place in the forefront.

[On the question of the relation of teasing and the comic the translator holds views of his own (*cf.* his *Psychology of Laughter and Comedy*) which are not quite those suggested in the first paragraph of this note. It is worth remembering that the comic element may reside chiefly in *what* the victim does against his will—in the *falling* or the *bumping*, for example—rather than in the fact that these actions are done *against his will*.—TRANS.]

look where there is nothing to be seen ; to mystify someone, as on the 1st of April ; to humbug him, during a parlour game, into coating his face with soot—all this is to make someone do what he does not want.

Acts of tyranny and abuses of power, in which certain children excel, may be entered under the same rubric. Here are two instances from the same family, which give a good idea of the inventive faculties of the two heroes :—

A little girl (twelve years) said to her junior, " I'll give you my doll, but only on one condition ; you're to call her Puah ".¹ " But can't I at least give her a surname sometimes ? " " No ", said the elder, " you're to call her Puah or you won't get her at all ".

A brother (twelve years) called out to his two little sisters, " I'll give my stilts to whichever of you will promise never to lend them to the other one ". The two little sisters loved each other a great deal, and in spite of their great desire to have the precious stilts, neither was willing to deprive the other of them so completely. However, an idea occurred to one of them. She thought, " I won't lend them to Louise, but I'll let her use them ". Full of this good intention, she said to her brother, " Give them to me, I promise ". " Ah ! " said the teaser, " you're as hard-hearted as that, are you ? Well, I'll give them to Louise ".

Again, blackmail, very numerous examples of which are reported in Burk's inquiry, is of the same order of ideas. " Do this, or I'll tell about such and such a fault of yours ". But that oversteps the limits of teasing, for blackmail is nearly always *interested*.

According to Burk, teasing that consists in making others do what they do not want is characteristic of boys of from ten to fifteen years of age.

STARTLING THE TEASED.

The form of teasing which consists in hiding behind a door and jumping out on some passer-by so as to make him shriek or start, and all those forms which consist in provoking fear or some other lively emotion in other people, are frequent enough to deserve a sepa-

¹ *Exod.* i. 15 ff. The name perhaps sounds worse in French than it does in English, from its similarity in sound to *puer*, to stink.

rate heading. Yet they link up very naturally with the foregoing. To provoke emotions is still to provoke involuntary and aimless movements, to make others do what they do not want; it is still a way of imposing one's will. The more habitually the person attacked is master of himself, the more difficult he is to disturb, and the more the teaser—if he does succeed in disturbing him—will have shown that he is capable of doing something big. Note that it is above all the expression of emotion which causes joy to the tormentor. It is not enough for him to know that one of his companions *has been* afraid, or to guess that the master *must have been* annoyed. What he greedily watches for are the cry, the trembling of the voice, the frown, and the reddening face, in the person who, by losing control of himself, shows that he is at the teaser's mercy.

Popular speech marks the relationship of this type of teasing with the foregoing. "To put someone in the cart", or "to lead him on", is to mystify him in the way shown above. "To lead him on" is to make him lose patience, lose control of himself.¹

We do not speak of teasing unless annoyance is caused to others. It is indispensable, however, to mention here the amiable counterpart of this taste for teasing, namely, the pleasure experienced by children, and by certain adults who have remained children at heart, when they cause other people amusing and pleasant *surprises*. It was a trait of genius in the programme of Baden-Powell to propose that his Scouts should do "a good turn" daily, no longer at the expense, but in the service, of their neighbour. Teasing and the pleasant surprise satisfy the same instinct, permitting their author to affirm his strength. The latter may therefore cure the former.

CONTRARINESS.

It is not everyone who can show off his strength by making another person do something against his will.

* [The French idioms are not quite equivalent to those given in the text: in the original they are *charrier* and *faire marcher*.—TRANS.]

But there is no need to be very powerful to assert one's independence towards others by oneself deliberately doing something which thwarts them. This is the teasing *par excellence* of young children. They take pleasure in exasperating their elders by their acts of disobedience. To do the opposite of what they have been told to do, is the equivalent within their reach of the teasing activities we have been considering up to now. If teasing is always doing something annoying to another person, then it is also teasing to take the initiative and do something the other person does not want one to do.

Hence we may include under this rubric all forms of teasing that do not find their proper place elsewhere, as, for example, the very curious pleasure children take in *calling names* at their companions. The fact to be explained here is not the actual teasing, but the annoying impression every individual gets from hearing his name altered, or simply *taken in vain*, as the Decalogue has it.

The third commandment is closely linked to the second. It is in the study of primitive peoples that the explanations would be found which we are not to seek here. It is certainly necessary to bring the following facts together—the nickname, a distorted reproduction of the *name*; caricature, a distorted reproduction of the *image*; and the counterfeit act, a distorted imitation of *gestures* and *voice*.

We shall not stay to do this, any more than to discover, for example, why the scratching of a quill pen, or the scraping of a pencil on a slate, exasperates certain masters—facts of which their pupils take advantage to torment them. Our aim is not to describe all forms of teasing, but to disentangle their unity.

INTERFERENCE WITH ACTION.

Another form of teasing, which is also easily reduced to the fundamental type, is to impede the activity of other people.

"What do schoolboys do among themselves?" writes M. Nicolay.¹ "One holds back his companion's arm, or nudges him,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

at the moment when, with a carefully co-ordinated movement, he is about to hurl a quoit towards the aim indicated. . . . A moment after, another youngster neatly catches the disc in his cap, arresting it in this way in mid-flight, to the great discontent of the thrower . . . but to the great pleasure of the bystanders, who burst out into applause and shouts of joy. . . . Another crosses the pitch with feigned indifference and purposely knocks over the pin at the very moment one of his small friends is flinging the quoit for a decisive throw.

"Such, caught in the act, are just the kinds of teasing customary among ordinary schoolboys".

And in fact our compositions abound in traits of this kind.

Besides, it is not always a game that is impeded, and there are a thousand other means of inconveniencing a companion than pushing him with the elbow. What, for instance, can be more exasperating than an interruption cutting short a narrative, or a contradiction arresting the development of a thought? That was how Socrates teased the Sophists. In either event, for children who have not yet acquired mastery over words, it means a false start.

We all know the vexatious way schoolboys have of punctuating every phrase in the narratives of their companions with stereotyped remarks, such as, "Jolly good job for you!" and "Swear to it!"

Innumerable, too, are quarrels caused by teasing which consists first of all in a simple contradiction.

I know two cousins who were found in a furious scrap. One had alleged that his brother had a bigger belly than the brother of the other one, and the latter had contradicted it with such energy that they came to grips over it.

A good deal of adult teasing—friendly and otherwise—is reducible to this simple formula: "Preventing the other from doing what he wants",

Such was the trick played by the Hôtel de Rambouillet on the Comte de Guiche. Such was also the practical joke played by those pensioners of the Fondation Thiers, who one night collected

a dozen alarm clocks, set them to ring, one after another, every quarter of an hour, put them in the locked cupboard of one of their companions, and then double-locked the man himself into his room.

PURLOINING GOODS.

An important variety of the foregoing type is teasing that attacks another person's property. Purloining from a companion the copy-book or the ruler he is about to use, and hiding his stockings or shoes when he is about to put them on, are already classic instances; and these fit without difficulty into the schemes we have just been considering, schemes for impeding someone by withdrawing the means of action from him.

This case is very frequent in the compositions of our schoolboys. The property attacked is, first of all in class, the schoolboy's instruments for work; in the street, the basket with which he goes for messages and the can of milk he is fetching back; also articles of clothing, and especially his cap. To snatch the head-gear from one's opponent and throw it away, is so frequent an episode in the narratives of quarrels that I asked myself at first whether it had a special meaning. The partisans of biogenetic parallelism might see in it a survival, singularly attenuated, of the scalping of primitive peoples. Alternatively, we might take more general account of the symbolic significance that has always been attached to the head and its covering—instance the crown and the mitre, emblems of authority. Is uncovering one's adversary's head in some measure to discrown him, lessening him in the eyes of the spectators and in his own? Perhaps so. But we must not omit to observe also, quite simply, that in the costume of the schoolboy the head-gear is the only article of clothing which offers an easy prize to the teaser. The victim is not always so obliging as to carry in his hand a satchel or a cane that can be snatched on a sudden and sent flying in the air, thus forcing him to turn out of his road and go and pick them up.

MOCKING THE HELPLESS.

From purposely impeding the activity of another person it is but a step to joyfully drawing attention to what embarrasses him. There is a form of teasing, which appears very ugly to us, but which is not unusual among children, and which consists in throwing into relief the physical defects of their companions. To propose a sprint to a cripple, or a feat of skill requiring two hands to a person with only one, is always a way of making one's own capacity stand out by comparison with another's weakness.

This last form of teasing borders on jeering, for one may draw attention to another person's defects without his being present. We leave our subject at this point. When there is no risk of a fight, when the aggressor is no longer even face to face with an opponent, one cannot, without abuse of language, speak any longer of teasing. Like fighting, teasing no doubt originally presupposes the presence of a third party; it is above all before a gallery that one takes pleasure in imposing one's will on another person by making him do what he does not want. But if the gallery takes on such an importance in the mind of the teaser that he sets about aiming blows at his absent opponent without any possibility of a counter-stroke, an essential element in teasing goes by default. Conversely, when it is no longer, consciously or unconsciously, just to display one's own strength, but rather to arrive at definite ends, good or bad, that the more powerful applies himself to realise his will by force, trickery, or skill, then there is no longer teasing either. We said that blackmail was not teasing. Nor was Iago a teaser; his actions were too interested and too conscious.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE SPECTATORS.

The manner of the actual teasing depends on the teaser. But it also depends largely on the gallery.

Teasing changes character according to the environ-

ment. Here, brutal force is prized, there, skill ; here, daring in speech, even cynicism, there, the discreet allusion ; here, naughtiness, there, wit. But the assailant always chooses that kind of fight which appears likely to be the most favourable to him ; he always manœuvres—unconsciously perhaps—in such a way that his opponent will manifest his powerlessness, do what he does not want to do, or say what he does not want to say.

M. Nicolay alleges that teasing does not exist in every country. No doubt he means a certain form of teasing, that, for instance, by which Parisian drawing-rooms set store. But assuredly the practice of teasing is of all places and of all times. It could hardly be otherwise, given its close relationship with the fighting instinct, the universality of which we have seen. Their ends are identical. By giving opportunity to the stronger to become conscious of their strength and display it, they both subserve natural selection.

As a form derived from the fighting instinct, the spirit of teasing, like it, maintains close relations with courtship. Teasing is a means the individual has, either to assert his power over the other sex, or to signify, to the other sex, his merits and his strength. "Who loves, teases", says a German proverb. The pranks one sex plays on the other are an essential part of certain popular courtships and highly important in the repertory of every flirtation. In this our actual state of society they represent an alteration of the erotic contest against the female.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEASERS.

While the spectators determine in large measure the mode of teasing, it is by studying the state of him who teases that we shall discover the general conditions of teasing itself.

"Observe a childish audience, at a Guignol performance, for example. . . . This small public is impatiently awaiting the rise of the curtain. . . . The young imps hustle each other ; one surreptitiously pinches his neighbour on the right, all the while gazing

steadily to the left ; another, with a sudden fillip, knocks off the cap of the boy in front of him. . . . All at once the harsh, strident voice of Punch gives warning that the piece is about to begin. . . . The teasing stops as if by enchantment ".¹

Idlers are teasers, and, among children, those who are not actively inclined.

" Among French children ", says Nicolay, " it has been recognised that *boarders* indulge in teasing more than other children. In America, such is the intensity of the life of sport that the idea of silly pranks rarely enters the mind of youth ".²

Hence this quite simple pedagogical precept : " If a child pushes the teasing spirit beyond tolerable limits, set him to physical exercises, give him every kind of opportunity to frolic about and be active ".

" Mystification ", writes Goethe, " is and ever will be amusement for idle people who are more or less intelligent. Indolent mischievousness, selfish enjoyment of doing some damage, is a resource to those who are without occupation or any wholesome external interests. No age is entirely free from such proclivities ".³

Comparison of vocations leads to the same conclusion. While our Swiss clock-makers, confined to their establishments, excel in all manner of drollery, our peasants joke but little. Similarly, Nicolay contrasts the workers of Boulogne-sur-mer with the sailors. With us in Switzerland, the " fair-weather sailors " of our lake steamers, whose occupation leaves them with energies to dispose of, are not so averse from teasing. The Belgians, it is said, call teasing " the idling of the mind ".⁴ That hits the nail on the head.

If the teaser has to dispose of unutilised energies, it is necessary also that he should feel himself in a position to make good use of them. Five times out of six, in Burk's inquiry, the teaser is older than his victim.

At first sight this might appear surprising. Is not teasing also the weapon of the weak ? Yes, often ; especially of those who, themselves serving only too often

¹ Nicolay, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 58-60.

³ *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, as quoted by Groos, *The Play of Man*, p. 226.

⁴ *Les fainéantises de l'esprit*.

as victims for others, take the offensive and join fight under conditions more favourable to them than usual. Hunchbacks and the deaf have the reputation of being teasers.

Apart, too, from the bravado-teasing we spoke of earlier, there are small boys who, in certain circumstances, take advantage of the chivalrous character of bigger boys to overwhelm them with pranks. But those are particular cases.

What of little girls? We often hear it said that they are greater teasers than boys. When said, this is not explained; and, in point of fact, the matter is far from proved. Among the hundreds of cases collected by Burk, while the number of *teased* of each sex is approximately the same—305 boys and 292 girls—a marked difference is to be observed in the matter of *teasers*—384 boys, as against 152 girls.

The usual presumption may be due to the fact that those who make teasing an attribute of the little girl unconsciously contrast teasing, in which one stops short at invectives, with scuffles, in which one comes to blows. In so doing they deliberately neglect all the occasions when the scuffle has been provoked by teasing, when invectives have been eked out by blows. If, to teasing that exhausts itself without bringing the participants to grips, we add all the instances when it gives rise to a scuffle, it is not in doubt that boys are to be credited with as much as, or more than, girls; and this is very much what the observations we have just made would lead us to expect. The boy who is incapable of keeping up the verbal joust cuts it short in a burst of anger and throws himself on his adversary. Under the same conditions the little girl will probably have recourse to that undignified retreat which consists in sulking.

Similarly, if we distinguish *teasing* from *jeering*—in the sense indicated earlier—we can hardly but subscribe to Nicolay's conclusion, "Young schoolboys are more given to teasing than little girls, but, in return, the latter are more given to jeering". The same author remarks that in drawing-rooms feminine aggressiveness naturally

assumes the form of scandal, while masculine aggressiveness is transposed into paradox.

I owe to a woman, a teacher of young girls, the following rather subtle remark, the inspiration of which, however, agrees remarkably with the contents of this chapter: "The small boy fights to show off his own strength, the small girl attacks her companions to bring to light their weakness". But, for fear of being accused of cursorily accepting an opinion that is too unfavourable to the other sex, I shall not quit this subject without recalling a very acute and true thought.

"Women have a very essential trait of character, which puts them at once below and above men: they think much more about others than do the latter; and they are accordingly led to be more compassionate and charitable, and also to be more given to scandal and curiosity".¹

After which, let us recall the lesson taught us by the cows in the Valais: the most characteristic traits of one sex pass over very naturally to the other. Between the psychology of man and the psychology of woman there is no impenetrable partition.

CONCLUSIONS.

Teasing is the fruit of instinctive tendencies whose function it is to assist natural selection, especially sexual selection, by bringing to light the strength and weakness of individuals of both sexes.

Teasing is originally provocation to physical fighting; but in proportion as manners, by being transformed, become less favourable towards the latter, teasing comes little by little to be substituted for it. After being identified with the fighting instinct at the outset, the teasing spirit thus becomes an altered form of it.

This transformation is accomplished more slowly in the male sex, no doubt because the interest of the race obliges the male to triumph in succession over his competitors and over the resistance which the female opposes to him, and thereby assigns to fighting capacity a preponderant place among his qualities.

¹ Félix Bovet, *Pensées*, p. 37.

CHAPTER V

CRUELTY

SPEAKING of teasing leads on naturally to the discussion of cruelty.

We reduced teasing to the instinctive pleasure taken in asserting one's strength and bringing to light another's weakness. By so doing did we not leave one of its most important characters in shadow? Is teasing not born of the pleasure taken in the infliction of pain? Is cruelty not at the root of it?

Conversely, all acts of cruelty might, strictly, come under our description of teasing, and be similarly explained. To make another person cry out or weep, wringing from him expressions of pain, is assuredly to make him do something against his will. It is likewise to testify to initiative independent of his, and to impede him in his activity. Active cruelty might thus be, as it were, the epitome of several forms of teasing, pushed to extremes. M. de Maday¹ has thrown this idea into relief by showing that "the intention to reassure oneself of one's physical and intellectual superiority" is one of the reasons that lead men to commit acts of cruelty.

The same author thinks that "cruelty may be considered as a psychical predisposition towards fighting. It makes use of the same means as fighting, and creates the belligerent spirit". In the general diminution of cruelty brought about by social transformations he sees a definite step towards peace.

It is not open to us, therefore, to avoid the obligation to study the relations between cruelty and the fighting instinct a little more closely.

¹ *Sociologie de la paix*, Paris, 1913, p. 38

If we accept the usual definition of the word *cruelty* as "the inclination to find pleasure in the sufferings of others", it is clear that cruelty is exhibited very frequently quite apart from fighting and teasing. *Schadenfreude*, the joy felt on hearing of a mishap that has befallen a neighbour, implies no hostile activity towards another person. The most cruel populations and epochs are far from being always the most bellicose; neither the towns of the South, where bull-fights are traditional, nor those of Flanders, where cock-fighting and fighting between ratting terriers flourish, have the reputation of being particularly warlike. Women are looked upon as being at least as cruel as men.

THE PROBLEM OF CRUELTY.

Let us take this problem as a whole.

In *The Basis of Morality* Schopenhauer reduces the actions of men to three distinct motives. He writes:—

"There are only *three* fundamental springs of human conduct, and all possible motives arise from one or other of these. They are:

"(a) Egoism; which desires the weal of the self, and is limitless.

"(b) Malice; which desires the woe of others, and may develop to the utmost cruelty.

"(c) Compassion; which desires the weal of others, and may rise to nobleness and magnanimity.

"Every human act is referable to one of these springs; although two of them may work together".¹

It was one of the instances of Schopenhauer's originality that he admitted the separate existence of malice, and identified it with cruelty. "Disinterested like compassion, malice takes as its final end another's pain".

One of the functions of reason is to reduce to unity the plurality accepted by *the plain man*. Philosophers and psychologists have conscientiously applied themselves to this task in relation to the motives of human

¹ English translation by Bullock. George Allen and Unwin, London, second edition, 1915, Pt. III. ch. 5, 171 f.

action. To perform it, they have had to choose between two methods. One, more rough and ready, is the method of negation: the multiplicity one thinks to observe does not exist; it is enough to look into it more closely. The other, more scrupulous of detail, is the method of reduction: variety exists, just as it appears, but it may all be traced to the same origin.

The two methods, however, are so nearly identical in their inspiration that they are often confused with each other. None the less, we may distinguish La Rochefoucauld, who denies the existence of disinterested sentiments, from the British Associationist school—Hume, Mackintosh and Mill—who set themselves merely to reduce the altruistic and egoistic tendencies to the same origin.

This very effort to make self-interest, or egoism, the sole human motive, cannot fail to come to light in connection with cruelty. Certain explanations of cruelty go no further than just denying it altogether.

FALSE CRUELTY.

It has been remarked, in the first place, that we very often accept as evidence of cruelty, that is, of pleasure created by the sight of pain, enjoyment which is in reality of quite a different character. Warnings of this kind are always seasonable; we offered similar ones in connection with teasing. Do not let us take for cruelty everything that has that appearance.

In his study of child's play Groos gave a separate heading to what he called *analytic play*.¹ *Experimentation* is a euphemism for what it would be more usual to call *destructive play*. The child finds great pleasure in taking to pieces the toys he is given. He breaks them up into their component parts. This is the counterpart of the joy he experiences at other times in *assembling* and *constructing*. Such analytic play begins very early. From his first year the child tears paper, empties drawers, and turns boxes upside down, and in this way secures

¹ *The Play of Man*, p. 97.

evident satisfaction for himself. It must be admitted that then, and still more later, he distinguishes very imperfectly between the world of things and the world of organisms. Just as he tears the pages out of a book, so he will strip a rose; and if we see him in the same way strip the wings from a butterfly, or the legs from a spider, we are not thereby authorised to attribute these acts to a specific instinct of cruelty.

The following is taken from one of the books of Perez, and relates to a child of ten months old:—

“The other day his nurse sat him down on the lawn in the garden, and, to amuse him, placed a tortoise near by. He first of all watched the little chelonian with considerable curiosity, seeing which, the nurse left him alone for a moment. By the time she returned, the tortoise had one foot half torn out, and the interesting observer was engaged in dragging away at another with all his might. For that matter, such indifference to pain in the animal, when this is not evinced by very apparent external signs, is common in the child and in a large number of adults, and is rather the outcome of a bad education than due to a natural defect of sensibility”.

Perez is a little hasty in speaking of *bad education* in connection with this baby less than a year old. Do not let us read “indifference to pain in the animal” into what may be nothing but the need to *analyse*, and curiosity to see what will come about. Such seemingly cruel curiosity lasts till well beyond early infancy, and plays its part even in the presence of animals which do exhibit their pain. The child takes an interest in placing the beast in a new situation, and watching how it will extricate itself; and much of the suffering the child causes must be laid to the account of this interest. In many cases the child thinks as little about his victim’s torments as does the walker through a forest, who turns over an ant-hill and watches the feverish comings and goings of the tiny creatures he has disturbed. It is not cruelty, it is insensibility, due either to lack of imagination, or to the exclusive predominance of the wish to *know*.

To speak more generally, we know that every tendency

which takes on the character of a *passion* possesses the mind so exclusively as to render us insensible to everything not its object, and, consequently, inattentive or blind to all the pain we may happen to be causing. Curiosity and scientific ardour have this effect. But so also have the love of gain, avarice, the sensual passion, zeal for some particular creed, and so on. It was not so much innate cruelty as thirst for gold, which brought about the horrors of the Conquest of Mexico, the atrocities of the Slave Trade, and, more recently, the scandals of the Belgian Congo. Love of finery, high living, and the liking for selfish comfort, are still responsible to-day for cruel sufferings hardly suspected by those who inflict them.

Again—to come back to our subject—the primitive instincts of the chase and the fight, like all the others, may render man deaf to the pain he causes.

But nothing of all this, properly speaking, is cruelty. In none of these cases is it another's actual suffering which gives satisfaction to the one who is dominated by some passion. Indeed, it is only fair to state, in defence of the latter, that the exclusive character of his temporary interests renders him no less insensible to his own, than to the sufferings of others. The man obsessed by the love of gain imposes privations and fatigues on himself which he does not feel. And the same may be said of the scholar, the worldling, the hunter, and of all who are under the influence of some passion.

So long as one adheres to explanations of this kind, and reduces assent to others' sufferings to the predominance of other interests, one virtually denies the existence of cruelty, and ceases to admit that there are people who like to see others in pain. To be satisfied at such a cheap rate is perhaps to the honour of psychologists, but it testifies to a most imperfect acquaintance with the under side of the human heart.

We must have the courage to go further. To explain cruelty, we must not be content to misconceive its character.

THE ASSOCIATIONS OF CRUELTY.

The law of association holds a preponderant place in all the explanatory theories of cruelty known to me. "When two facts have been simultaneously present to consciousness, the reappearance of one tends to bring about the reviviscence of the other".¹ This law applies to affective facts—feelings and emotions—just as much as to images and ideas. If, then, we find cases in which the sight of another's pain occurs in someone's consciousness in juxtaposition with a characteristic personal enjoyment, we shall not be astonished if henceforward the perception of the other's pain is accompanied, for the consciousness in question, by the revocation of pleasure. Now, such cases are not unusual. As we have just seen, there is hardly any instinctive tendency which cannot lead the individual very frequently and naturally to make his neighbour suffer. The tiger, seizing its prey, must be glad to have something to feed on; but its victim suffers, and neither the pangs of hunger, nor the joys of appeasing them, will always prevent the stronger from seeing the agonised look in his victim's eyes. Thus, the image of another's misery would come to be naturally associated in the beast of prey—which we resemble in so many traits—with the satisfaction of its appetite. "The misfortunes of some make the happiness of others". Strictly speaking, this proposition would be enough to account for the fact of cruelty.

However, there is one of the instincts with which the association established by cruelty between another's pain and our own pleasure is more closely linked than any other. This is the instinct of reproduction. In the animal kingdom and in primitive culture, as we have seen, the fight is closely associated with love. That is as good as to say that the same link exists between pain and sexual pleasure. And, in point of fact, we observe

¹ [The Behaviorists' have neatly restated this law as the law of the *substitution of stimulus*.—TRANS.]

that in a very large number of well-known cases the pleasure of cruelty does have an after-taste of specifically sensual pleasure. The need of inflicting pain in order to stimulate the senses—sadism—was long considered as a sexual perversion belonging to psychopathology. A more careful study has shown, however, that we have in this a general fact to which a place must be accorded in normal psychology, and that here again the difference between the healthy and the morbid is less one of kind than one of degree.

Even in the child we very often observe a mysterious association between cruelty and the senses. The facts are repugnant enough to recall, but very clear. Havelock Ellis¹ quotes several cases relating to boys, and I know of wholly similar ones in the lives of little girls. Let us remark in passing that these facts peremptorily command whoever is concerned with education, to eschew this and all other methods of corporal punishment.

But such evidence from children attracts our attention to a very singular fact: sexual pleasure is often vaguely associated with the sight of another's suffering and *with pain felt by the subject himself*. The example of Rousseau, given in his *Confessions*, is well known. Psychiatrists were the first to invent the parallel term to *sadism*, namely, *masochism*, to denote the desire to suffer pain associated with the excitation of the senses. But they were not long in recognising that the same individuals were successively or simultaneously sadistic and masochistic, finding pleasure in both inflicting and suffering pain; and so they merged under the same rubric the cases which they had first set themselves to distinguish and had considered as antagonistic. This rubric is known as *algolagnia*.²

The two forms of *algolagnia* may be distinguished within sexuality itself. This has been done by Freud, not without subtlety.

¹ *The Sexual Impulse, Love and Pain, etc.*, 1908, pp. 109 ff., also in Appendix.

² From *ἄλγος*, pain, and *λάγνος*, sexually excited.

"The roots of active algolagnia, sadism, can be readily demonstrated in the normal. The sexuality of most men shows a taint of *aggressiveness*, a propensity to subdue, the biological significance of which lies in the necessity of overcoming the resistance of the sexual object by actions other than those of mere courtship. Sadism would then correspond to an aggressive component of the sexual instinct, which has become isolated and exaggerated, and which has been brought to the foreground by displacement".¹

This is not true only of the male. In the coquetry of the female, who takes pleasure in exciting the male by the humiliations she inflicts on him,² we may see one of the origins of cruelty in the less aggressive sex.

In like manner, according to Freud, at least one of the roots of passive algolagnia, or masochism, may be traced with equal assurance. It is the result of the excessive value the lover sets on the loved object, the necessary psychological consequence of the choice he has made.

For the female, the explanation is still simpler. In most animal species, as in woman, sexual pleasure in the female is necessarily preceded by pain.

But we may dispense with such detailed analyses if, as has been done by Havelock Ellis in an analysis of algolagnia, we give precedence to the notion of the fight.³ The fight, so intimately associated with love, consists in strokes given and strokes taken. Through this as an intermedium, therefore, suffering inflicted on another person and suffering felt by oneself gain equal title to foreshadow sexual pleasure.

¹ [*Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, p. 22. I have departed in several particulars from Dr. Brill's translation, which, here as elsewhere, appears to me unsatisfactory.—TRANS.]

² [So as to increase the intensity of the process of tumescence, to adopt the term used by Havelock Ellis.—TRANS.]

³ Cf. Adler, "Der Aggressionstrieb im Leben u. in der Neurose", in *Heilen und Bilden*, p. 23: "In treating of sadism and masochism a start has always been made from facts belonging to the sexual order. As a matter of fact, this implies confusion of two instincts primitively separated, the sexual instinct and the instinct of aggressiveness". Cf. also, especially, Stanley Hall, *A Synthetic, Genetic Study of Fear*, p. 185: "Hence even Sadistic impulses are the sequel and not, as the Freudians assert, the antecedent of aggressiveness against others".

For Ellis, "the sexual attraction of pain is really a special case of erotic symbolism. . . ." ¹

Such considerations certainly explain, "in great part", as Ellis modestly says, special cases of algolagnia, and even the more general fact of cruelty.

CRUELTY AND THE FIGHTING INSTINCT.

It is a great advantage to be able to set an innate tendency, like the fighting instinct, at the basis of cruelty. So long as one represents cruelty as only the result of an occasional association of ideas, the outcome of individual experience, one may see how a link has become possible between another's suffering and one's own personal satisfaction, but one does not thereby explain how this association has been able to take on such importance in the race as to produce an instinctive tendency.

Now, however, the significance of the fighting instinct in the cause of natural selection having been recognised, the significance of the *liking for pain* becomes simultaneously apparent. If the fight is to serve the race, it is important that neither the actors—the males who fight—nor the spectatresses—the females before whom they fight—should be in any way accessible to pity; or, to put it otherwise, it is an advantage that they should be cruel. If a fighter were capable, *while he was fighting*, of feeling a sympathetic emotion for the sufferings of his opponent, the blows he delivered would be the weaker for it, and the ordeal would thereby cease to be conclusive. Again, it is no less essential that the spectatresses, who represent the reward of the contest because they are the judges of it, should not be vitiated in their judgment by any compassion they might feel for the wounds of the vanquished. It is important that they should tremble with one emotion, and one only—

¹ *Erotic Symbolism, etc.*, 1914, p. 42. "By 'erotic symbolism' I mean that tendency whereby the lover's attention is diverted from the central focus of sexual attraction to some object or process which is on the periphery of that focus, or is even outside of it altogether, though recalling it by association of contiguity or of similarity". Ellis, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

admiration for the stronger—otherwise the race would be balked in its purposes.

We have done our best to trace the origins of cruelty. We have found them in the instinct of the fight; an instinct which, on the one hand, encourages the liking for both undergoing and inflicting pain, and, on the other, encourages the liking for watching pain. Cruelty has thus appeared natural to us, by the same token as the fighting instinct. If it be true, as we shall see, that the latter instinct enters as a primordial element into most of the great human activities, we shall glimpse a meaning and a truth in the famous sally of Nietzsche, "Almost everything we call culture is founded on a spiritualisation and deepening of cruelty".¹

MORBID DEVIATIONS.

It is more usual to speak of cruelty as a symptom of morbid degeneration, in both individuals and peoples. Enjoyment in the watching of pain, manifested in the holding of barbarous games, announced and accompanied the decadence of Rome; it is manifested also in connection with the boxing matches held in our large towns, and is taken as the sign that our society too is coming to an end. What are we to think about this thesis? Suppose we admit it: does it mean that the cruelty of decadent societies is a pathological deviation from a normal instinct, or a regression towards a primitive form of the instinct, a form which had been surpassed at other periods in the history of such societies? The contents of the chapters which follow will throw light on this problem. Meantime certain indications are possible.

The fight is useful to the race by pointing out, for everyone to see, those most apt to perpetuate the race, and by allowing them to do so. To fight implies that one accepts pain for oneself and for the other person, and joy in the fight is intimately linked to the pleasure of risk. To whoever throws himself into the fray, neither the other person's pain nor his own can appear

¹ *Jenseits*, III. 229.

as an absolute evil; on the contrary, the liking for giving and receiving blows is an integral part of the fighting instinct. The primitive and healthy instinct tends towards the complete experience.¹ When, of the two experiences closely associated in the sensuous enjoyment of the fight—pleasure in suffering oneself and pleasure in making someone else suffer—only one retains a pleasant tone, thereby excluding the other and securing that it is itself pursued for its own sake, we feel instinctively that we have to do with a morbid deviation. The liking for delivering blows without running the risk of receiving them is cruelty in the usual meaning of the word. It is cruelty detached from the instinct of the fight, implying cowardice.

The liking for receiving blows without taking the trouble to give any, is a symptom which perhaps seems more unusual because there is no single name for it in ordinary speech. But it would be easy to enumerate its various forms. This *pleasure of pain* has been often observed. Like cruelty, it has been the occasion for attempted explanations by means of the laws of association, for the links are many which attach pleasure to pain. Socrates remarked on this in his prison.² At the moment our misery ceases, our pleasure is proportionate to the pain we are on the point of seeing come to an end. But, as has been recognised, there is more in this than a passive association. There is a striving, thoroughly active sometimes and impassioned, which justifies both the parallel we are tracing between this instinct and that of cruelty, and the common explanation that must be advanced for both. "Everything is not painful in pain".³ The trivial example of the tongue, which cannot be prevented from tampering with an aching tooth, leads us to think that there is something *interesting* in every pain that can be borne.

¹ Johann Bojer, in his novel, *The Last Viking* (especially in ch. 18) has rendered with singular intensity this almost animal joy in watching a battle royal, and in taking part in it.

² *Phædo*, 60 B.

³ Camille Bos, *Revue philosophique*, July 1902.

So Groos, in his chapters on experimentation play, is led to give a place to the sensuous enjoyment of pain, which he explains by the desire for an intense life.¹ The melancholy of the poet, "complacent tasting of sorrow",² is of the same order. We should make little enough account of the æsthetic capacities of anyone who was unable to feel pleasure in the reading of a sad book.³

The proud suffering of the Stoic, through which he asserts his freedom, the joy of martyrdom which suffuses the Christian, and—combination of both—the ascetic's passion for austerity and sacrifice, add different variations on the same theme. In them all, man enjoys the satisfaction of seeing his soul as the stage for strong feelings, and counts it happiness to be judged worthy of suffering so acute.

In speaking of such exalted experiences as these, one feels in a confused way that they come very near to morbidity. They fall into it, in my opinion, as soon as they lose their social value.

The verses of Mme. de Pressensé are sublime :—

... La compassion c'est la passion sainte,
C'est le charbon de feu :
Celui qui la connaît n'a qu'une seule crainte,
C'est de souffrir trop peu.⁴

because they express the anguish of a life wholly consecrated to the work of the Good Samaritan. Imagine

¹ "I have frequently had occasion to note that we commonly enjoy stimuli whose effect is distinctly disagreeable, because they are calculated to satisfy our craving for intense impressions. . . . Our satisfaction in strong, self-produced excitement is so intense as to make physical pain to a great extent enjoyable". Groos, *The Play of Man*, p. 159.

² Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, as quoted by Groos, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

³ [Every theory of pleasure and displeasure must start with the recognition of the fact that they are truly correlative, i.e. that neither can be felt at all unless it is *spiced* with the other. One might go so far as to say that it is an inveterate tendency in man to seek the greatest possible intensity of feeling by off-setting pleasure with the greatest amount of displeasure it can stand.—TRANS.]

⁴ "Pity is the holy passion, the fuel that keeps the fire of life burning bright; he that knows it has but one fear—the fear of not suffering pain enough".

the same craving for sympathetic pain, without the stimulus of such pity and without any accompanying wish to relieve another's ills. You would at once judge it sterile and morbid.

The Catholic conception of *merit* has lightened and transfigured many a bed of pain for the sick who have applied it to themselves. But let it be set up as a doctrine, and used, first to explain another's sufferings, and then to dispense us from participating in them by sympathy, and from relieving them as best we may; in that event, this doctrine grows somewhat revolting, and leads us to suspect some disorder in the mind which comforts itself therewith.

RAGGING.

It remains to ask ourselves whether cruelty, in the strict sense of the word, may not have another significance still, besides the one we have envisaged so far. We saw that it acts in the service of the race by stimulating the strong, the teasers, to fight, and so exercising their powers and setting a value upon them. May it not also serve the race by inuring the weak, the teased? *Ragging*, or collective teasing practised on new-comers, is to be observed in every society. More than every other form of teasing, this seems cowardly and cruel. The same meaning cannot be given to it as to individual teasing, for it does not throw any member of the group into relief. Yet its social function is clear. Such ragging, the original type of which is to be found in the initiation ceremonies of primitive peoples, ensures social homogeneity. Individual teasing directs attention to one of the *elect*; communal ragging indicates the level of physical and moral endurance below which no member of the group may fall.

This significance found in collective ragging enriches the interpretation we have given to individual teasing. It certainly does happen that the teaser, even when he is alone in his attack, justifies his interference, in his own mind, by the idea that he has the inuring of his

victim in view, that he is putting him to the test, and contributing to his education.¹ "It's my job to see", he says to himself, "whether you can stand this, whether you can put up with this sort of persecution without making a fuss about it". Provocation of this type exists even in the animal world. I have had quoted to me the case of a cat who teased her kitten until it became annoyed, and who showed real pleasure when she saw the fighting instinct aroused in her offspring.

Such *teasing* is education—in its rudiments. Who shall say to what extent our own education, after all these centuries of time, is still made up of teasing?

¹ Cf. what we said in Ch. II, above, on *punitive* aggressiveness.

CHAPTER VI

THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIGHTING INSTINCT

ITS CONTINUATION, CANALISATION AND COMPLICATION

WE have so far tried to analyse the fighting instinct—which we found so lively in the child. Seeking its components and its unconscious springs of action, we have viewed it in different aspects, all of them closely inter-related, and all showing its kinship with the fundamental instinct which ensures the perpetuation of the species.

Ever and again the problems we have broached have brought us face to face with the fact, that one and the same instinctive tendency may be manifested under various forms, and that these correspond to the various moments in an evolution which has been imposed upon it by outward circumstances. It is this fact we must now study more closely.

THE TRANSITORY CHARACTER OF INSTINCT.

Instincts were long held to be absolutely unchanging. Fixity was taken to be one of the characteristic and essential traits of instinctive acts—fixity not merely from one end to another of the life of an individual who was deemed to be taught nothing by experience, but also within the race as a whole through successive generations.¹ This was only part of the truth. Two men, at

¹ [This notion had sometimes a theological twist. Cf. Addison, *Spectator*, No. 120, July 18, 1711: "There is not in my Opinion any thing more mysterious in Nature than this Instinct in Animals. . . . I look upon it as upon the Principle of Gravitation in Bodies, which is not to be explained by any known Qualities inherent in the Bodies themselves, nor from any Laws of Mechanism, but, according to the best Notions of the greatest Philosophers, is an immediate Impression from the first Mover, and the Divine Energy acting in the Creatures". —TRANS.]

an interval of some fifteen years, completely transformed the current psychological ideas of instinct.

The first of these was William James, whose chapter on this subject in his *Principles of Psychology* has deservedly remained famous.¹ He set himself to show that instinct is not this mechanical something that it was generally thought to be. The play of instinct is not the play of a spring which can be released from outside by circumstances, like the spring of a clock which makes it strike the hour immediately the hands are in the required position and irrespectively of whether it really is the hour or not. The instincts, properly so-called, are transitory. Some, no doubt, occupy such a place throughout the individual's life that we are led to think them permanent, but what are really permanent are the habits they have created.²

Spalding—quoted by James—studied the instincts of chickens very carefully. He found that their behaviour was very different, according to the period at which it was being considered; and that the habits to which these instincts gave rise depended on the circumstances in which they were first manifested.

“If a chick is born in the absence of the hen, it ‘will follow any moving object. And, when guided by sight alone, they seem to have no more disposition to follow a hen than to follow a duck or a human being. . . .’

“But if a man presents himself for the first time when the instinct of *fear* is strong, the phenomena are altogether reversed. Mr. Spalding kept three chickens hooded until they were nearly four days old, and thus describes their behaviour: ‘Each of them, on being unhooded, evinced the greatest terror to me, dashing off in the opposite direction whenever I sought to approach it. The table on which they were unhooded stood before a window, and each in its turn beat against the window like a wild bird. One of them darted behind some books, and, squeezing itself into a corner, remained cowering for a length of time. We might

¹ This chapter was first published in *Scribner's Magazine*, 1887.

² “The law of inhibition of instincts by habits is this: *When objects of a certain class elicit from an animal a certain sort of reaction, it often happens that the animal becomes partial to the first specimen of the class on which it has reacted, and will not afterwards react on any other specimen*”. James, *op. cit.*, ii. 394.

guess at the meaning of this strange and exceptional wildness; but the odd fact is enough for my present purpose. . . ."¹

To take facts better known: the nursling instinctively seeks his mother's breast or the bottle that serves as a substitute. But if for any reason the infant has to be fed from birth by a spoon, the sucking instinct, as such, disappears very quickly, at the end of a few days even. To say that the instinct to *sip* persists is to confuse the habit that has been acquired, and that endures, with the instinct that is innate but transient.

James has collected still more facts on the innate, but also transient, character of extremely precise instincts appearing later in the animal's life.

"I have observed a Scotch terrier, born on the floor of a stable in December, and transferred six weeks later to a carpeted house, make, when he was less than four months old, a very elaborate pretence of burying things, such as gloves, etc., with which he had played till he was tired. He scratched the carpet with his fore-feet, dropped the object from his mouth upon the spot, and then scratched all about it (with both fore- and hind-feet, if I remember rightly), and finally went away and let it lie. Of course the act was entirely useless. I saw him perform it at that age, some four or five times, and never again in his life. The conditions were not present to fix a habit which should last when the prompting instinct dies away".²

James also quotes an instance given by Dr. H. D. Schmidt, of New Orleans.

"I may cite the example of a young squirrel which I had tamed, a number of years ago, when serving in the army, and when I had sufficient leisure and opportunity to study the habits of animals. In the autumn, before the winter sets in, adult squirrels bury as many nuts as they can collect, separately, in the ground. Holding the nut firmly between their teeth, they first scratch a hole in the ground, and, after pointing their ears in all directions to convince themselves that no enemy is near, they ram—the head, with the nut still between the front teeth, serving as a sledge-hammer—the nut into the ground, and then fill up the hole by means of their paws. The whole process is executed with great rapidity, and, as it appeared to me, always with exactly the same movements; in fact, it is done so well that

¹ James, *op. cit.*, ii. 396.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 399.

I could never discover the traces of the burial-ground. Now, as regards the young squirrel, which, of course, never had been present at the burial of a nut, I observed that, after having eaten a number of hickory-nuts to appease its appetite, it would take one between its teeth, then sit upright and listen in all directions. Finding all right, it would scratch upon the smooth blanket on which I was playing with it, as if to make a hole, then hammer with the nut between its teeth upon the blanket, and finally perform all the motions required to fill up a hole—in the air; after which it would jump away, leaving the nut, of course, uncovered ’’.

James gives the name *instinct* to certain highly determinate reactions in the animal, which present the various characters we enumerated in our third chapter. The second of the authors I mentioned, Freud, when speaking of the sexual instinct, has in view a whole range of facts that are comparable but much more complex. His theories go considerably beyond James's, but do not contradict them. They tell us the history of an instinct, which, being thwarted by circumstances, especially by those of human society, is unable to establish itself under the form of habitual reflexes, but which, so far from disappearing on that account, merely metamorphoses itself. Among all its components, those which find means of satisfaction on its first appearance determine the habitual form in which it is to be manifested. To Freud are due these pregnant notions of *repression* and *sublimation* of instinct, to which we shall ourselves have recourse in following up the evolution of the fighting instinct.

The whole of Freud's work may be regarded as the epic of instinct. Like a nomadic tribe comprising confederate clans, the cluster of various tendencies which makes up the *libido*² of the child sets out on its march towards the Promised Land. But, on the point of arriving, it encounters formidable obstacles which almost always result in dislocating the tendencies. Some are

¹ James, *op. cit.*, ii, 400.

¹ [It is well to insert the reminder that Freud always uses the term *libido* as equivalent to *sexual* energy. It has remained for the metaphysically-minded Jung and his disciples to extend the scope of the term until it has become practically synonymous with Bergson's *élan vital* or Professor Percy Nunn's *horme*.—TRANS.]

repressed, more or less decidedly, and remind us of their continued existence on the confines of the country they have not been able to enter, only, if at all, by occasional incursions. Others, which appear to carry along with them the distinctive emblems of the tribe, continue their march and establish themselves, without laying down their arms. Others, again, enter only after having been disarmed, devote themselves henceforward to the most pacific functions, and, in order to live at all, renounce what appeared at first to be their very reason for existence.

This is the history of the sexual instinct. Is it also the history of all the great instincts, in so far as they are thwarted? We dare not assert it. But we shall demonstrate that Freud's schema applies even in detail to the fighting instinct. After that, it will remain to ask ourselves the reason for this concordance. Must we look for it in a general law of the evolution of instinct, a law verified in the first instance in these two cases? Or, on the contrary, must we find it in the close kinship we have already observed between the instinct studied by Freud and the one of which we are writing the history? Must we envisage them as but two forms of aggressiveness, two forms of one vital, generic instinct? This question has mostly a theoretical interest; the majority of the Freudians no doubt regard it as already settled by the very wide scope their founder promptly gave to the concept of *libido*. What would appear to offer more than a speculative interest is to follow in detail the avatars of the thwarted fighting instinct.

THE THWARTING OF THE FIGHTING INSTINCT.

That the fighting instinct in the child of to-day is thwarted by concurrent social forces—parents, masters, police—has been already testified by the schoolboy compositions we collected. We have in it a tendency which is no longer adapted to the social conditions in which we live, and which cannot therefore be given a free

course. No doubt the repression of the fighting instinct is not comparable to that of the sexual instinct. As we saw, there is nothing in matters of fighting comparable to shame in matters of sex. Still, let us emphasise, even on the strength of what our schoolboys say, that the forces holding them back and determining their relatives' prohibitions belong in part at least to the moral order. (I call imperatives *moral*, into which the thought of consequences does not enter.¹) Prudential cares, fear of hard knocks, and fear of punishment, count for a good deal. But these are not alone in question. The oldest of our schoolboys write that it is *bad* to fight, without explaining why. Others, more unusual, censure fighting on grounds that are to some extent æsthetic: fighting is *ugly* and *coarse*. Whatever be the source of these estimates, they act on the child as a moral curb.

Instinct, according to James, normally gives rise to habits. Is the fighting instinct destined to give rise in man to habits of fighting? Let us understand what we would be at. We certainly do not think of anyone as continually fighting; nor do we see what interest nature could have in arranging matters in this way. But there is no question of this. The swallow does not pass all its time in building its nest. Instinct enjoins on the individual acts to be accomplished only for the moment; or an external circumstance occurs, and releases the chain of reflexes. The fighting play of the young animal has to fit him for provoking his competitor in a contest that will enable him to choose his female—*when the time comes*. Nature has also wanted to teach the child to be ever ready for the fight, to have mind and body at all times prompt enough to defend himself, if he is attacked, and to attack on his own account without fear or mercy, whenever opportunity serves him for his own advancement.

¹ Cf. the author's studies on the psychology of morals: *Archives de psychologie*, IX, *Année psychologique*, XVIII, *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, 1913.

But do not let us forget that, in so far as man is concerned, this reconstitution of "the state of nature" is quite hypothetical. The notions of *Bellum omnium contra omnes* and *Homo homini lupus* are abstractions of philosophers, dating from a period when ideas were held on the origins of our civilisation, which owed nothing either to the observations of travellers or to the researches of anthropologists.¹ In reality neither the animal nor the savage is so pugnacious as that.² We know hardly any animal which attacks those of its own species just for the pleasure of attacking them, which is continuously belligerent by nature. We must not imagine a permanent state of war as normal for the race, nor as that for which it is the mission of the fighting instinct in its origins to prepare the child.

"The taboo of blood, or life, must exist, at least in a rudimentary state, in animals, particularly in those living in a gregarious state. No society, not even an animal one, is conceivable without a certain respect for the lives of others. This taboo is therefore not peculiar to man; it pushes its roots down, like humanity itself, into animality. Perhaps it would be enough, to explain its genesis, to have recourse to the general law of selection. . . ."³

Doubtless the taboo of blood between individuals of the same species does not imply interdiction of fighting. However, once reason was at work, it must have been easy to pass from the one prohibition to the other. Thus from the very beginning, the fighting instinct of nascent humanity was to some extent regulated and *canalised*.

The fighting instinct, then, like the sexual, is thwarted in the individual by very strong inhibitions. What happens to it?

What happens to the sexual instinct, under compar-

¹ [In this connection, cf. the theory so attractively developed in *The Origin of Man*, by Carveth Read, who is both modern and an anthropologist. "It is my conjecture", he writes (pp. 34-5), "that man became gregarious, or recovered the social habit, because of the utility of co-operative hunting; so that he became at first a sort of wolf-ape . . . the hypothesis helps us to understand why man is still imperfectly sociable".—TRANS.]

² See quotation from Ellwood, p. 152 below.

³ S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes, et religions*, 1905, i. 8.

able conditions? There are many possibilities. Freud and his disciples have described them with great care, but have not, in my view at least, always taken the trouble to give us the full picture. In some measure, perhaps, this is due to their psychology being wholly dynamic, and scorning dead classifications; in life, where very extremes touch and merge into one another, no partition is impenetrable. In some measure also, perhaps, it is due to their being still not quite sure that they have come to the end of their discoveries.

The nearest approach I have found to an enumeration of the avatars possible for a repressed instinct is the following small table I have borrowed from Adler: ¹

Unconscious inhibition of an instinct shows itself in consciousness by phenomena which are thoroughly characteristic, and among which individual psychology takes particular notice of the following:—

1. The instinct is converted into its opposite.
2. The instinct is deflected towards another aim.
3. The instinct is directed upon the actual person of the subject.
4. The psychic accent passes over on to an instinct of secondary strength.

I shall not hamper myself with this classification. On the one hand, the author does not offer it as complete; on the other, it comprises facts which I do not intend to deny, but which are not clearly manifested in the course of this study of mine.

Let us simply follow up the fighting instinct in the child, and see what becomes of it according to the individuals concerned.

CONTINUATION.

In the first place, it may just *continue*, without apparent charge. The pressure of society is then without effect. The individual remains as an adult what he was as a child. Instinct having given rise to habit, he

¹ *Heilen und Bilden*, pp. 24-5.

[Cf. also many valuable and suggestive remarks by the late W. H. R. Rivers, in *Instinct and the Unconscious*.—TRANS.]

continues to feel the same pleasure in fighting, and takes advantage of every chance to do so. A pugnacious adult succeeds to a pugnacious child.

This case, psychologically the simplest, is socially the least satisfactory. The instinct, by permanently failing to change, turns the normal child into an *unadapted* man.

A Turkish teacher, M. Alaeddine, a student of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, has been good enough to forward some notes to me on children he has observed.

"When I was at a secondary school I knew two children, the most inveterate fighters in the whole school. One was a bad character; he fought for the sake of fighting, and sought, as best he could, to hurt his opponent. All the other boys took to their heels at his approach. Not content with the contests he engaged in at his own school, he formed groups of fighters, and took pleasure in attacking the children from another school.

"The other schoolboy's fights were honourable ones. Though he was proud of showing off his strength, he always protected smaller boys who took refuge with him; he had not the heart to fight those smaller and weaker than himself.

"I have had the opportunity of following up their lives. The former of these two fellows was expelled from the school, being unworthy of it. He became an apache, and later an assassin. The other, though he has remained a man always ready to join battle for the least of reasons, has had an honourable and serious career".

The first of these two children is an example of the type we are studying, a type that comprises several varieties.

In the sphere of sex, what would correspond to the foregoing would be an individual who satisfied his instinct with no concern for either moral rules or social conventions—a Casanova, for example. But here again we must distinguish different cases, according to the effective limits of inhibition. One man laughs at the refinements of the moral law, without overstepping legality; another snaps his fingers at the penal code, but is restrained by shame; another, again, defies shame, but stops short at incest; rare indeed are those who are driven by the instinct beyond all bounds whatsoever.

CANALISATION.

The necessities of social life require the fighting instinct to keep within certain bounds. In our peaceful societies at the beginning of the twentieth century, before the cataclysm broke upon us, opportunities for serious fighting did not abound. But it is to be observed how the fighting instinct continued to function with a minimum of alteration by being *canalised* in the fighting games of adults. These fighting games, which at other times, as, for example, in Greek antiquity or in the Middle Ages, had had their value as exercises—like the child's play of which they were the continuation—had come in our times to take on a *face value*. Not one in a hundred of those who indulged in Swiss wrestling contests, or in boxing, or football,¹ or fencing, did so in preparation for something more serious. These activities marked the canalisation, socially inoffensive, of an instinct which could find no opportunity to express itself other than through games.

It is to be remarked that each of these types of game—fencing, boxing, wrestling—devises regulations for an isolated movement, a phase, of the natural course of those child battles the whole sequence of which we followed out in our first chapter. In none of them does the chance any longer occur to *let oneself go*, to throw away weapons and resort to one's fists, or to second the effect of fists by kicking, biting, or scratching. Strict conventions are imposed on the combatants to canalise their instincts.

COMPLICATION.

There is still another possibility. The fighting instinct sometimes alters profoundly, but in such a way as not

¹ Football, combining the instincts of the chase and the fight, may furnish opportunity for certain *regressions*. "Modern football is perhaps the most primitive and may become the most savage of all modern games, particularly in the scrimmage or *mêlée*. It has been described as a prize fight multiplied by eleven (? fifteen.—TRANS.). The spectators too, relapse, and perhaps yell and dance like aborigines". G. Stanley Hall, *Recreation and Reversion*, p. 513.

to attract our attention, because the alteration simply results from the development of the other instincts. Aggressiveness continues to function, and is canalised ; but it is, above all, *complicated* by an alliance with all the other forces of the individual. The contest continues to be pursued for its own sake, instinctively, but the most varied resources of the mind are made use of, to render it more interesting, and to increase its chances of success. This *complication* of the fighting instinct begins early. It is not long, with both the individual and the race, before the value of skill, of a cool and collected head, and, little by little, of the highest forms of intelligence, comes to be appreciated. Agonistics testify to this enrichment of the fighting instinct, no less than the history of actual fights.

It would take us too far afield to pass in review all the instincts which come to be added to that of the fight, and so change the physiognomy of the latter. Along with intellectual functions, there are social tendencies, in particular the instincts of leadership—love of authority and command—and, on the other hand, the inclination to obey : the wish to be distinguished, and its opposite, the wish to remain one of the crowd.

Thus, for the fighting instinct at any rate, intellectualisation and socialisation appear to be the two main types of complication.

Similarly, in the sphere of sex, what we to-day call *love* presents innumerable aspects of the enrichment and complication of the primitive instinct. While the brutal instinct continues to function simply in some individuals, who represent among us the vestiges of an ancestral condition, yet, for at least the greater part of mankind, æsthetic, social, and religious values are attached to the satisfaction of their natural appetites.

CHAPTER VII

THE ALTERATIONS OF THE FIGHTING INSTINCT

ITS DEFLECTION, OBJECTIFICATION, SUBJECTIFICATION, AND PLATONISATION

DEFLECTION.

SPORTS have been psychologically reduced by M. de Coubertin to two main groups, *balancing* sports and *fighting* sports. "Fencing, boxing, wrestling, swimming, mountaineering, running, and football are fighting sports".¹ What is this but to say that the fighting instinct, simply canalised in fighting play, properly so called, has been still further deflected when swimming, mountaineering, and running are held to be as good as combats entered into with an opponent?

Of these different sports, mountaineering touches us the most nearly.² And in this connection certain pages of Javelle allow us to observe that M. de Coubertin's classification is so far exact.

After drawing up his *plan of attack*, the Alpinist describes the circle of peaks confronting him.

"This amphitheatre is formed of La Maya, Mont Dolent, the Aiguilles Rouges, the Tour Noir, and Darrei, which unite in a wall the better to bar the way, and which brutally rend the azure with their gigantic battlements. One would say that it was their mission to defend the approach to the white solitudes which stretch on the other side. As if they had to resist some warrior similar to those of the Hindoo epics, who could tear away whole mountain sides, they have heaped around their amphitheatre all the horrors they could find . . . an impassable line of granitelances . . .

¹ *Essais de psychologie sportive*, Lausanne, 1913, p. 11.

² [It is perhaps unnecessary to remind the reader that the author is writing from Switzerland—TRANS.]

. . . volleys of stones . . . the untamable brutality of its great walls of naked rock ; on all sides nothing but evil and menacing things are to be seen. . . . No, everything is well guarded, well defended ; there is not a weak point in this formidable enclosure, and, as if there were not obstacles enough, at the foot of all the walls opens the long vent of gaping rimayes. Do not imagine that at a distance, even in the midst of the amphitheatre, you are in safety. Stones started from the top of all these walls can reach you there, the glacier is strewn with their splinters. From time to time boulders leap down the great couloirs ; wait a little, and as it were a trial-avalanche rolls down ; anon all is silent, and this circle of giants remains there, terribly immobile, regarding you expectantly. Then—most insignificant and delicate little being, made only of flesh and blood—you arrive in the presence of these walls of granite and ice, and you oppose to them, it would seem, something yet stronger and more indomitable than themselves, since you have persuaded yourself quietly that, with your will, your intelligence, your courage, and a little patience, you will find a good way of overcoming all obstacles, in spite of everything".¹

Whatever be the acrobatic feats the climber has to make in order to keep his balance, Alpine climbing is certainly one of the fighting sports !

This conception of the mountain as an enemy—so strikingly brought out in the foregoing extract—will not astonish anyone who has met Alpinists. But, were it not that we are accustomed to it, we should not fail to be astonished at the imagination it betrays. Could anything be less like a fighter than rocks which are both inanimate and motionless ?

Besides mountains, the instinct may be deflected towards many other objects. As we shall see, for many natures every activity is a contest and every obstacle an enemy. The most natural way for such people to be stimulated to action is for them to make-believe, as is done at fairs, that they are aiming a staggering blow at an "Aunt Sally !" These deflections of the fighting instinct sometimes present an appearance that is far from agreeable ; instance the horrible saying of a young German working furiously in his garden : "At every clod we broke with our spade we made-believe it

¹ E. Javelle, *Alpine Memories*, English translation, London, 1909, pp. 367-8.

was a Frenchman whose head we were cleaving".¹ One thinks involuntarily of the fury of Ajax, massacring sheep that he took to be the enemies on whom he wished to revenge himself at all costs; or of the gentler madness of Don Quixote cleaving the windmills asunder.

The deflections of the sexual instinct are comparable at all points with those we are now considering. Let us recall only one classic example—the place taken by animals in childless households, and at the firesides of the unmarried. Other examples, of the same psychological stamp, are less inoffensive or more repugnant.

There is one form of deflection of the fighting instinct which is, so to speak, particularly ingenious and fruitful, from the social standpoint. This occurs when *competition* is substituted for the actual contest. There is still an opponent, and the same energy is still put forth; but this energy is not really spent *against* the opponent.² In this way all the excitement of the contest is preserved, and competition continues to direct the spectators' attention to the strongest. But society has eliminated some of the unpleasant effects of the fight. As the song has it, there are now

So many dead, and so many wounded—
Nobody killed at all.

Competition extends the field of pugnacity. Attack may be made on the record of persons who are absent. Above all, one may compete with *oneself*; one may surpass and overcome *oneself*.

OBJECTIFICATION.

A very different case from the foregoing is that in which the instinct *objectifies* itself to obtain satisfaction. Instead of plunging into the fray in person, a man may

¹ It is only fair to remark that we know of this saying only through the protest it evoked from a German educationist, Hans Reichenbach, in *Die Militarisierung der Deutschen Jugend*, "Die Freie Schulgemeinde," July 1913.

² The author has treated this subject of competition elsewhere, from the pedagogical standpoint. See his *Le Génie de Baden-Powell*, Neuchâtel, 1921, p. 27.

watch it from the outside. In matters of play, without taking part as an actor in an organised contest, he contents himself with imagining one, of which he becomes the spectator. This is already to be observed in the child, under quite definite conditions—conditions which are admirably brought to light in the following case, taken from autobiographical notes which a French colleague has been good enough to put at my disposal.¹

“ My parents were no longer young, my father being well past his sixtieth year. After the mid-day meal he took his rest in that dear old chair which, in my mind’s eye, I always see a little dilapidated, with its motley covering. During this period no noise might be made; I had to play quietly.

“ I was not twelve years old when my father died.

“ Being an only child, I was not tempted by others’ example. I saw other children playing in the street, but my mother had so thoroughly persuaded me that children who played in the street were ‘young cads’, that I never had the idea of mixing with them. To me they appeared as beings of a different race. Their running about, their shouting, and their quarrels, which I sometimes watched at the window, as at a cock-fight, seemed quite outside what I was fit for. I did not feel my legs made for running, like them, nor my fists and throat for striking and shouting, like them. Rather did the spectacle frighten me. It was beyond me, and at the same time seemed contemptible ”.

Circumstances were obviously doing for this child, in regard to the fighting instinct, what the naturalist Spalding did for the chicks, when he tied a hood over their eyes at the moment they ought to have been following the hen. He was not being allowed to fight, at an age when all his congeners were doing so. What was the result ?

“ It so happened that my first companions had been of the other sex. Actually, I knew no other companionship at first than that of two little girls, and I believe this must have had a profound influence on my character. I played very little with soldiers, and a great deal with dolls.

“ By the time I went to a boys’ school, this special kink in me had already been formed.

¹ The narrative is somewhat long, but it is so typical that, after having read it, no one will be surprised at my having been unable to bring myself to abridge it further.

"Perhaps it was because I was never physically very strong, and had no experience at all of the pride and intoxication of strength.

". . . On Thursdays, when I was alone at home, it so happened that I used to play with lead soldiers. But it was not the soldiers that interested me most. I began by turning over the oil-cloth on the table; on the side that now showed, it was green, and represented fields. I cut winding strips of white paper, which had to do duty for roads and pathways. Then I mobilised other toys, buildings and sheep-cotes; I built villages and scattered herds in the fields. Then, and not till then, I set out my armies in battle array. And still I preferred the representation of manœuvres to war.

". . . I was nine. This was the year of the great war in the school, and on this occasion I took an active part in the game. As a soldier? Not at all. As a general? No, again. As an ambulance man? Nobody thought of it. I was President of the Republic of Cravifie".

In his capacity as President he performed the functions of a statesman, drawing up regulations, acting as an administrator, disposing his troops, and designing the residence where he was to remain while the others were fighting on his behalf. But, the fight being once joined—

"In both camps we faithfully imagined we were being attacked by our opponents; for both sides the war was a holy one for the defence of our territory. Sometimes the action grew embittered, and the hand to hand conflicts turned to tragic issues. At such solemn moments I galloped into the fray at the head of my troops; but these were only brief appearances, worthy of a chief of state.

"It was very unusual for me to be attacked in the course of these sallies. But if that did happen, it was merely for form's sake; there was no fury in it; they knew I was not one of the fighters. Besides, as soon as I was assailed, two or three of my faithful body-guards were on the spot to protect me, and I always came back scot-free to my chalk citadel.

". . . Certain children take pleasure in destroying. As for me, I have never been able to see the breaking of a toy, the tearing down of the branch of a tree, or the crushing of an inoffensive beast, without a catch at my heart. Destruction was repugnant to me.

"I long remained leaning against my palace—a sombre grey wall running from the gymnasium to the water-closets—and I

did not tire of gazing out upon the battle; for each sally, each victory, seemed to proceed from me, complete, full-armed, like Pallas Athenæ from the brain of Zeus. My muscles hardly worked, but my imagination was on fire, burning fiercely without let or hindrance.

"... Later, towards the age of thirteen, I once more carried out a small imaginary war with my three best chums, or rather with the three friends of my childhood. Among them was a little girl of eight; we included her; and all four of us were generals! I had organised our army in the following way. To each general I had given as assumed name. Each had the command of an *invisible* army corps. A great part of my activity consisted in *paper*, drawing up military laws and regulations, and apportioning the various garrisons. There was also a commander-in-chief—who was just as real as our armies. So no one of us had to obey any other.

"The enemy was imaginary too. I had found everything went better so, for I had scruples about fighting with my friends, even in play".

Here we have the battle altogether objectified. Even the enemy is imaginary. The child still takes pleasure in belligerent activity, but this is completely intellectualised, wholly mental. There are now no more blows given or blows received than there are in the act of reading a novel. Thanks to the analysis, so well carried out by the author, we have here a proof parallel to that furnished by Spalding's chickens. The child who does not fight at the age when others fight, does not fight later on. Though it does not disappear, the instinct alters profoundly.

This tendency of the fighting instinct to objectify itself in early youth has found expression in a toy, the lead soldier. It is currently supposed that boxes of soldiers furnish the play characteristic of little boys, in the same way as the doll symbolises the interests of the little girl. This is a great mistake. There is a marked difference between the two cases. The little girl who busies herself with her doll is occupied with the fictitious child in the very way in which she would act in reality; from beginning to end of her play she is eminently active, and is really rehearsing her to-morrow's task. But the

boy who indicates his taste for fighting by setting his lead soldiers in array, is in some sort projecting his fighting instinct outwards, objectifying it, as we have put it, and incarnating it in the miniature figures which manœuvre before him. They advance and retire at his command. No doubt he is not merely a spectator, since, like the President of the Republic of Cravifie, he performs the functions of a general. He is rehearsing himself for command, if you like; but assuredly he is not rehearsing himself for fighting; and it is not for that reason that his case interests us at the moment.

The same objectification of the fighting instinct is to be observed in the pleasure so many people take in writing, reading, and hearing battle stories. The success of novels of adventure, explorers' narratives, stories about "Indians", and a great part of what is called *criminal* literature, testifies to the frequency of this deflection of the instinct.

Writers who would not personally harm a fly fill their writings with scenes of massacre.

Mr. H. G. Wells appears to me an interesting case of this kind. Take, for instance, his *scientific* tales, *The First Men in the Moon*, *The Food of the Gods*, *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, *When The Sleeper Wakes*, *The Invisible Man*, *The Country of the Blind*, and a dozen of his short stories, not to mention *The War of the Worlds*; in each you will find detailed narratives of horrible carnage. Every grand discovery which he imagines gives him the opportunity for hecatombs. In Wells's case one would be wrong to consider these tales of battle as an indirect satisfaction taken by a repressed instinct. This interpretation, plausible though it be at first sight, is combated by the fact that in the series of his other novels—should we call them *domestic* novels?—we do not notice this predilection for assault and battery. No; Wells's *scientific* novels embody his conception of the world, his philosophy, his ideas on society and progress; and it is in this, his general view of the universe as a battlefield, that the objectification of his fighting

instinct is realised. Other thinkers look upon the world as a battle in which they are themselves engaged; their fighting instinct is deflected and widened, but not objectified. For his part, he sees it as carnage towards which he plays the part of spectator. As he now is, so was old Heraclitus before him: "War is the mother of all things, and reigns over all things".

We have remained so far within the sphere of fiction—fancied battles, lead soldiers, warlike novels. But it is obvious that the same alteration of the fighting instinct must explain the interest thousands of people take in watching boxing and football matches—just as formerly they watched contests between gladiators—an interest to the satisfying of which the cinematograph is now contributing in a degree hitherto unknown.

This liking for the sight of battles, which we set down here as an alteration of the fighting instinct, is to be taken as the exact parallel of a well-known perversion of the sexual instinct—the perversion of the *voyeur*—which, for that matter, is only the exaggeration of a tendency observed also in normal sexuality. To the other forms of objectification of the fighting instinct, of which we first spoke, corresponds the extraordinary development of erotic literature and imagery.

But these objectionable parallels must not let us lose sight of more general considerations. Independently of every repression of the fighting instinct, the interest man takes in watching a battle is linked up with the pleasure he finds in seeing any event whatsoever unrolling before his eyes, with the generic instinct of curiosity.

Further, as we saw, the ends nature appears to be pursuing, when she urges individuals to fight, require that there should be spectators of the contest. Even among animals, we observed an instinctive tendency to watch the fight without interference. The objectified fighting instinct, the spectatorial instinct, and curiosity in general—in these three we have more than enough to explain the crowds that press round Carpentier and Bombardier Wells.

At the risk of turning back once more on our tracks, we must observe again that the objectification of the fighting instinct is naturally but not constantly¹ accompanied by cruelty. To project outside of oneself the contest one delights in, is to enjoy blows given, without the risk of receiving any. It is therefore to be expected that cruelty in the strict sense of the word—pleasure in causing suffering—and objectification of the instinct, will be reciprocally encouraging.

SUBJECTIFICATION.

Opposed to this objectification of the fighting instinct, which encourages cruelty—that is, the pleasure one takes in seeing others receive blows without taking the risk of getting them oneself—is there such a tendency as the *subjectification* of the same instinct, encouraging passive algophilia—that is, the pleasure one takes in receiving blows without risking the sight of another's suffering? What we know of sadism and masochism, and, in a more general way, of the *ambivalence* of certain tendencies, leads us to put this question. And, if we reflect on what happens with the sexual instinct in cases of auto-erotism and narcissism, we shall be inclined to answer affirmatively. Adler, as we saw, ranges the conversion of the instinct which makes it take for its object the actual person on the subject, among the usually observed effects of repression. He expressly quotes "humility, submission and devotion, voluntary subjection, flagellantism, and masochism" as the effects of this phenomenon. "The extreme limit to which this conversion of the instinct may go, is suicide".² Do

¹ See p. 97.

² Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 29. Adler seems occasionally to give a very wide meaning to *aggressiveness* (*Aggressionstrieb*). On p. 28 he defines it as "the tendency through struggle to lay hold on satisfaction" (*Trieb zur Erkämpfung einer Befriedigung*). But a little further on, on p. 29, he denotes "batteries, blows, biting, acts of cruelty" as "the manifestations of aggressiveness in its pure form". We are therefore in order when we identify his instinct with that which we ourselves have under consideration.

not let us go so far! The first stages, in which the *subjectified* combat is still clearly recognisable, are the most interesting. A very striking form of subjectification is irony, which is, properly speaking, teasing directed against oneself and, at the same time, against others. This manner of belittling oneself out of pride, of pushing oneself forward at the expense of oneself, is to be met with often in men who are otherwise by no means aggressive.¹ The most remarkable internal struggles are those which take on a moral value in the eyes of the subject.

Mon Dieu, quelle guerre cruelle!

Je trouve deux hommes en moi. . . .²

This hymn of Racine's, "taken from the Epistle of Saint Paul to the Romans", is entitled, "Complaint of a Christian on the Contradictions he feels within himself". It sums up and symbolises an experience that has been a thousand times repeated.

It is curious to observe how often, in this *internal* struggle, the mind has recourse to external and carnal weapons against its adversary. I refer to the importance assumed by blows, self-discipline, fasting, and all manner of maceration. As we might have expected, the inclination to suffer oneself links up with the subjectification of the fighting instinct, in exactly the same way as the pleasure of seeing others suffer is encouraged by its objectification.

PLATONISATION.

Among the deflections of the instinct, we have seen³ that particular one in which the physical effort of the

¹ I owe this remark to a talented psycho-analyst, Mme. Spielrein-Scheftd.

² My God! what a cruel war!
I find two men within me.

This is not the place to call to mind the struggle that occasionally springs up between two personalities coexisting in the same individual under certain conditions of morbid dissociation. Cf. the classic case of Miss Beauchamp, in Morton Prince's *The Dissociation of a Personality*.

³ See pp. 93-5 above.

contest is directed against an object that is no longer a person, and that only the imagination of the subject perceives as an enemy. It may happen, on the other hand, that there really is an opponent, of flesh and blood, but that the contest entered into against him has no longer anything in its external manifestations in common with the battle from which it borrows its metaphors. Then occurs what, on the analogy of Platonic love, I should call *Platonisation* of the instinct. Platonic love has an object that is wholly real; but there is no longer any trace of the physical behaviour of the primitive instinct in the attitude it imposes on the subject. The favours it solicits are all mental. Similarly, the Platonic contest is really a contest against a personal opponent, but the strokes aimed at him, and the strokes risked in return, leave no ecchymoses. We saw earlier how the instinct is complicated and enriched in proportion as intelligence develops; mental forces little by little come to preponderate in the combat. In the Platonic contest they take up the whole place. Tactics and strategy were introduced in agonistics; finesse and diplomacy—tactics and strategy without the striking of a blow—now supplant them altogether. *Cedunt arma togæ.*

The symbol of this stage in the evolution of our instinct is the game of chess. Chess is the war-game *par excellence*—with two armies, face to face, and each piece representing one aspect of the battle.¹ What could be more unlike two youngsters grappling in the street, than two solemn gentlemen sitting, motionless

¹ Groos (*The Play of Man*, p. 196) advances a curious theory on the possible origin of chess and other board games. "The primitive races, who find it difficult to convey their thoughts in speech, naturally take to marking on the sand, and hence the figure might arise. If the leader of one of the more intelligent peoples wished to instruct them concerning some past or future combat, it would be a simple method of illustrating his meaning to draw an outline on the ground and represent the position of the hostile forces by small stones or similar objects whose movements would symbolise the manœuvres of the forces or the advance of the knights for single combat". On this showing, a "war-game" analogous to that played by our own military officers would be the starting-point not only of chess but of draughts, halma, and backgammon.

and full of thought, one at each side of their chess-board? That *this* comes from *that*,

There cannot be any dispute :
But it must be admitted, I fear,
It has *altered* a little en route
In passing from *there* over *here* !

And yet it was in vain that chess Platonised the battle, for it still remains a man's game. In the two inquiries carried out by Scheifler on the games preferred by school-children,¹ chess, as is not surprising, is rarely indicated by children as their favourite game ; but it is so indicated twenty times more often by boys than by girls. The frequency of this choice increases regularly with increasing age : from 0·5 per cent. for boys of ten, it rises to 5·8 per cent. for boys of fourteen. This fact leads one to think that chess is a male pastime, not simply because it is a war-game, but because it makes appeal to reasoning.

CORRELATION.

To arrange our subject-matter in as ordered a manner as possible, we have studied *in isolation* the various avatars of the same instinct, and, making use of the etymological and Aristotelian meaning of the word, we have called these the *alterations* of the fighting instinct. But a liking for clearness must not be allowed to disguise from us the complexity of life. These alterations are not all mutually exclusive ; we have pointed that out as we went along. There is nothing to prevent the canalisation of the instinct during the actual course of its complication. Quite the contrary. Deflections are either alterations of the simple instinct—such as the madness of Ajax—or alterations of the instinct after it has been intellectualised and complicated—such as the mountaineering of a prudent guide. Similarly, there are instances of competition—deflections—which make no appeal to physical force—Platonisation. And so on.

Within the same individual one also observes several

¹ " Zur Psychologie des Geschlechter. Spielinteressen des Schulalters ", in *Zeitschrift für angew. Psychologie*, viii, 1913.

simultaneous and different alterations of the same instinct. All authors, as we said, are agreed in asserting that a pitiless asceticism—a mark of the subjectification of the fighting instinct—may coexist with definite cruelty—a symptom of objectification. I have friends whose pugnacity is manifested by a passion for mountaineering—deflection—and at the same time by a taste, which is surprising in intellectuals, for *criminal* literature—objectification.

It is very probable, however, that these various alterations of the same instinct are not all equally compatible one with another. It would be worth while to establish correlations between them. Some correlations would appear to be positive; the proportion of senior army officers—complication—who like the game of chess—Platonisation—must be considerable in countries where every one has the opportunity of being initiated into this game. On the other hand, lovers of chess must be but rarely lovers of boxing—negative correlation.

We have not pushed our researches far enough to be able to say anything further on this subject.

The most obvious contrast is between people who fight and people who do not; on the one hand, muscular effort and the risking of physical wounds, on the other, the absence of such effort and such risk, the fighting instinct being objectified or Platonised. One cannot both fight and not fight—in the simple, physical sense of the word. We should expect, then, with pugnacity as with the *libido*, to meet forms of objectification or Platonisation especially among those, like our small President of the Republic of Cravifie, for whom opportunities of satisfying their instinct have been lacking at the appropriate moment; among those, like intellectuals, ecclesiastics, and workers in sedentary occupations, for whom they are habitually lacking; and finally, among fighters in the intervals of fighting.¹

¹ See below on the reading of Loyola, p. 112, and on the liking shown by Frederick II for lead soldiers, p. 176. That fighting games which are altogether Platonic, such as draughts, etc., are met with among very primitive peoples (see Groos, *The Play of Man*, p. 191), is probably to be explained under the last clause above.

CHAPTER VIII

SUBLIMATION

WHEN speaking of the transformations of instinct in the spirit of the Freudian school, one cannot fail to come upon the idea, and the term, *sublimation*. It will be as well first to remind ourselves what Freud understands by this

"The third issue in abnormal constitutional dispositions is made possible by the process of *sublimation*, through which the powerful excitations from individual sources of sexuality are discharged and utilised in other spheres, so that a considerable increase of psychic capacity results from a, in itself dangerous, prohibition".¹

"In general, there are very many ways by which it is possible to endure lack of libidinal satisfaction without falling ill. . . . We therefore have to conclude that the sexual impulse-excitations are exceptionally 'plastic', if I may use the word. . . . One amongst these processes serving as protection against illness arising from want, has reached a particular significance in the development of culture. It consists in the abandonment, on the part of the sexual impulse, of an aim previously found either in the gratification of a component-impulse or in the gratification incidental to reproduction, and the adoption of a new aim—which new aim, though genetically related to the first, can no longer be regarded as sexual, but must be called social in character. We call this process *Sublimation*, by which we subscribe to the general standard which estimates social aims above sexual (ultimately selfish) aims".²

As it happens, the Freudians have reserved the term *sublimation* for the diversion of sexual tendencies towards ends that are foreign to primitive sexuality and socially

¹ *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, English translation, p. 322.

² *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*, English translation, p. 290.

more valuable.¹ But there is no reason why we should be bound by this restriction.

We would emphasise two points especially. First, that it is legitimate to apply the notion of sublimation to instincts other than the sexual; and secondly, that the term, by itself, implies nothing as to the way this giving of value to instinctive tendencies *works*.²

Conversely, the psychical form in which the altered instinct clothes itself, gives us no information about what we ought to think concerning this alteration, if we aspire to judge it in the capacity of physician, educationist, or moralist—that is to say, from the standpoint of an ideal.

In short, the concept of sublimation belongs less to psychology than to medicine and pedagogy; it always implies a judgment of value.³ We may even say—with Freud himself, as may be seen from the second passage quoted above—that it tends more and more to imply a *moral* estimate. This is just how Pfister understands it. For him, sublimation is “a derivation achieving results of high moral value”, and it is to be understood that, for him, morality means social morality. He does not leave it to the subject to judge, in the light of his subjective impressions, what the value is of the process going on in him. What is important for Pfister is the adaptation of the individual to the world and to society, adaptation such that the subject’s action on his environment is widened and enlarged. His criticism of asceticism,⁴ which he contrasts with sublimation, leaves us in no doubt in this respect.

¹ [Cf. Ernest Jones (the leading English Freudian), *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, second edition, p. 570: “When the primitive goal was a sexual one, this process of deflection, here on to a non-sexual goal, has been given the name of ‘sublimation’, but there are similar refining and modifying processes at work with all anti-ego impulses, e.g. cruelty”. And again, *op. cit.*, p. 364: “Sublimation concerns not so much the normal sexual desire as the individual components of the sexual instinct; it refers to the child far more than to the adult; it is an unconscious process, not a conscious one; and it does not consist in a replacement”. —TRANS.]

² Pfister, *The Psycho-analytic Method*, p. 311, says expressly: “As to its form, sublimation presents no new phenomenon”.

³ Cf. below, p. 110, the definition of Dürr.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 554 ff.

If the idea of sublimation belongs to the moral order, we may expect that very different alterations of an instinct will be held to deserve this name, according to the moral views of physicians and educationists. The belligerent ardour of a young man, deflected towards gardening, because, while digging, he imagines himself smiting his enemy;¹ the liking for battle objectified in the rich amateur who presents his town with an athletic ground; the pleasure in Platonised conflict shown by the politician who strives with all his might to break down the influence of some petty, ill-disposed tyrant—are these sublimations? Who shall say whether the social values thus secured are high enough to be worth this title?

It is better to move to a much higher plane. There are certain alterations of elementary instincts which are to be found at the basis not only of socially useful activities, but of the highest human functions in the spheres of art,² morality, and religion.

SUBLIMATION OF LOVE.

Freud was not the first to point this out. Long before him, Charles Secrétan, in *The Principles of Morality*, drew a comparison between the different senses of the word *love*, which is worth recalling, and which will be profoundly instructive for our purposes.

“In one fairly usual form of speech . . . the word *love* denotes the need for eliminating a product which is superfluous to individual existence, and which invariably accompanies the completion of the organism. This function demands a complementary organism, which becomes the object of desire. . . . Thus love consists in the desire for possession. . . . The loved object is only the means for obtaining a personal satisfaction; the lover thinks only of himself, and is simply and fully selfish. None the

¹ See above, p. 94.

² We have had to forego studying the sublimation of the fighting instinct in art. The parallel between love and fighting might easily be followed up in this sphere. The fine book of Groos, *The Play of Man*, to which we have already referred so often, would furnish not only materials but even lines of direction for such a work.

less, he is under the yoke of nature, and is the instrument of the race. . . .

"In the second sense of the word—the simple, human sense—love is not so much pleasure as happiness. . . . Possession of the body is no longer the inevitable object now, but rather the desirable complement of the real object, which is the complete possession of the loved one through the perfect gift of herself. It is still my own satisfaction I seek; but I cannot find it except in the happiness of the loved person. . . .

"And finally, there is a third kind of love, which in no wise partakes of desire. This is benevolence, well-doing, kindness, which, whether because it raises itself above its own needs, or because it naturally lacks nothing, wills the good of the loved object purely and simply, without thought of return for itself. This love knows no individual preferences. . . . It freely chooses the field in which its action promises to be the most effective. Such is the love of the Sister of Mercy for the sick whose sores she laves.

"These three senses of the word are absolutely diverse. Yet one shades into the other; and in contrasting the two extremes we find a sufficiently striking parallelism. There, we see sensual egoism making the other person its instrument and victim; here the total self-abnegation of devotion to mankind. But the egoism of conscious motives is only an illusion in everyday love . . . in pursuing his own enjoyment the individual sacrifices himself in his own despite for racial ends; while, in charity, where the general good alone is willed and the individual effaces and destroys himself, it is really he who triumphs, in the full assertion of his power. Mind and body . . . are in contrast in the two kinds of love; and yet it is the same law the applications of which we are following in both spheres. It is the feeling of personality which induces a man to forget himself and devote himself to charity. Each kind of love may thus symbolise the other, the true opposite of which it is. That is why the same vocable is really appropriate to express such dissimilar ideas".¹

To-day we think we understand that the unity of the three states described by Secrétan does not exist merely in the minds of those who, vaguely perceiving their symbolic relationship, call them by the same name. It is one single tendency the development of which leads man from one to the other of these kinds of love. Diverse as they are in their objects, they all contain the same

¹ Secrétan, *Le principe de la morale*, Lausanne, 1883, pp. 160 ff.

forms of *organic resonance* ;¹ and it is these latter which give to the kind look, the light touch, and the gentle voice of the Sister of Mercy dressing the wounds of the sick, something of the primitive tenderness of the lover.

From the moral point of view—the point of view at which Secrétan stands, and to which the idea of sublimation has brought us, too—the three stages are clearly differentiated. From the psychological point of view, we should say that in the second stage the instinct is canalised and complicated, while in the third it is, in addition, deflected and Platonised.

THE FIGHT FOR IDEALS.

Let us come back to the fighting instinct.

Along with charity, courage has always been highly regarded among the virtues. And, just as there is love and love, so there is courage and courage.

“Energy is meant for action. And as man cannot act except in some determinate way, either for the good or against it, all action inevitably assumes the character of a struggle. Every act is a conflict. . . .

“To put an end to conflict is impossible. Life is a conflict. As long as it lasts, conflict will endure. There is no getting away from this. . . . To say that the struggle is undertaken for life and to understand by that, material existence, is to affirm that life is the supreme good. This may be true for the beasts, whose greatest misfortune is to perish. But for man, life is not the supreme good. . . . The supreme struggle of any creature is for its supreme good ; and in the case of man, his supreme good is, not life, but justice. The great and righteous struggle is the struggle for justice. All other conflict is but the imperfect image of this ”.²

This notion of the fight for justice, of conflict as a symbol and epitome of the moral attitude, is to be met with in the most varied civilisations—in Christian chivalry,

¹ I have borrowed this phrase from Ernest Dürer. For him sublimation is the advantage which nature “takes of the individual’s sensual dispositions, to procure organic resonance for useful images and thoughts, especially for images and thoughts motivating useful actions”: quoted by Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

² Charles Wagner, *Courage*, London, 1894, pp. 193-5.

in Japanese *Bushido*,¹ and among the Greek Cynics, emulators of Herakles, the intrepid redresser of wrongs.

For, the same attitude may be imposed on the good man by very different ideals. Over and above the struggle for life—nutrition and reproduction—there is the struggle for the means of life—riches and power—which may themselves be taken as the goal. Over and above these selfish struggles, again, there are similar, but altruistic struggles for the lives, health, and prosperity of others—struggles for the family, the city, the homeland, or humanity. And finally, there are struggles for the supreme ends—beauty, truth, justice, freedom.

In proportion as the personality of the fighter is enriched, the instinct of the fight in him is complicated by its linking up with other instincts. The opponent, who was first of all the personal enemy, or the enemy of the clan, is transformed at the same time. When the stake in the conflict is a great, impersonal ideal, the opponent ceases to be a concrete person; the enemy is everything, wherever met, which obstructs the progress of the ideal. At the conclusion of this process of depersonalisation, there is a corresponding moral programme, entering into both the great moral attitudes, love and fighting, which at first appear to stand in such contrast; there is an implacable hatred of evil, and an indulgent pity for the guilty, the victim of enemy forces.

THE THREE STAGES OF SUBLIMATION IN THE FIGHTING INSTINCT.

The three stages that Secrétan distinguishes in the evolution of love are to be found, more or less, in the history of the fighting instinct. If we consider them from the point of view of their moral value, in the sense already indicated, we may see in them the three stages of sublimation; first, the primitive, selfish instinct; then the instinct complicated and enhaloed by altruistic thoughts; finally, the Platonised instinct, in which nothing of the physical behaviour of the first animal

¹ See Nitobe, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*, Tokio, 1908.

impulse remains, but which still reminds us of this behaviour by the organic resonance guessed at in ordinary speech and expressed through its metaphors.

The narrative of the individual's moral experiences occasionally enables us to follow out this transformation of the fighting instinct, stage by stage. The most typical case is no doubt that of Saint Ignatius Loyola. We shall relate it in some detail.

Ignatius Loyola was first of all a soldier of this world, "vigorous and well-built, very particular to cultivate a fine, elegant air, and fully resolved to follow the career of arms".¹ At the court he frequented, ideas of glory and honour played a significant role. The glory to be acquired by spectacular actions, and by success, was the standard by which the genius of a captain was computed.² Loyola had no other ambition. "He was of the country, and to some degree of the race, of the *conquistadores*".³

Then he became the Christian paladin, devoting his sword to the service of a high cause. Some of the circumstances of his conversion are too good illustrations for our present study for us to hesitate in restating them.

At the siege of Pampeluna, in 1521, he had his leg broken. For long months he was incapable of all activity. To amuse himself, he wanted to read; and his liking for battles made him ask those tending him to bring him *Amadis de Gaule*—"a phantasmagoria of heroism, with heroes slain, giants cleft asunder, knights overthrown by twos and threes at a blow, men-at-arms by eights and tens, and soldiers by thousands on the battle-field; and but a single valiant warrior, sometimes Amadis, and sometimes Galaor or another, to perform all these feats".⁴

Instead of that which his instinct craved for, they brought Ignatius *The Flower of the Saints*, and *The Life of Christ*. This was the beginning of an ardent meditation, which was crowned by a vision of the Virgin holding the infant Jesus in her arms. From that moment he chose his side. Renouncing the ideas of temporal glory on which he had fed his mind until then, he now had but one ambition—to give himself wholly to the service of God, and to emulate the noble virtues of those saints whom he had just learned to know.

But he was still, as one of his older biographers remarks, only "a conscript in the rude Host of the Spirit."

¹ Henri Joly, *S. Ignace de Loyola*, p. 5.

² Malzac, *Ignace de Loyola*, Paris, 1898, p. 103.

³ Dom Festugière, in *L'expérience religieuse dans le catholicisme*, i. 726 n.

⁴ Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, p. 242.

His encounter with the Moor indicates how imperfect was still the spiritualisation of his belligerent instincts.

"The half-converted infidel was prepared to admit that Mary had conceived Christ while still a virgin, but maintained that thereafter she had lived like other women! Ignatius, incensed at finding the glory of his Lady slighted, asked himself whether he was not in duty bound to avenge her. On the other hand, he was averse from shedding blood. He evaded the difficulty by slackening the reins of his mule, saying to himself that, if she followed the same road as the blasphemer, he would rejoin the latter and kill him".¹ Contrary to probability, and perhaps to the secret wish of Ignatius, too, his mule allowed the Moor to travel the main road by himself, and took to a mountainous path alone.

Henceforth his weapons were of no more use to him. He was not a Christian soldier, but a soldier of Christ. This third stage was inaugurated in March 1522 by the "vigil of arms" at Montserrat, a vigil inspired by the customs of chivalry, and still more, perhaps, by narratives from the romances. He hung up his belt, his dagger, and his sword, in a chapel. And there he left them. His spiritual weapons were now to be the clothing of a poor man, a kind of bag made of coarse cloth, shoes of esparto grass, a rope girdle, a gourd, and a wallet.

From beginning to end of his career, Ignatius remained a soldier. Long before he conceived the idea of commanding an army, he drew up the plan of his *Exercises*, which were to incite him to conflict; and in that way he set on foot "a military method, which made the soul and its different faculties march under orders, act by act, modality by modality".² He was a soldier before he was a general. Others, like Francis of Assisi, became commanders without anything in their language ever having shown the instincts of war. Others again, like William Booth,³ were born generals, and became soldiers only by accident.

The whole-hearted piety of Saint Ignatius was the spiritualised expression of his chivalric temperament. The Glory of God, in which His vassals share, remained his dominant motive.⁴ Jesus was his "Captain-General," appealing to His knights. "To fight for God under the Banner of the Cross, to enlist in Christ's Host, to be ready, night and day, to run whithersoever duty calls"—these were the images constantly in his mind.⁵

When the range of Loyola's action extended, he became a military leader. The vow of the seven friends at Montmartre (1534) was a crusader's vow. The society he founded was a

¹ Joly, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

² Dom Festugière, *op. cit.*, p. 729.

³ See p. 122 below.

⁴ Cf. Malzac, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁵ A. Brou, S. J., in *L'expérience religieuse dans le catholicisme*, ii. 446.

company; and *company*, to his mind, was a metaphor drawn from military life, synonymous with *battalion* or *regiment*.

"Whosoever", says the Bull of 1540, "will bear arms for God in our Society, which we wish to be called the Company of Jesus" . . . and, further on, "Let all the members of the Company know, and remember, not only in the first days of their conversion, but all the days of their lives, that all this Company, and all those within it, are fighting for God. . . ."¹

Something analogous is revealed by the life of Josephine Butler, who will always hold an honoured place in the history of nineteenth-century morals.

"She was", writes Mr. James Stuart, "a great leader of men and women, and a skilful and intrepid general of the battles she fought".²

And it is thus she is revealed in every page of her book, *Personal Recollections of a Great Crusade*, in which she recounts the efforts she undertook in 1870 for the abolition of the policing of morals and of the state regulation of prostitution. In this she gave proof of a courage and endurance, in the service of the cause, which make her a heroine of justice. She had instantly perceived the immensity of the task to which she was devoting herself with no other force than the force of her convictions.

When, in 1869, a Bill in Parliament, to introduce the policing of morals into the British Isles, roused her conscience to its life's work, she conceived this immediately under the form of a conflict. At the moment of throwing herself into public action she wrote in her journal:

"What have I to do with peace any more? It is now war to the knife. In a battle of flesh and blood mercy may intervene and life may be spared; but principles know not the name of mercy. In the broad light of day, and under a thousand eyes, we now take up our position. We declare on whose side we fight; we make no compromise; and we are ready to meet all the powers of earth and hell combined".³

This state of mind was the result of a profound crisis, which had lasted several years, and during which her pugnacity, stimulated by the sight of evil, and at the same time transfigured by the noblest of ideals, had not yet reached full sublimation. We have an echo of this in that fine letter she wrote in 1885 to Mrs. William Booth:

¹ Joly, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-4.

² *Josephine E. Butler, An Autobiographical Memoir*, by George W. and Lucy A. Johnson, with Introduction by James Stuart, p. ix.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

" You said in your address that, but for the grace of God, you would have felt desperate anger at those unjust and wicked men. I had to endure all that before the grace of God was in my heart, and even after, while it was not strong enough to overcome the fire of wrath within me. For months and years I longed to bathe my hands in blood. I was on the point of becoming an assassin of assassins. Vengeance, horror, and hatred devoured my soul. God seemed blotted out. What I knew and saw shook my hold upon Him. Demons seemed to govern the world. My dreams at night were of murder and violence. I hated with a hatred which broke my heart and drove me from God. I was a murderess in my heart, through vengeance".¹

We chose these two examples, Saint Ignatius Loyola and Mrs. Butler, on account of the stages to be distinguished in the *moral* sublimation of their fighting instinct. But, through its inspiration, the courage of both is closely linked to their *religious* experiences. It will be well to broach this new sphere, religious experience, on its own account.

¹ Quoted in *The Life of Catherine Booth*, by F. de L. Booth-Tucker, 2 vols., London, 1892, ii. 345.

CHAPTER IX

THE FIGHTING INSTINCT AND RELIGION

DOES the fighting instinct, which holds so important a place in the moral life, play its part also in religious experience?

RELIGION AND THE SEXUAL INSTINCT.

It is well known that contemporary psychology tends to establish the closest of relations between the religious life and the sexual tendencies, making the latter the source of the former. This theory was first advanced in a spirit of contempt for, and hostility to, religion; and it was opposed by William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.¹ James used arguments which appear inadequate now, when we have regard to the facts brought to light since his time, especially by Stanley Hall,² and, in neighbouring domains, by the school of Freud. The very principle that William James so well laid down—the distinction between questions of fact, relating to the origin of a phenomenon, and judgments of value, comprising an estimate of it³—has led judges who are as competent as they are impartial—Flournoy,⁴

¹ 1902, pp. 11 ff.

² In *Adolescence*, 2 vols., 1904.

³ "In recent books of logic, distinction is made between two orders of inquiry concerning anything. First, what is the nature of it? how did it come about? what is its constitution, origin, and history? And second, what is its importance, meaning, or significance, now that it is once here? The answer to the one question is given in an *existential judgment* or proposition. The answer to the other is a *proposition of value*, what the Germans call a *Werthurtheil*, or what we may, if we like, denominate a *spiritual judgment*. Neither judgment can be deduced immediately from the other". James, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴ Cf. *Une mystique moderne*, "Arch. de Psychol.", xv. 1915. Flournoy, however, vigorously opposes a form of this doctrine, the so-called erotogenic theory of Schroeder, who takes no account of sublimation.

[For an account of this modern mystic, see *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, by R. H. Thouless, Cambridge, 1923.—TRANS.]

for example—to subscribe to this sexual interpretation of religious facts.

Among the facts which first directed attention to the possible connection between these two orders of emotion, we must put in the forefront the importance taken, in the vocabulary of mystics, and even in ordinary religious speech, by terms borrowed from carnal love, and by metaphors, some of them very bold, used to describe divine ecstasies.¹

There is assuredly the same reason for our undertaking a close examination of the relationship between religious experience and the fighting instinct.

THE MILITARY VOCABULARY OF RELIGION.

In a little book which appeared in 1905,² Harnack showed the considerable place that has always been taken in Christian speech by terms borrowed from military vocabularies. Saint Paul describes the *panoply* of the faithful, and speaks of the *campaign*, the *army*, *ransom*, *prisoners*, *baggage*, *companions in arms*, the *fight*, and the *crown* that is to be the reward of the *conqueror*. In Clement of Alexandria are to be found the *trumpet*, the *phalanx*, the *general*. In Origen, and in Tertullian especially, such metaphors are still more abundant. Thereafter they pass into the condition of hackneyed phrases. Christians speak of themselves as *warriors* enrolled in an *army*, the *leader* of which is Christ. Those who are not of them are civilians, or *pagans*, a name which has stuck.

This kind of metaphor has not been abandoned since :

¹ Cf. quotations by James, *op. cit.*, p. 111 n. So far as I know, the case of Raymond Lulle, which furnishes a striking parallel to that of Loyola, has not been brought out as well as it deserves to be. Stopped in the middle of an amorous career, just as the other in the middle of a military, Lulle experienced a conversion which consisted in the sublimation of his love passions towards a religious object, just as Loyola's conversion consisted in the sublimation of aggressiveness. Lulle's language is as fully saturated with tender feelings as Loyola's with the warrior spirit. Some of the dialogue in *L'amé et l'aimé* is specially noteworthy in this respect. Cf. Marius André, *Le B. Raymond Lulle*.

² *Militia Christi. Die Christliche Religion u. der Soldatenstand in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten.*

quite the contrary. To be convinced of this, we have only to glance over collections of hymns of our own time. Take, for example, in English :¹

- (i) Onward ! Christian soldiers,
Marching as to war,
With the Cross of Jesus
Going on before.
- (ii) Soldiers of Christ ! arise,
And put your armour on . . .
- (iii) Fight the good fight
With all thy might . . .

And there are many more of like kind. Think also of Luther's hymn :

A sure stronghold our God is he. . . .²

And even in France, without going back to the Psalm of Battles, there are no more popular hymns in Protestant churches than certain battle-songs.³

These warlike expressions are not equally diffused in all epochs and in all faiths.⁴ Almost entirely absent from Moravian psalters, they flourish in Methodism and culminate in the Salvation Army. The great orders of the Catholic Church use them in very varied proportions.⁵ On the other hand, they are not limited to

¹ [The English examples are increased in number in this edition.—TRANS.]

² [Ranke said that this hymn was "the production of the moment in which Luther, engaged in a conflict with a world of foes, sought strength in the consciousness that he was defending a divine cause which could never perish". *Encycl. Brit.*, eleventh edition, article on "Hymns".—TRANS.]

³ [The following are the first lines of three of these French Protestant hymns quoted by the author:—

- (i) Up ! arise ! holy cohort !
Soldiers of the King of kings !
- (ii) The signal of victory shines from the skies. . .
- (iii) Soldiers of Christ ! To the fight ! To the fight !—TRANS.]

⁴ Curious observations might be made by bringing out the proportions of warlike hymns in the different collections, according to the age of the singers to whom they are addressed, or the type of church for which they are intended.

⁵ In French Catholic hymnaries we find : "March on to the fight ! March on to glory !" and "Arm, Christians, arm ! The voice of the Lord calls us to the fight".

Christian experience. The Mussulman speaks of himself as a warrior of Allah, and the Psalms are by no means lacking in explosions of bellicosity.

Such language raises a problem; for, obviously, these figures of speech express an attitude of mind. The popularity enjoyed by the hymns we have mentioned is due, less to their artistic, than to their religious merits, that is to say, to the manner in which they answer to certain permanent needs of piety. What relation is there between the warlike instinct and the religious life?

This is the question Harnack put to himself in the study to which we referred. He limited his investigation to the Church of the early centuries, for which the problem was a particularly intriguing one. "How could a religion, so manifestly pacific in intention and conduct as that of Christ, so quickly give its adherents the feeling that they were soldiers?"

HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

Put in this way, Harnack's question allows of a double solution; for it may be solved by historical, or by psychological means; by historical, through discovering, for each period in the life of the Church, the precise source of the military terms introduced into its vocabulary; by psychological, through studying *religious experience*, religion as it is felt and lived, in order to find what place is taken in it by the military or fighting tendencies of the individual.

Both researches are legitimate and necessary, and neither can be substituted for the other. Psychologists are at fault in despising the exact inquiries of the historians, and historians, in thinking the psychologists' interpretations useless. Sharply distinct though they are, these two orders of research ought to be brought together and used to complete each other. If history, the science of fact, intends to explain the events it recounts, then it ought to appeal, not to facts alone, but to laws; and these laws, when they refer to human facts, will often be the laws of psychology. On the other

hand, psychology, a science of law, can be built up only by induction from facts minutely observed; and, the more these facts belong to the past, the more will it depend on the help of biography and history.

Nevertheless, sciences of fact and sciences of law require such different turns of mind in their workers, that only too often the psychologists have disdained the historians, and the historians scorned psychology.

Take an example.

In his study of military saints, Father Delahaye observes that "the popular type of martyr most often presents himself to the imagination in a warlike form"; and he asks himself the reason for this. He glimpses two possible answers to this question, one psychological and the other historical, and he admits only one, the historical. "Was this warlike form the symbolic expression of the spiritual conflict which has led to the Christian life being compared to Christ's Host, and which early consecrated the term *soldier of Christ* to denote the most heroic among Christians, and especially the martyrs? Symbolism is a convenient explanation, and may suffice, in certain cases, to lull the imagination. Unfortunately it is quite superficial, and most often does not correspond at all to reality. Unless its application is perceived in a concrete case, the hypothesis deserves to be looked on with every suspicion. It seems more natural to attribute the frequent repetition of the military type to the vogue of a model".¹

Father Delahaye is right on one point. One general law of psychology cannot, by itself, account for an exact historical fact. But if we wish to see how what he calls symbolism clears up and solves the problem in a concrete case, we must read the short article by E.-Ch. Babut on the martyrs of Agaune. "All the martyrs were spoken of as 'soldiers of Christ', and, whenever several were glorified together, people did not fail to call them 'the holy legion'. This commonplace word, inserted into a festival lesson or a hymn, and afterwards understood literally, led to the belief that a real legion of 6,600 men had suffered martyrdom".²

Besides—and this is what is important for our purposes—were Father Delahaye right in his own hypothesis, yet, as soon as he had succeeded in demonstrating the replicas of a single model in so many legends, the solution of this problem in history would leave the psychological problem untouched. It would still remain

¹ *Les légendes grecques des saints militaires*, Paris, 1909, p. 118.

² *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, Lausanne, July, 1914.

to explain the *vogue* of the legend-type; and, to do that, to study closely the character of piety at the time.

Harnack himself in no way deserves the reproach we have just levelled at Father Delahaye. Before undertaking, on the plane of history, the solution of the problem he put to himself about the Christianity of the early centuries, he sketched out another solution on the plane of psychology.

"War", he writes, "is one of the constitutive forms of all life. Certain virtues that are not externalised find their highest symbolic expression under military conditions—obedience and courage, for example, ever-readiness, and faithfulness unto death. Hence, no higher religion has been able to do without images borrowed from war, nor, consequently, without soldiers".¹

Harnack, broaching the problem as a historian, has not minimised the psychological aspect of the questions he treats. Before the present writer himself, as a psychologist, examines the collection of facts he has brought together, he would prefer to prove that he is by no means indifferent to the many problems of history raised by each of the cases in which religious pugnacity is embodied. This he will attempt to do—and will be forgiven for this digression—by bringing forward a modest contribution to the study of the origins of a typical contemporary case—the Salvation Army.

The Salvation Army is an evangelical organisation, spread over the whole world. It has its soldiers of both sexes, in uniform, its officers of all the ranks of the secular army, its general, its staff, its corps, its headquarters, its councils of war, its journals—*The War Cry*, *The Little Soldier*—its flag, and its watchword—*Blood and Fire*. "Altogether pacific, besides", as Harnack says, "it has done great things, and constitutes one of the most curious phenomena among the Christian organisations of modern times".²

Founded in 1865, under the name, *The East London Mission*,

¹ Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7. On the history of the Salvation Army see especially George S. Railton, *General Booth*, London, 1912; F. de L. Booth-Tucker, *The Life of Catherine Booth*, 2 vols., London, 1892, and Harold Begbie, *The Life of William Booth, the Founder of the Salvation Army*, 2 vols., London, 1920. Also P. A. Classen, *Der Salutismus*, Jena, 1913, which contains a very careful bibliography.

this great work of evangelisation did not take its present title until 1877, and then only in circumstances in which the will of its leader, William Booth, went for little.

He was preparing his Christmas appeal, and was walking up and down his office, discussing the details of this circular with his eldest son and his assistant, Mr. Railton. It was a question of stating in a few words what precisely the Christian Mission was. Mr. Railton had the pen in his hand. He wrote: "The Christian Mission is a volunteer army composed of converted workers". "No", said Mr. Booth, "we are not volunteers, for we feel ourselves compelled to do what we do, and we are always on service". He struck out the word *volunteer*, and substituted for it the word *Salvation*. A Salvation Army! It was simple, direct, it sounded well. "So corrected", writes Mr. Railton, "the phrase immediately struck us as a happy one". In two words it expressed the great principles on which the Mission was based, and the high aim set before it. The new name was first joined to the old; soon it passed into the foreground; finally, the early appellation, *Christian Mission*, disappeared altogether.¹

If an army is a collection of men under the orders of a leader, the Christian Mission was an army several months before gaining its new name. In January 1877, Mr. Booth had proposed to his 36 collaborators that they should abandon the democratic organisation he had little by little given to his work, and replace it with a constitution reminiscent of the autocracy of Wesley. Committees took up too much time, he said to them; the evangelists were continually asking questions about meetings and places, questions which had to be answered immediately. They were at war. They were at grips with an active and enterprising enemy. Prompt decisions and immediate action were necessary for success. The annual conference might be maintained, but in future it should have the character of a council of war, rather than that of a legislative assembly.

Obviously, William Booth had, to a high degree, the temperament of a leader. If it was not he, in his work, who arrogated to himself the title, it was certainly he who took upon himself the functions of a *general*.

About the same time, countless details concurred to give the work its warlike character, without there ever having been a deliberate intention to adapt secular, military institutions to a religious purpose.

The title of *captain*, which led on to the hierarchy, now so rich,

¹ Booth-Tucker, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 139. I have also in my possession an account written by Mr. Railton himself, reproduced in the *Canadian War Cry*, August 2, 1913.

of the ranks by which the members of the Army are distinguished, was originally more naval than military. It was designed to catch the ear of the Whitby fishermen. Some time before, the annual conference had forbidden the evangelists to call themselves *The Reverend*. But the commonplace *Mr.* had the same inconveniences, and counted for nothing with the masses. *Captain*, we are told, had the advantage of being biblical and popular; it was commonly given to the masters of coasting vessels, to the overmen and foremen in mines and industry, not to speak of the leaders of football teams.

Our inquiry leads us to explain the characteristics of the Salvation Army by the coming together of several men of very different types. Unlike the Company of Jesus, it was not the product only of the temperament of its founder. William Booth had nothing particularly bellicose about him. As a child, his favourite pastime was fishing. Undoubtedly, he had been converted, at the age of fifteen, in a Methodist chapel, and had thoroughly imbibed the habits of speech of this environment. A letter has been preserved which he wrote at twenty years of age to a friend. It abounds in warlike imagery.

"Grasp still firmer the standard! Unfold still wider the battle flag! Press still closer on the ranks of the enemy, and mark your pathway still more distinctly with glorious trophies of Emmanuel's grace, and with enduring monuments of Jesus' power! The trumpet has given the signal for the conflict! Your general assures you of success, and a glorious reward, your crown, is already held out. Then why delay? Why doubt? Onward! Onward! Onward! Christ for me! Be that your motto—be that your battle cry—be that your war note—be that your consolation—be that your plea when asking mercy of God—your end when offering it to man—your hope when encircled by darkness—your triumph and victory when attacked and overcome by death! Christ for me! Tell it to men who are living and dying in sin! Tell it to Jesus that you have chosen Him to be your Saviour and your God. Tell it to devils, and bid them cease to harass, since you are determined to die for the truth!"¹

From this we may conclude that William Booth was well prepared by his Methodist training for the language he was to use later on. We should be wrong in concluding from it that he was predestined by nature to command an army. His biography shows that he was of the stuff that makes leaders; he was a man of initiative, apt for great enterprises. He was made to found an order, to direct a movement. But his Mission lived and prospered for twelve years without his thinking of turning it into an

¹ Booth-Tucker, *op. cit.*, i. p. 53.

army. The more we know of the facts, the more we see that his work owes its warlike shape to the fact that this leader of men came into touch with two characters very different from his—Railton and Cadman.

Railton certainly had the temperament of a soldier, and, more precisely, of a skirmisher. "Left to himself, however, his genius would probably have been rather of the destructive than constructive type. A radical of radicals, and an extremist of the most pronounced stamp, he was for exposing, tearing down, and demolishing every form of religious sham and humbug that he encountered".¹ His missionary zeal urged him to numberless extravagances. He learned Spanish, and set off for Morocco without money or friends. Later, when he was already a Salvationist, he travelled through England on foot, bare-headed, carrying a red banner in his hand, which bore the three words, *Repentance, Faith, Holiness*. On another occasion, he preached uninterruptedly for three days and three nights. From 1872 Railton was Mr. Booth's collaborator, and appears to have immediately played a very important part in the Christian Mission.²

As for Cadman, he began by being a fighter in the more literal sense of the word. Born and brought up in the slums, by occupation a chimney-sweep and by inclination a boxer, a great frequenter of public-houses, a gallows-bird, squat, strong for his size, he was a tough customer in all the assaults and batteries in which he was for ever being mixed up. His conversion was as complete as it was sudden.

It was Cadman, it would seem, who invented the title of *captain*. It was he also who, in 1877, before the adoption of the name *Salvation Army*, announced a meeting of Mr. Booth's at Whitby by introducing him as the *general* of the *Halleluia Army*.

I have cause to think that the role played by Cadman in the totality of events with which we are now concerned was second to none.

The Salvation Army, as we know it, results from the meeting of these three temperaments—the leader, the apostle, and the fighter.

Such would be our *historical* conclusions on the genesis of the Salvation Army. Obviously, they leave the psychological problem intact. It remains, in fact, to understand the Army's affinities with the environment in which it had its birth; not so much the environment of Methodism, as that of the *down and out*, where it was

¹ Booth-Tucker, *op. cit.*, ii. 27.

² See *Commissioner Railton*, by Eileen Douglas and Mildred Duff, London, 1921.

to achieve such magnificent successes. One may already guess that the case of Railton, and still more that of Cadman,¹ are typical of certain large classes of mind.

ZINZENDORF.²

If I have insisted on the distinction between the two problems, the historical and the psychological, it is because it seems to me this is too often forgotten. If I am not mistaken, disregard of the respective rights of the two disciplines has warped the conclusions of two inquiries, both ingeniously carried out, namely, those by Pfister³ and Reichel⁴ on the source of the mystic vocabulary of Zinzendorf. Pfister, as a psychologist, lays bare all the sexual tendencies hiding behind the rich imagery of the pious count. Reichel, as a historian, shows the numerous borrowings Zinzendorf has made from the hymnology of his time. There is no necessary contradiction—and indeed, I believe, no contradiction at all—between the facts they each set forth. Discrepancy appears only in the judgments of value they bring to bear on their author. Pfister contends that Zinzendorf sublimated his voluptuousness insufficiently, or rather, did not sublimate it at all. Having regard to his work,⁵ one may hold a different opinion on this point.

FAILURES OF SUBLIMATION.

Let us come to our psychological problem. We spoke of sublimation, when an instinct was deflected so as to achieve results of high moral value. By taking several

¹ Former boxers are not unusual among the soldiers of the *Army*, as has been shown by Harold Begbie in his *Broken Earthenware*, 1911.

² [Born at Dresden, 1700; 1721, became associated with descendants of the old Moravians; established these at Berthelsdorf; preached and wrote and travelled in Europe and America; tried in vain to effect religious union with Wesley; 1727, put in order the ancient Moravian liturgy.—TRANS.]

³ *Zinzendorfs Frommigkeit im Lichte der Psychoanalyse.*

⁴ *Die Frommigkeit des Grafen L. von Zinzendorf.*

⁵ Cf. Félix Bovet, *Le Comte de Zinzendorf*, Paris, 1860, English translation, *The Banished Count*, and abridged translation, *Zinzendorf, a Pioneer of Social Christianity*, London, 1896.

typical examples,¹ we have observed that, with the fighting as with the sexual instinct, this sublimation is occasionally tinted with a religious colour, being associated with a comprehensive vision of the value to be put on the universe and on life, with a conception of God and His action in the world.

But it very often happens that the mere, crude, primitive instinct, in no way sublimated or Platonised, takes on a religious value for the subject, and is regarded by him as the worship of God. The study of such failures of sublimation is instructive. In the sexual sphere the facts are particularly striking and have been often mentioned. Take, for example, the cult of the phallus, sacred prostitution, and the obscene rites—of varying degrees of obscenity—in all primitive civilisations. The deification of carnal love is apparent even in higher civilisations, throughout their history. No doubt the sects which have been accused of practising debauchery, under the cover of religion, have not all deserved this reproach; but the indubitably attested facts, relating to both individuals and groups, are numerous enough for us to see in them an indication of the link uniting the two orders of emotion. They thus constitute a warning, how fragile are the highest sublimations, unless common-sense, represented in the race by dutifulness toward our neighbour, steps in and adapts the ecstasies of the mystic to the needs of social life.

Failures of sublimation are not less numerous in the domain of the fighting instinct. Mars and Venus are brother and sister. The worship of brute force is not less ancient nor less extensive than that of carnal love. And the same regressions to the most primitive forms of paganism reappear in the great religions. Mahomet's Holy War is on the same level as his sensual paradise.

In Christianity, since Constantine turned the *labarum* into a military symbol, it has happened often enough

¹ Saint Ignatius, Mrs. Butler, Railton, and Cadman. See also, below, the cases of Penn and others.

that armed conflict has been extolled as a religious service, not merely by isolated individuals or sects, but by the Church as a whole. War has been given divine sanction. At times, in the eastern churches, it was the close assimilation of church to nation which led to the proclamation of a holy war, in cases of extremity. Then the whole people rose in defence of the national God. Such a condition of affairs reminds us of that which obtains in primitive cultures, where each tribe has its god, "going on before it".¹ In the West, the wars of Charlemagne and the Crusades were also fought by Christendom as a religious service, *for Christ and the Church*.

"As for the Protestant churches", wrote Harnack, in 1905, "the military element is totally absent, the political element itself counting for much less than in the Catholic Church. No doubt they, too, and notably the reformed churches, have had to draw the sword on behalf of the Gospel—instance the Huguenots and Cromwell—but it has been only to meet incidental necessities".²

Taken literally, this assertion remains true to-day. The churches were not directly engaged in the European War of 1914-18. But who will deny that a large number of them to-day in the West are, in spirit, quite as *national* as the Russian or the Armenian church, and quite as ready to consider a struggle entered into by the state or the nation as the worship of God?

This phenomenon, which appears as a regression when we are speaking of religion or of the Christian Church as a whole, is interesting to observe also in individuals. The liking for conflict is very strong among many churchmen. So long as it is a question of theological anger, propagandist ardour, ecclesiastical politics, even spiritual fanaticism, we may still speak, if not of sublimation in the full sense of the word, at least of Platonisation of the fighting instinct. But there is often much more,

¹ [Cf. the hymn already quoted, "Onward! Christian soldiers."—TRANS.]

² Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

or much less, than that ; either an inward conflict, where the mind often has recourse to very carnal weapons against the flesh—flagellation and all manner of ill-treatment—or, worse still, an objectification of the fighting instinct, leading the religious to take pleasure in watching others being persecuted and tortured.

Finally, in a number of religious minds, the instinct appears quite simply, in its crude, primitive form.¹

The converse is striking, too. The figure of the Christian soldier is not less classic than that of the soldier priest. General Gordon and General de Sonis—and how many others!—took up, in wholly original fashion in the twentieth century, the succession of the devout knights of the past. If the alliance of sword and cassock, of army and clergy, is so usual on the political plane, it is, it would seem, because this alliance has singularly deep roots in the individual himself—roots so deep that, after all we have just been considering, we may hold ourselves justified in recognising the fighting instinct as a constitutive element in religious experience.

Would the psychologists who put the *libido*² at the starting-point of religion rise up in their wrath against this conclusion? They would be wrong. As we observed, the relationship between the fighting and the sexual instincts is very close. There is nothing to prevent these psychologists from viewing the pugnacity which

¹ *Nomina sunt odiosa*, but in Switzerland, in Italy, in Germany, and no doubt elsewhere, the war of 1914-18 brought out the belligerent temperament of certain churchmen. After the Boer War, an English pacifist, Walter Walsh, wrote a book called *The Moral Damage of War* (London, 1902). The documents he gathered seem to me most interesting.

[As I write there comes into my hands a copy of *The Nation and Athenæum* for February 17, 1923, in which mordant criticism is levelled at a dignitary of the Church of England for his attempt, as his critic put it, to improve upon the Sermon on the Mount. It would appear that he had refused to hold out the hand of fellowship to a dozen German students who had been invited to spend a month in England. He was, he is reported to have said, "a plain Englishman with red blood flowing in his veins". Red blood, we know, will not always submit to sublimation!—TRANS.]

² [In Freud's, not Jung's, sense of the term. See note above, p. 85.—TRANS.]

we have treated in isolation, as one of the components of the *libido*; and the preponderant place they attribute to sexuality in the genesis of religious experience will then explain quite naturally how the fighting instinct comes into it.

Do not let us discuss *in the abstract*; or we shall be running the risk of unprofitably exaggerating divergences of view, which depend in large measure on the more or less extended meaning we give to the terms *sexual instinct* and *religious experience*.¹

THE PLACE OF FIGHTING IN RELIGIONS.

Let us rather see what part the various religions allow to conflict in their manner of regarding the universe.

There is something of optimism in them all,² for, if we are to credit Höffding, the generating principle of them all is anxiety for the conservation of values.

But, while this is true of every religious attitude, yet for the most part this optimism is not integral. Most believers would say with Voltaire,

That all will be well one day—therein lies our hope :
That all is well to-day—therein lies delusion.

The term *meliorism*, invented by James, serves much better than *optimism* to characterise the most frequent

¹ Since the publication of the French original of this book, the author has had the opportunity of studying the psychological sources of the religious sentiment. In his opinion, they ought to be sought in love, but in *filial* love, rather than in the *conjugal* love of the mystics. This allows us to explain also the ease with which an alliance is formed—an alliance that often amounts to confusion—between the religious sentiment and patriotism. Belligerent ardour naturally profits by this confusion. Cf. *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, Lausanne, Nos. 32 and 36, 1919 and 1920.

² "That which remains with me as the last foundation of morality and religion is—*Despair not*. This formula implies that Reason will have its way in the end, that the Good is the Final Cause of things, or, to put it otherwise, that God is God—according to the Mahometan profession of faith—that God alone is *that* he is—Hebraism—that God is Love—Saint John. It is the practical synthesis of every monotheistic creed. Ormuz and Ahriman will not always be equally powerful. Ormuz will end by conquering. Everything will come right in the end; otherwise, there is no God, or God is not God." Félix Bovet, *Pensées*, p. 214.

religious attitude, particularly the Christian attitude. Integral optimism, the joyous acceptance of life as a whole, is the superhuman intuition accorded in ecstasy, and sometimes the slowly ripened fruit of meditation in the sage; it is not everyone's daily bread, nor even the daily bread of every religious soul.

Now the idea of conflict is foreign only to the extreme attitudes of despairing pessimism and contented optimism.¹ In all others the conservation of values supposes and implies a victory, and hence, a conflict. Religions are distinguished, one from another, according to the theatre assigned by them to *the struggle*, and the part they allow to man's efforts in it.

At the origins of religion, the struggle in question is a form of that between man and nature. Good spirits serve him, on occasion, as auxiliaries against bad; but even the latter may be constrained by suitable magic practices to serve the ends of one who knows how to make use of them.

At this stage there may be a religious struggle of men *against* the gods, to force the latter to lend their aid. "I will not let Thee go, except Thou bless me", said Jacob, wrestling in the night with the Almighty. This mysterious episode in Genesis, together with Christ's parables on the effects of persistent prayer, and the saying about the violent who ravish the Kingdom, exert a stimulating influence to-day on the aggressive ardour and tenacity of certain Christians.

Later, in Zoroastrianism, for example, and in the gnostic epics related thereto, we have the struggle of the Good against that which opposes it. The triumph of the Good requires an effort on the part of the Principle of the Good. Certain forms of our own liberal Protestantism—very heretical forms, no doubt—have taken up this conception, which is not without grandeur,

¹ I noted the following significant remark in Charles Wagner's *Courage*, p. 194: "To counsel us not to fight is to engage us to abdicate and to declare that life is an evil". Logically, one would have expected the sentence to end, "that life is good". Practically, the two extreme attitudes are equivalent.

and have Platonised the struggle.¹ The monsters to be cleft asunder by their Ormuz are the evil tendencies in man, or the inertia of matter; and they speak of a God who toils at the kneading of this rebellious dough, toils in the sweat of his brow and in suffering, and toils partly in vain.

But, in general, in Christianity, the majesty of the monotheistic God has appeared incompatible with the risks of a real battle. The elements constituting the conflict are in some sort duplicated; the Son suffers, receiving strokes without returning any, while the Father triumphs without having an opponent who can reach him. As for the faithful, if they share the sufferings of Christ the humiliated, they are yet associated, even here below, with the victory of Christ the conqueror. They are fully involved in the conflict. *Bella premunt hostilia.*

To look for the exact significance of this struggle, and of its various aspects, we should have to pass the whole history of dogma in review.

It is enough for us to have shown that man's fighting instinct has been objectified under different forms at every stage in the history of religions, and that it holds a place of honour in Christian doctrine. That need not surprise us, recognising, as we do, the power of the tendencies which urge man to conflict.

THE MORAL ELEMENT IN RELIGION.

Religious experience is not identical with the sublimated fighting instinct. On the one hand, religious experience comprises elements in addition to those of conflict; on the other, the sublimated fighting instinct enters very largely into attitudes which have nothing specifically religious in them.

"Every religious genius", wrote Flournoy in 1904, "is constituted by two elements indissolubly united and equally indispensable, the mystic element and the moral element".²

¹ Cf. H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*, London, 1917, p. 120: "It is not by suffering that God conquers death, but by fighting".

² *Le génie religieux*, p. 4.

I should like to appropriate this formula, paraphrasing it in the following terms: In the experience of the great religions, and more particularly in that of the Christian religion,¹ there are two fundamental aspirations; the one aims at triumphing over Evil, and is an element based on fighting; the other aims at uniting with the Good, and is an element based on love.

If it is desired to reserve the epithet *religious* for the latter element, the former may be considered as more particularly *moral*, and it may be concluded that conflict enters into the great religions, because these are, by definition, moral religions.

It is to be noted that everything is not combative in the military metaphors of religions; everything is not related therein to the *moral* element.

As we observed, these images have gone on being enriched in the course of centuries. At the beginning, we have in the forefront the conflict itself, its risks, carrying with them the duty to be well armed, the personal bravery and endurance of the fighter, the enemy and his wiles, and the recompense promised to the victor. The struggle in which each one of the faithful is engaged is no doubt not a selfish one, conducted on his own behalf; but there is no single leader. Each fights away by himself, and unity of effort does not appear. The conflict is a scattered one.

With the establishment of the Church, the idea of the army takes precedence over that of the private soldier. All the separate efforts are co-ordinated, and the Christian Host is ranged in a hierarchy. Personal fidelity to the leader is coined into little disciplinary duties towards immediate superiors.² Little by little, obedience comes to be considered, almost on the same grounds

¹ "To become as a little child, to have no other care than to remain always in the attitude of repose and perfect abandonment, which is that of the little child in his mother's arms! And yet, from time to time I hear a voice—and this voice also comes to me from the Gospel—which troubles and unsettles me, a voice crying, 'Strive!'" Félix Bovet, *Pensées*, p. 193.

² See the author's articles alluded to above, p. 129.

as intrepidity, as the governing quality of the soldier. He is exercised in obedience, just as he is trained in courage.

Finally, just as in modern campaigns the role of strategy appears more and more prominent, so certain Christian missionaries make a military virtue even of intelligence. With regard to one of these, I wrote in 1911:

"John R. Mott is the general of an army on the march. The most famous of his books, the *Commentaries* of his first campaign, bears the following title: *The Strategic Points in the World's Conquest*. John Mott attacks the problems he encounters just as did Descartes a problem in physics. He treats them as would a man of science who is at the same time serving as an officer of Sappers".¹

Now in certain individual cases and in certain collective undertakings, it has come about that the army, obedience, and the beauty of combination, have driven the struggle against evil out of sight. The instrument is so perfect that it becomes admired for its own sake, and the aim for which it was designed is no longer thought about. The sense of social cohesion becomes so important in consciousness that the fighting instinct is pushed into the background. Several factors in the military mind—obedience, for example, and attachment to the leader—have nothing aggressive about them. Quite the contrary.

The recent case of Ernest Psichari, to which we shall return soon, is very characteristic in this respect. He obviously came to Christ through the Church, to the Church through the secular army, and to the army through his need for obeying. The moral element appears to be totally lacking in this conversion.

CONCLUSIONS.

What relation is there, then, between the fighting instinct and religious experience?

If religious experience has two aspects, the one being surrender, for the sake of union with the divinity, and

¹ *Quelqu'un John R. Mott*, pp. 3 and 10.

the other, fighting, for the sake of the struggle against evil, we may see the moral element in this experience as the sublimation of the fighting instinct, in contrast to the quietist element, which would be, as has been pointed out, the sublimation of the sexual instinct. And further, since so many facts show us the close relationship of the two instincts, we may also conceive them as one and the same vital impulse, the integral sublimation of which is full and complete religious experience.

What is true of religion in general is true also of Christianity. If the inward behaviour of the Christian is so often that of a warrior, this is because every man has in him a deep-rooted desire for fighting, and because Christianity, inviting man to unite with God and collaborate with Him in the triumph of Good over Evil, necessarily appeals to this instinct. In order that the fighting instinct may, in the spirit of the Gospel, take on a moral value, and that there may be left in it nothing which will obstruct the union of man with God, both Spirit and Love, a transformation of the instinct is necessary, which not every man who has submitted himself to the guidance of Christ brings to good issues. The belligerent feelings of the old Adam often persist, strangely associated with the highest ideals.

CHAPTER X

THE FIGHTING INSTINCT AND VOCATIONS

WE have followed out, as best we could, the transformations which the fighting instinct undergoes under the pressure of circumstances. Before deducing from our observations certain conclusions that relate to education, it will be well to take a closer view of the social effects of the instinct. And first of all let us take the following question. Since the pugnacity of an individual shares in the determination of his artistic, moral, and religious attitudes and concepts, will it not influence him too in the direction he is to give his life through the choice of a career?

PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS.

The general question of the relations that exist between an individual's instinctive likings and the profession or trade he follows, is of the greatest interest. It is astonishing how little this has been studied up to now.

Quite recently, it is true, the science of social economics has been occupied with a problem that is nearly akin. To guide a child in the choice of his career, it has occurred to people to inquire into his aptitudes. Tests have been invented to throw these into relief. Vocational guidance has become as much a psychological as an economic study in the United States.

But this is not altogether what we would be at. We are speaking of the natural likings and instincts of the child, rather than of his capacities and aptitudes.

Perhaps it is worth while to show that the psychological study of this question is legitimate, and to forestall an objection that will no doubt be raised by certain

intransigent sociologists. "If", they will say, "you wish to know why individuals choose this or that occupation rather than another, study the law of supply and demand. You will find the answer, not in the likings of the individual, but in the needs of society. And if, in addition to economic considerations, you will take into account the greater or less estimation in which the different vocations are popularly held, you will still be brought back in the end to sociological laws".

Once again, we are faced with two methods, which are not really contradictory so much as complementary. Legitimate though it is, the sociological way of envisaging the problem is not the only one. The psychological inquiry into the likings and tendencies of the individual ought, indeed, to rank with the other; it is more concrete, and relates to facts that are more primitive. No doubt the likings and tendencies of the individual do not always find satisfaction at the moment when he enters upon a vocation. A child does not always become what he has dreamt of becoming. His bent is very often thwarted. Nevertheless, to understand what he does become, it is indispensable to start with his instincts. Society will modify the road he follows, but, strictly speaking, will not set him in motion. It will never do more than guide his steps, and it will guide these, chiefly, by putting obstacles in his way!

Making abstraction for the time being from social factors, we might compare the problem, as the psychologist sees it, to the fiction of the *free market*, a fiction which economics cannot do without, although, in fact, few markets are not subject to restrictive and conventional rights, which have the effect to some extent of *closing* them. By the free market in this connection I mean the unfettered action of the individual's tendencies and instincts; and it is at the two ends of the social scale that this comes nearest to being realised. Along with the children of the rich, who are free to choose, because they may do as they like, may be taken certain categories of the proletariat, the unskilled, who see

several avenues open before them, none of which, doubtless, will carry them very far, but several of which, none the less, are distinct enough in appearance to leave something to choice.

The question may be raised then, and is worth raising.

THE VOCATIONAL DESIRES OF CHILDREN.

It has been raised in a series of reports,¹ which are attached to the studies of individual psychology by Dr. Adler of Vienna.

The authors of these reports make particular use of data which have been collected through asking school-boys questions such as the following² :—

- (a) What occupation would you like best to follow ?
- (b) If that one were not within your reach, which would you choose then ?

and elsewhere :—

- (c) Enumerate all the occupations which, at some time or other, you have wanted to follow.

No doubt, as our authors themselves remark,³ these answers from children ought not to be taken too seriously. They express, not so much mature resolutions or wishes, as momentary whims. But notwithstanding their being of the nature of dreams, of those castles in Spain so eagerly constructed by the child's imagination, they are interesting. One of Adler's theories is, that dreams, and other very varied manifestations of the unconscious, are the symptoms of a life-plan, which we sketch out for ourselves in very early years, and by which, in some sort, we build up our whole subsequent existence. The facts supporting this hypothesis are many and interesting.

Summarising these answers from children, so as to relate them to what is known of the child's instinctive

¹ In *Heilen und Bilden*, Munich, 1914.

² Von Maday, in *op. cit.*, p. 309.

³ Kramer, in *op. cit.*, p. 322.

life, the Viennese psychologists consider them from two very different points of view. In the first place, in what the schoolboy would like to be, they see an indication of his internal attitude towards his father and the whole of his family circle: either he is in harmony with it or in revolt against it. In the second place, they bring the child's choice of one occupation rather than another into relation with certain definite instincts.

Let us take up these two points of view in succession.

FATHER AND SON.

We may class children in two groups: those whose whole ambition is to follow in their father's footsteps, and those, on the contrary, who are in revolt against the paternal occupation. Both attitudes are determined by deep feelings.

Those of the first group have an intense affection and admiration for their father, feelings which do not, however, exclude respect mingled with fear. Everything connected with their father has had, and, until they are of mature age, will retain, prestige and attraction for them.

In the other group, on the contrary, we observe opposition of character between father and son, opposition more or less unconscious, more or less unacknowledged, but thoroughgoing. Freud, who explains all these childish feelings by tendencies of the sexual order, compares this opposition to the conflict recounted in the legend of *Œdipus*. The Theban hero, as is well known, killed his father without recognising him, and married his mother. On this showing, the hostility of a son towards his father has the child's love of his mother for its cause, and, fundamentally, amounts to sexual jealousy.

Whatever may be thought of this theory, which does not directly concern us here, there are certainly children to whom the choice of a career appears to present itself nearly in these terms: "What career shall I follow, so as in no way to resemble my father?" For them, the

choice of a vocation is nothing but a symptom of the internal act by which the child shakes off the paternal yoke.

A very striking instance of this has just been brought into clear light. It is particularly interesting to us, since it concerns the origins of a military career.

Ernest Psichari, who fell on the battlefield in August 1914, was a grandson, through his mother, of Ernest Renan. Brought up outside of religion, in the humanitarian ideas of socialism, or at least of democratic rationalism, he was, consequently, very far removed from the army and the Church. His two novels, *L'appel aux armes* and *Le voyage du centurion*, together with letters of his published in *Le Correspondant*, and a very well-informed article by his friend M. Henri Massis in the *Revue hebdomadaire* for January 1916, enable us to-day to follow the stages of his conversion, or rather, of his conversions, for Psichari was first converted to the army and then to the Church.

The history of this man's mind is very curious. His conversions, in which moral and religious feelings counted for nothing, would be mysterious and incomprehensible, were it not that certain remarks by M. Massis provide the answer to the riddle. What Psichari "wanted with all might was to take the side of his forefathers against that of his father".¹

The hero in *L'appel aux armes* voluntarily enters upon the military profession by enlisting in the Colonial artillery; and he does so, not out of bellicosity of temperament, nor out of patriotism, but because he wanted to set his face against the traditions of his childhood. The army was at the antipodes of the liberal ideas in which he had been brought up. He was converted to the army to escape from the ideas embodied in his father.

THE FIGHTING VOCATIONS.

We must go a step further. Certain special instincts may determine the form that is taken by this dream of escaping from the paternal sphere of influence and from everything reminiscent of the father.

Sometimes these instincts seek the maximum of satisfaction for themselves through the choice of an appropriate occupation. At other times, the career that is chosen is to help the individual to restrain tendencies that he is more or less consciously repressing.²

¹ Massis, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

² Cf. Stekel, quoted by Von Maday, in *op. cit.*, p. 324.

These two cases, however, are not so opposite as it might seem. The fighting instinct, of course, is too anti-social for any regular vocation to allow it satisfaction otherwise than through an alteration of it. The ideal of Fourier, making use, for the sake of *social order*, of "the reprobate passions as they are given in nature, and without any change in them",¹ is but seldom attained in this world. In this connection, Kramer writes:

"It is of little moment in this respect whether a child writes, 'I would like to become the greatest captain in Austria, do better than Prince Eugène, and found a universal empire', or simply records his wish to be a cab-driver in order that he may exercise command in the streets".

"Inclination for the fighting vocations", says Von Maday, "extends over almost the whole period of youth". It begins before the tenth year, and lasts until fifteen or sixteen.

We must be careful not to forget that, alongside of occupations which have the appearance of being fighting occupations to the child, there are others which give satisfaction to the fighting instinct when it is *deflected*—market porters, mountaineering guides, for example—and when it is *objectified*, or *Platonised*. Alongside of the occupations in which the aggressive instinct finds means to satisfy itself, there are others—such as that of butcher, cab-driver, dentist, accoucheur, surgeon, and so on—which in an indirect way provide the where-withal for cruelty to feed on; and cruelty, as we saw, is closely linked up with the instinct of the fight.

Even the peaceful profession of schoolmaster may embody the realisation of aggressive or cruel wishes. When a child writes that he would like to become a teacher "so as to be able to thrash his class", and "to hammer crowds of schoolboys into shape with his ruler", the case is clear. It is hardly less so when the child alleges, as the motive of his choice, his wish "to make a lot of red ink lines in the copy-books".

When the child renounces this ideal, it is sometimes

¹ Fourier, *Œuvres choisies*, edit. Gide, p. 27.

in favour of becoming an army officer, a marine, or a pilot; and in this the author finds an interesting confirmation of the position he has taken up.

Besides this first mode of sublimation, in which the subject satisfies the dangerous tendency in him, through a vocation that is socially useful, there are other cases when the individual chooses a career which will help him to resist the tendencies the menace of which he feels within himself. He sets his face, as it were, against his natural inclinations.¹ Instance the born criminal who turns himself into a judge, the voluptuary who takes orders, and so on. Yet it is to be remarked that these cases may be interpreted more simply. The judge in question objectifies his taste for crime, rather than restrains it altogether; the monk Platonises his amorous instincts and finds a higher object for them.

I have never come across a case where it was necessary to admit, as certain authors are in the habit of doing, that an instinct undergoes mutation into its opposite. The expression does not seem to me a happy one, no doubt because the idea does not seem clear to me. An instinct is not an indeterminate force. It is a force which, by definition, assumes a certain motor *form*. If nothing remains of this characteristic *form*, by what is the instinct to be recognised?

ORGANIC INSUFFICIENCY.

At the basis of all these facts Adler sets his important theory of organic insufficiency—*Minderwertigkeit der Organe*. The individual aspires to self-possession, *self-containment*—if the word may be pardoned. He feels there are some functions in him weaker than others. Certain inclinations, certain instincts, which are necessary for him before he can become *a whole man*, are insufficiently lively in him, as a result of his physical constitution. And so he seeks and chooses the vocation which will develop him in the direction in which he suspects himself to be insufficient.

¹ Stekel, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

"The career which gives a man complete satisfaction is that in which he finds compensation for the special insufficiency of which he is more or less conscious".¹

"A child who feels the lack of food dreams of being a confectioner or a cook; another who is sickly wishes to turn himself into a doctor—unless when he chooses a career which, as a necessary preliminary condition of its being followed, presupposes a state of robust health, such as that of soldier, brigand, or explorer".²

Adler's theory has something striking in it. It immediately evokes concrete cases, such as those of men of puny and delicate appearance, in whom the fighting instinct is thoroughly awakened, and in whom it either shows itself, unaltered, by its urging them to quarrel with everybody else, or objectifies itself by turning them into military historians, in every line of whose works one may read an intense admiration for the army and the career of arms.

A German psychologist, Ziehen, who knew nothing of Adler's theories, and who studied the psychology of great army commanders, wrote: "It is striking to observe how often the lives of great commanders indicate bodily weaknesses. Prince Eugène was to have taken orders at first; the slightness and elegance of his build brought a contemptuous nickname upon him from the lips of Louis XIV; he was called 'the little curate.' His weakness was for long an obstacle to his entering the army. Zieten, a cavalry general, whom we cannot, it is true, rank with the great commanders, was astonishingly small, even weakly. It was said of Moltke at the end of his life that, in mufti, he would be taken for an old professor of Mathematics or Philosophy".³

TWO QUESTIONS.

When we seek to establish a relation between the likings and instincts of the individual, on the one hand, and the occupations represented in an evolved society like ours, on the other, the problem that is raised may be put in two ways:

To what careers does an instinct lead?

¹ Thalberg, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

² Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

³ *Die Psychologie grosser Heerführer*, Leipzig, 1916, p. 10.

To what instincts does a career bring satisfaction?

The first question need not delay us. If we ask, "To what does the fighting instinct lead?" the answer must be, "To everything". Everywhere, on 'Change and in the Law Courts, in Covent Garden Market and on the high seas, you will find people who have entered upon their vocation owing to the pugnacity that is in them. As we saw, there are saints and apostles, in public life and in cloisters, who look upon the moral and spiritual life as a battle. We think we have abundantly shown the variety of the forms which this instinct may assume.

THE CAREER OF ARMS.

Let us pass on, then, to the second question, concentrating attention on the vocation of arms, which represents, *par excellence*, the use to which society puts the fighting instinct. To what instincts does the military career correspond? In time of peace this career is represented by two types, the professional officer and the man who has voluntarily enlisted. To what does a liking for this spontaneously chosen calling correspond?

Some twenty years ago, Hamon wrote a little book on the psychology of the professional soldier, which seems now very remote from the times in which we are living. It brings together facts which deserve attention; but if it is not exactly a pamphlet against the military career, yet, by its arrangement of facts, its tone, and its intention, it is at least a kind of address for the prosecution. It sets out to show that individuals who spontaneously choose the vocation of arms are "people who are predisposed to violence by their physical organisation". On this showing, there must be a positive and direct relation between the fighting instinct and the military career.

Another author, for his part frankly militaristic, Dr. S. von Maday, puts forward the same opinion, though more subtly.

"The military vocation", he says, "occupies a special place among vocations. If one wished to divide occupations into two classes, one would have to put that of arms into one, and into the other, all the rest. Every human activity is really a compound of conflict and work. Human evolution starts with conflict and culminates in work. Many vocations, no doubt—the Bar and commerce, for instance—still contain pugnacious elements; but the element of work prevails. The military career alone has been preserved as an almost purely pugnacious vocation—unless we add to it some others now rather unusual, such as those of hunter, police agent, and footpad".¹

But the analysis Hamon himself carries out of the psychology of the professional officer fails to square with this conclusion of his and of von Maday's.

"The individuals who choose this occupation", he says, "do so from personal interest. . . . Hunger for an existence freed from all the anxieties of the struggle for life, with a salary regularly paid, an existence analogous to that of a civil servant, but having this advantage, that it brings consideration to those who enter upon it; the wish to be dressed in a uniform that will establish a distinction between them and the common run of mortals, and will open society drawing-rooms to them; the self-satisfaction of giving orders to other individuals, who must obey without a murmur or suffer severe penalties; a natural taste for this occupation, the purpose of which is wholly sanguinary; an insufficiency, conscious or otherwise, of energy and capacity to carve out for oneself, through literary, artistic or scientific work, a place which shall be as important as the one coveted; a disgust for business, commerce, and finance, or the impossibility of throwing oneself into them from lack of capital—these are the motives,

¹ In *Heilen und Bilden*, p. 310. For my part, I can hardly admit the antithesis, "fighting—work". It has an economic interest—pillage and production—but I cannot see any psychological basis for it under actual social conditions of to-day, unless it be for apaches.

[Cf., however, a view recently developed by M. Pierre Janet, in *Les médications psychologiques*, and, in a more concise form, in three articles contributed to the Medical Section of the *British Journal of Psychology*, i. Pts. I. II. and III., 1920–21. According to this view, we must, in examining man as he is and as he is becoming, construct a hierarchy of tendencies, somewhat as follows: (i) *animal* tendencies, (ii) *suspensive* tendencies, (iii) *social* tendencies, (iv) *intellectual* tendencies, and, at the summit of the hierarchy, (v) *work* tendencies. "It is because work and effort belong to tendencies that are higher than reflection that I have often tried to describe them under the name of *rational tendencies* or *ergetic tendencies*". *Brit. Journ. Psych.*, Medical Section, i. p. 160. —TRANS.]

whether acknowledged or not, which induce individuals voluntarily to enter upon the military vocation".¹

Whatever be the value of Hamon's analysis, the result of it at least is to show that the motives which determine individuals to enter the vocation of arms are complex, and that, in our day, there is no longer any obvious correlation between the instinctive liking for conflict and the occupation of soldiering. Is not Hamon's first assertion that certain men turn themselves into soldiers *to free themselves from the anxieties of the struggle for life*? I believe this is a well authenticated fact. It is incontestable that up to August 1914 those of our contemporaries who had an inclination for the giving and receiving of knocks, might well consider that they would more easily get what they wanted by turning themselves into anti-militarist agitators than by serving as officers in the army. Even in actual war the opportunities for hand to hand conflicts have for long been singularly few and far between, for officers still more than for "other ranks".² Even Cervantes gave free course to the ill-humour of balked pugnacious wishes when he spoke of "those happy ages that were strangers to the dreadful fury of those devilish instruments of artillery", which kill you off a man at a great distance without his being aware to whom he owes this kind attention.³

If it is possible to enter the army to *avoid* conflict, we shall be the less astonished that some, like Psichari,

¹ Hamon, *Psychologie du militaire professionnel*, new edit., Paris, 1904, p. 184.

² [If the majority of the war neuroses were due to the strain of continual fighting on comparatively untrained civilians, some at least seem to have been due to the inability of these same civilians to let their pugnacity out. Had they had more chances of *seeing red*, it might have been the better for them, psychologically speaking.—TRANS.]

³ *Don Quixote*, Pt. I. ch. 31. Cf. also Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, canto xi [and Hotspur's "popinjay" on the battle-field, who talked

so like a waiting-gentlewoman

Of guns and drums and wounds—God save the mark! . . .

And that it was great pity, so it was,

This villanous saltpetre should be digg'd

Out of the bowels of the harmless earth,

Which many a good tall fellow had destroy'd

So cowardly. . . .—TRANS.]

turn themselves into officers, without any taste for responsibility, and, indeed, just in order to satisfy their need for being obedient to others.

This is not always the case, of course. But even when, as we should, we bring the liking for command, which is a form of the desire to exalt oneself, into relation with the fighting instinct, we arrive at a conclusion which is as astonishing as it is instructive. The opponent, for the one who fights, is that person on whom he is eager to impose his will, and to whom he wishes to show himself superior. For the combatant officer, so long as peace lasts, this person will be first and foremost the private soldier! Who will deny that the vocation of army officer does, in fact, allow opportunity to certain brutal instincts, canalised but not always sufficiently Platonised, to exercise themselves on and against subordinates? ¹

The attraction of military clothing, with its bright colours, which certainly enters largely into the minds of children, deserves separate treatment. It is more closely connected with the primitive fighting instinct than at first appears. Let us confine ourselves to emphasising the near kinship to be perceived between the nuptial array of certain animal species at the time of courtship struggles, and the war costumes of primitive peoples, from which are derived in a direct line both the gaudy armour of all epochs and our own dashing uniforms of to-day. The primitive quarrel, as we saw, is biologically designed to set a value on the individual, not so much in the eyes of his adversary as in those of the spectators and spectatresses of the fight. Who will dare to assert that uniform does not contribute to the same end? If *full dress* is maintained, after the war of 1914-18, along with horizon blue, khaki, and field

¹ [It is an unpleasant experience for the translator, as it must be for many another comparatively well-intentioned civilian who looks back over the period when he was a *temporary* officer, to recollect how often, in "orderly room" and in court-martial, pugnacity that would have been better directed elsewhere, was vented on a N.C.O. or private who was more stupid than defaulting.—TRANS.]

grey, it will be because it has its utility for increasing—by very primitive means, no doubt, but how effective, who shall say?—the warrior's prestige in the eyes of the community.¹

In this connection quotation may be made from a Swiss document that appeared in 1916.

"It is a curious fact, which I have often observed, and which all who have been soldiers will be able to confirm, that *the sex* frequently lose all reserve in the presence of a uniform. It may even happen, very often, that they will literally throw themselves at a soldier's head. Nor do I speak of debased natures, but of women who would not judge these same men worthy of a glance, if they met them dressed in civilian clothes, and who yet fall into their arms at once, because they are dressed in uniform".²

Who will maintain that this prestige attaching to uniform in the eyes of the fair sex has not contributed to the making of more than one military career? ³

Neither Hamon nor von Maday has anything to say on the intellectual tastes which find means of satisfaction in the career of an army officer ⁴—interest in military history, pleasure in acting in combination with others, pleasure in taking a prompt decision which seizes and unravels all the elements of a complicated situation in the twinkling of an eye. These factors certainly come in, too; and it is permissible to think, that, under the conditions of modern warfare, the careers which have been determined by such wholly intellectual tastes have better chances than any others of meeting with success.

And if, in time past, it was the fighting instinct which determined men to enter upon the vocation of army officer, yet this instinct was already as fully intellec-

¹ [Cf. the rapidity with which the Brigade of Guards in England reverted to their pre-war display of colour, and the arguments which were urged in the public press and elsewhere for and against this expensive arrangement!—TRANS.]

² *Der Freie Schweizer Arbeiter*, Berne, September 22, 1916.

³ [Whoever doubts it, let him read the novels of Thomas Hardy, especially perhaps *The Trumpet Major* and *Far From the Madding Crowd*.—TRANS.]

⁴ Cf. Ziehen, *op. cit.*

tualised in that profession as in those of the Bar or commerce. The commanders of the future will not be combatants. Are the commanders of to-day?

In 1914 there were many more players of football among the officers of the British Army than among those of the German, and, I suspect, many more players of chess among the latter than among the former. These two games are very unequally distant from primitive forms of pugnacity; but who will deny that chess is nearer than football to the warfare that is waged to-day?

CHAPTER XI

THE FIGHTING INSTINCT AND HUMAN EVOLUTION

WHILE treating of the relations that exist between the instincts of individuals and their vocations in society, we have several times touched upon problems connected with the history and development of mankind. It is worth while now to attack these problems in earnest.

THE RECAPITULATION THEORY.

With this in view let us adopt a standpoint that has often been found to be instructive for the psychologist and the educationist, the standpoint of psycho-biological parallelism. Haeckel expressed this under the somewhat pompous name of *the fundamental biogenetic law*; the Americans call it more simply *the recapitulation theory*. It is by now familiar enough. According to this theory, the life of the child repeats, in their main outlines, the stages through which the development of mankind has passed.

This *law* has two aspects. It is applied, sometimes to the development of the organism from its beginnings in the primitive cell, sometimes to the history of the human psyche. In the latter event, we are no longer concerned with embryology and comparative anatomy, but with child psychology and the history of civilisation. We take the likings, tendencies, and traits of character, of the boy we see growing up under our eyes; and in these we think to discover the summary recapitulation of the appetites and habits of mankind from generation to generation.

Under this second aspect, the theory assumes such a magnitude that no one has yet been found to expound

it in all its wealth—a fact that need not astonish us.¹ The data to which it may be applied have not all been gathered together and classified; nor has anyone succeeded in grasping the relationships which have been *surmised* between the drawings of children and those of primitive peoples, between the grammar of baby-talk and that of certain well-worn idioms, between the dreams of the child's imagination and myths and folklore, and between so many other varied manifestations of mental activity in the beginnings of individual men and of mankind as a whole.

It would be well worth doing, however; for the recapitulation theory has been subjected to a lively attack in the realm of biology,² and those who base their work upon it in the mental sciences may well ask themselves whether they are not building on a shifting soil.

However we may regard Haeckel's theory as a definitive formulation of law, it is not in doubt that it constitutes a very fruitful working hypothesis. It is eminently fitted to bring to the inquirer's notice many facts that would otherwise pass unperceived. And it is a valuable theory for the educationist, too; for many of the child's instincts and likings, which were formerly a dead weight on his teacher's hands, take on a positive interest, as soon as the latter ceases to regard them as individual and passing whims, and accustoms himself to look on them as the living prolongation of the great forces which have fashioned mankind during thousands of years.

¹ Cf., however, the interesting works of Ferrière, *La loi du progrès en biologie et en sociologie*, Paris, 1915, and of Davidson, *The Recapitulation Theory and Human Infancy*, New York, 1914, not to mention Stanley Hall's monumental *Adolescence*.

² [Cf. the guarded views of Professor J. Arthur Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*. ii. 487 ff.: "Many outcrops that seem quite perplexing in man are probably anachronistic stirrings of ancestral habits. . . . Recapitulation is general, not detailed; it often shows telescoping; and it is truer of stages in organo-genesis than in stages in the development of the embryo as a whole. . . . Needless to say, we must beware of the vicious circle of arguing from the development to the presumed ancestor, and then from the ancestor to its recapitulative rehabilitation in development". The translator is not alone in thinking that many of the recapitulationists, not excluding Stanley Hall, are only too willing victims of such circular arguments.—TRANS.]

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT.

Before broaching the special study of the fighting instinct from this new point of view, let us restate an obvious truth, which, for all its obviousness, is too easily overlooked.

Whatever be the physical function, the development of which we are retracing in the individual and the race respectively, so as to superimpose one on the other, it is *a priori* certain that the lines of these two evolutions coincide at two main points; at the starting-point, since, by definition, you begin in both cases from zero, and at the point of arrival, since, between the condition of a function in the average adult individual and the condition of the same function in the average of mankind to-day, there is necessarily causal correlation.

The action of the environment on the individual is decisive in this matter. If a child of fifteen draws in the way he does, this is not solely the result of the progress he has naturally made in the arts of seeing and of co-ordinating the movements of his hand with his visual perception; it is due also to the influence of his environment, if not to the drawing lessons he has received, at any rate to the other pictorial representations he has seen. His point of arrival necessarily depends on the point of arrival of the human beings round about him. No small Egyptian, at a time when the science of perspective did not exist, had the ambitions of the least capable among the schoolboys of to-day.

The same observations are easy to make in respect to moral ideas. There comes a time when the boy no longer fights as he did at the age of ten or twelve years; the instinct of the fight now generally takes other forms, being canalised or metamorphosed. One of the causes of this transformation is obviously the system of moral ideas—partly incorporated in the penal code—which has been reached, in the course of racial development, by the society that surrounds him. There is more than a

curious analogy between these two conditions of affairs. There is the direct relationship of cause and effect.

By the same token, we see that, for the science of mind, the comparison of the development of the child with the development of mankind ought to be completed by the comparative study of the development of the individual and the development of society.

THE FIGHTING INSTINCT IN THE CHILD AND IN MANKIND.

In between the point of departure and the point of arrival, there are the actual stages of development. It is with the study of these that we are concerned. Do they succeed each other in the same order in the child and in the race?

Let us first consider the fighting instinct itself.

In the individual it is to be observed early, but not immediately. The nursling does not fight, and for good cause. Groos noted the first instance of fighting play during the course of the third year.¹ Later on, from nine to thirteen years of age, the child passes through a period when the crude instinct explodes with particular intensity. Thereafter it becomes complicated and canalised, and, even when it does not attain to full Platonisation, opportunities for its appearance in its primitive crudity become more and more unusual.

In the race, the psycho-sociologists appear to admit something analogous. Our first ancestors, we are told, did not fight without being attacked.

"Not until the earth filled up and competition for food and territory became intense did man's full ferocity against his fellow-men develop. It is not improbable, therefore, that in the whole course of human evolution the fighting instinct has greatly increased in strength. While reaching its maximum expression in the barbaric stage of culture, even in civilised man this instinct is still unnecessarily strong".²

¹ *The Play of Man*, pp. 174-5. See, however, a case of one-sided teasing at a more tender age, quoted on p. 54 above.

² Charles A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, New York and London, 1912, p. 217. All this must be understood, of course, of the *crude* fighting instinct.

The means employed by this primitive instinct deserve attention. In our first chapter we enumerated the child's weapons, and noted the order in which he learns to use them. Scratching and biting come first; then, much later, kicking; then, later still, punching; along with the last come the first weapons properly so called, the stick he brandishes and the stone he flings. From this time on, he makes use of the various inventions of mankind, the sling, the bow, and the various improvements on these, according as tradition and the environment makes them known to him.

Primitive man clearly has the same means of attack at his disposal as the child. Lucretius enumerates them, all mixed up:

Arma antiqua manus, ungues, dentesque fuerunt
Et lapides et item silvarum fragmina rami.¹

But phylogeny enables us to understand better why our ancestors learned to use them in a particular order. Senet has brought this out well.

"The weapons of primitive man must have been nails and teeth. The use of fists and feet as weapons necessarily implies the completely vertical position; and the precursors of man cannot have had recourse to them. Then came stones and sticks, and after that weapons of flint, axes, lance points and arrow-heads. It was at this stage that the fight, from having been defensive, as it necessarily was at first, became offensive".²

The invention of the stick to strike with—the club—marks a red-letter day in the history, not merely of aggressiveness, but of the whole of civilisation.

"The power to strike with fists and hands", writes Stanley Hall, "made man formidable to his fellows and to lower creatures, but to swing a stick through a large area and therefore with greater velocity, to transform the point of impact or concussion from the sensitive and softer hand to the hard, heavy end of a stick, even before it was edged or pointed, gave to man's hand a weapon which made wood and metal, as well as enemies, brute or human, his servants".³

¹ *De Natura Rerum*, v. 1282.

² "Periodo belicoso en la evolucion psicologica individual", *Archivos de Psiquiatria*, iv. 1905.

³ *A Synthetic, Genetic Study of Fear*, p. 339.

The importance of this discovery, and of the discovery of the art of throwing—the other special endowment of man¹—explains, on Stanley Hall's view, the place taken in the life of primitive peoples and in that of the child by stick games and throwing games.

It has often been remarked that little girls do not know how to throw. They make but little play with their fists, though somewhat better with their feet. By way of compensation, boys agree in recognising their ability to pull hair, to scratch, and to bite. If one thinks to apply biogenetic parallelism so rigorously as to induce from these facts a hypothesis bearing on the origins of mankind, one may conclude that the instincts of the two sexes were differentiated in this respect at the time when division of labour turned the male into a hunter, who ranged abroad and provided for the needs of the female, while the latter was immobilised in one place by the care of the young.

THE FIGHTING INSTINCT IN THE INDIVIDUAL AND IN SOCIETY.

Senet has traced a curious parallel between the evolution of individuals and that of societies. In the development of both he distinguishes five periods. For the individual, these are :

1. The nutritive period ;
2. The belligerent period ;
3. The genetic period ;
4. The emotive-intellectual period ;

¹ Hall says categorically that no animal other than man has acquired the art of using projectiles. But Groos says, "Even monkeys throw stones, dry branches, and fruit", and quotes the well-known case of Miss Romanes's tame ape, which flew into a passion when a tailoress laughed at him, and "threw at her everything he could lay his hands on" (Groos, *The Play of Man*, p. 181, quoting Romanes, *Animal Intelligence*). The question whether the higher apes ever come to deliver blows with a stick is disputed. "Before he had discovered anything to throw with, man provided himself with an auxiliary by taming and using the strength of ferocious animals". I do not know whether this assertion by Tarde, *Philosophie pénale*, p. 416, would be upheld by contemporary anthropologists.

5. The period of decline ;
to which there correspond in the life of societies :

1. The pastoral and agricultural period ;
2. The period of territorial expansion and conquests ;
3. The period of emigration and colonisation ;
4. The industrial and scientific period ;
5. The period of decline.

Obviously, the comparison made by Senet rests on the idea that society is an organism. Arrived at a certain point in its development, it tends to reproduce itself and give birth to daughter societies, colonies, which soon come to live their own life. The time when the particular society is ripe for this labour of reproduction is marked, in the *adolescent* political state, by an overflowing abundance of life, which is felt from within as euphoria, but which, from without, appears as an outburst of megalomania. Reproduction of a society implies territorial extension and conquests as preliminary conditions. From the standpoint of society, this is the reason for the warlike period.

Ingenious and attractive as this parallel is, it seems dangerous to push so far the approximation of society to an organism.¹ For this comparison of the individual and society as types, we should prefer to substitute that of concrete and varied individuals on the one hand, and, on the other, societies in their multiplicity. Certain traits are assuredly common to every individual, others to every society. But it is striking to notice how the various transformations of the fighting instinct in individuals find their counterpart in the variety of political constitutions. When we speak of the fighting instinct of a society, we are far enough from attributing psychological tendencies to society itself. Unwilling as we have been to admit that society is an organism, we should be still more seriously at fault in attributing to it a

¹ On this topic see the very remarkable criticism of Ferrière, *La loi du progrès* [and, more recently, in English, the long and often trenchant discussion by R. Austin Freeman in *Social Decay and Regeneration*, London, 1921.—TRANS.]

mind or soul. When we speak of social or collective pugnacity, we would be understood to mean *the fighting instinct of the individuals who compose the society, in so far as they put this at the service of the group*. We shall explain our position in this matter more at length in the next chapter.

COLLECTIVE PUGNACITY.

The chief outbursts of the fighting instinct in the individual are nearly contemporaneous with the awakening of his social sentiments.¹ The individual soon discovers the advantage it is to him, not to be alone when he joins battle. His pugnacity, which, to multiply its weapons, has already concluded an alliance with intelligence, is complicated still further by being combined with the social instinct.

When the political State is constituted, one of its main tasks is to make use of the social sentiments of the individual so as to canalise his fighting instinct. Little by little it comes to monopolise this for its own advantage, by taking rigorous proceedings against all aggressions that it has not ordered.

We may also speak of an early canalisation of pugnacity in societies. This often corresponds to a division of labour. The man who does the fighting is a particular kind of man living in the midst of a nation that does not fight. There is a warrior caste. And this caste has its own history; its destinies vary in different societies; here, it maintains itself in all its vigour and comes to dominate the other castes; there, it has to give way to another caste, and is wiped out. The comparative history of warrior castes in all the great civilisations in which they have been found: what a splendid subject for study!

¹ Gulick, "Psychological, Pedagogical, and Religious Aspects of Group Games", in *Ped. Seminary*, vi. 2, 1899, puts the fighting games between 7 and 12 years of age, and the social games after 12. On the relation of pugnacity and society in ants, see R. Rolland's article, quoted above, p. 50.

Simultaneously with its canalisation, social pugnacity—the pugnacity of individuals for the profit of society—is complicated, and in the same manner as before, by being intellectualised. Skill and intelligence take an ever more important place in it. Consider the history of warfare. Whether it be the single combat, the battle, or the campaign as a whole, what characterises each of its operations is the ever-growing place taken in it by movements that have nothing in common with the shattering blows delivered by Homeric heroes. The role played in war by non-combatant troops and lines of communication services goes on always increasing. Thus, even in the outbursts of social pugnacity, the primitive instinct is complicated by tendencies which profoundly alter the expressions it finds.

Further, for a large number of our western societies, *the belligerent period* seemed to have passed away. Collective efforts were no longer directed towards conquests by force of arms. The instincts of the fight were Platonised, and the economic struggle tended to be substituted for the other.¹

And do not let us think only of warfare. The whole evolution of the State shows brute force being slowly relegated to the background by the appearance of new forces. This evolution is easy to follow, for instance, in the matter of the penal law.² First there is the family vendetta, that is to say, the instinct hardly canalised at all by custom; then, vengeance exercised by society, which reserves to itself the right to apply the *lex talionis*. The State takes the sword in hand, and uses it as an instrument of justice. Then the very sword disappears, and the penalty inflicted is shorn of everything that is reminiscent of the primitive conflict; the idea of sanction, derived from the talion, vanishes. And, without having to be taught it, young children come to

¹ In the same way one might point out *objectification* of collective pugnacity—the cult of Napoleon—and its *internalisation*—civil war, under one form or another, taking the place of war directed outwards.

² Durkheim, *Deux lois de l'évolution pénale*, Année sociologique, iv.

understand, as a little one of seven remarked, that "the gendarme's sabre is only a sign".¹

This is because the norms of morality are little by little applied to acts accomplished in the interest of the group, as well as to those which emanate only from individuals. Before Christianity, the Greek philosophers debated the problem of the legitimacy of wars. Plato condemned all those which brought one Greek city into collision with another. The Stoics, disciples of the Cynics in this respect, upheld a cosmopolitan ideal which allowed no more room for brutal conflicts. These were lone voices. But we know how analogous ideas took possession of the minds of princes in the Middle Ages and brought about the Truce of God, and how they appear to have influenced the politics of European States at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is to be noted, again, that a time came in the history of other civilisations—in China for example—when, not content with having canalized the fighting instinct, political societies glimpsed the possibility of sublimating it.

In discussing the sublimation of the instinct in the individual, we distinguish three characteristic stages: first, the crude instinct realising itself in physical behaviour; then an intermediate stage, in which physical behaviour, though still in evidence, is enhaloed by the ideal at the service of which it is put; finally, complete sublimation, the primitive behaviour having disappeared, and the psychic forces within it being now utilised for the good of society. In the history of political States this evolution of pugnacity has so far hardly passed beyond the second stage.

We are no longer at the first stage. There may still be societies in existence which fight by instinct, for the pleasure of fighting. But these are tribes which seem very far removed from ourselves.

A large number of political States are in the second. They fight as hard as of yore, but they commit brutal

¹ In a delightful conversation recorded by Mlle. Audemars, *Intermédiaire des éducateurs*, iv. 1916, p. 75.

acts only in the service of an idea—the fatherland, liberty, right as against might, “the war to end war” This is not the place to establish the hierarchy of these ideals.

The third phase, in which the whole of instinctive pugnacity would be transformed into a grand collective effort on behalf of humanity, has not yet been reached by any political state.

And yet—perhaps we must allow an exception in William Penn and the State called after him. Here was a man whose personal life was a marvellous example of complete sublimation. A soldier’s son, passionately devoted to the career of arms, who had taken part with honour in naval fighting and the Civil War in England, he yet renounced everything to follow the apostles of non-resistance. And, thanks to him, one political State, Pennsylvania, managed to live through seventy troublous years without an army, and without wavering in its firm resolve not to settle any of its differences by force.

STATE AND SOCIETY.

It is well to remind ourselves, too, that the terms *State* and *society* are not synonymous. In default of political societies, there have always been a large number of religious societies which have realised the sublimation of their instinct of the fight.

Recent events have allowed curious observations to be made in this matter. Christian missionaries of every nation hurried from the ends of the earth to take up arms in the defence of their country. Many of these men, had they, *in their capacity as Christians*, been attacked by savages invading their mission stations, would no doubt have hesitated to resort to force, even in order to protect what they held most dear. Many of them would have been seen joyfully undergoing martyrdom and putting literally into practice the Gospel precepts of non-resistance. This they would have done in so far as they were members of a spiritual society which rejects the use of carnal weapons. But, in so

far as they were citizens of a political State, they were members of a group in which the warlike instinct had not been sublimated, and they were conscious of duties which this relationship imposed upon them.¹

These facts come in appositely to remind us that one of the expressions we have used requires to be made more precise.

We spoke of the actual state of our societies in respect to the evolution of the fighting instinct. But this state of the collective mind, on which depends in such large measure the state of mind of the individuals who are being formed within our environment, is itself the result of the state of mind of individuals of to-day. And this state of mind is very unequal in different men. There are many among us who are *backward*, many people who have remained at a very much lower stage of development, either in will and conduct—the apaches, for instance—or in ideas and manner of estimating others—such as certain panegyrists of “Force”. They

¹ [The translator is able, from his own war experience, to quote an example which aptly illustrates the point raised by the author. J. P. before the war was a teacher of mathematics in a Mission College in the East. An ardent Christian, he was yet a man in whom the fighting instinct was very strongly developed. At the outbreak of war, he hurried home to obtain a commission in the Royal Artillery, and served, not without distinction and gallantry, in France. Then came the Labour Corps; natives from the country in which J. P. had previously been were drafted in large numbers to France; and, along with other missionaries who could speak the native language, he was “seconded” from the Royal Artillery for service as an interpreter. This at once brought him into touch with those men with whom he had previously been associated *in his capacity as a Christian*, and recalled into present activity many of the systems of ideas which had been put temporarily out of action by his service *as a citizen-soldier*. The normal outlet for his pugnacity—against the enemies of his country—was now stopped; he was for the time being a non-combatant. And very soon there arose in him a fierce *internal* conflict which bade fair to wreck his life. He became the champion of the natives against the oppression, real and imaginary, of the British Army authorities; he found a new enemy on whom to vent his wrath—his own superior officers. Eventually, he deliberately got himself court-martialled for refusing to obey orders. All the time he was under arrest awaiting trial I think he was genuinely happy, and had he been heavily sentenced, as he well might have been, would have remained happy. Unfortunately, the authorities refused to make a martyr of him. He was “severely reprimanded”, and sent back to his duties as an interpreter. The internal conflict between his ideals as a Christian and as a citizen-soldier was left undecided. He is now a Labour politician—on the extreme Left.—TRANS.]

represent a state of society which has passed away. But we have also with us precursors, men who represent a state of society which the mass has not yet reached. These are breaking ground along the road which others will travel later, along the very road which, if the hypothesis of parallelism holds, groups, even political groups, will end by following.

CHAPTER XII

ARREST AND REGRESSION

WE spoke of evolution of the fighting instinct in the individual and in society. We also implicitly admitted that arrest of development is possible, and that even regression may be expected. In every sphere in which the *norm* is conceived as an advance, as progress, we must anticipate such anomalies as standing still and retiring.

THE MEANING OF REGRESSION.

The actual term *regression* is not very clear. In individual psychology, it is used in two senses, according as the subject who regresses is considered in respect to the social environment in which he lives, or in comparison with himself. These two senses of the term ought to be distinguished.

In the former case, for example, we should say that the state of mind of an apache represents a regression in the twentieth century. The traits of resemblance accumulated by Lombroso between criminals and primitive peoples may be considered as so many symptoms of regression. Strictly speaking, it is improper to use the word in this way. But it is easy to see how its meaning has been extended so as to cover such cases. The outlaw is not an individual in a state of *individual* regression; but outlawry may be considered as a *social* regression. The passage from one idea to the other is easy and frequent, in spite of the confusion of mind it has created.

Properly, we should speak of regression in the case of an individual only when his state represents a retire-

ment, a turning-back, succeeding to a state that is more advanced, further evolved.

We said, for example, quite properly, that anger determines a regression of the fighting instinct in children. Under the shock of pain, the schoolboy will *see red*, and will let himself go *all out*, up to the point of biting and scratching at random, even although these are fighting methods he has outgrown long ago.

If we preserve the strict meaning of the word *regression*, we shall speak of *arrest of development* in most of the cases of individual psychology which social psychology would consider examples of regression—the case of the apache, for instance. A man whose pugnacity continues¹ into adult life in every form in which it was expressed at the age of twelve, is the victim of arrest of development. We shall say that a man has *regressed* only if he falls back into forms of pugnacity which he had discarded and outgrown.

Cases of regression are not unusual, without even leaving the province of normal psychology. A single cause is to be found for most of them—anger. And this anger in turn appears to be determined by a state of powerlessness. The individual finds himself face to face with a task he is incapable of carrying through, an obstacle which he knows not how to surmount. Being unable to advance, he retires.

Someone—no matter who—blocks your path. You persist in trying to pass, and resort to every argument you can think of, to persuade him to let you do so. He remains obstinate. In this conflict of two wills, you appeal to all the resources of your intelligence and imagination. Then—you lose patience and threaten him with the police. This is the first appeal to force. It is the beginning of a regression, perhaps unavoidable. If your anger grows, you may be led into provoking him to fight; and, if the feeling of your powerlessness exasperates your rage, you may descend to such fighting behaviour as you thought you had left behind you during early adolescence.

¹ See above, p. 90.

Read, for instance, this page from Wells :

" Suddenly I felt a whirlwind of rage answering the rage in his eyes. The pent-up exasperation of three weeks rushed to its violent release. . . . It was an amazing flare-up of animal passion ; from the moment that I perceived he was striking at me to the moment when both of us came staggering across the door-mat into the dignified and spacious hallway, we were back at the ancestral age, and we did exactly what the ancestral age would have done. The arms of the commissioner about my waist, the rush of the astonished porter from his little glass box, two incredibly startled and delighted pages, and an intervening member bawling out ' Sir ! Sir ! ' converged to remind us that we were a million years or so beyond those purely arboreal days. . . . " ¹

WAR AS A REGRESSION ?

The facts we have just been dealing with have been compared to the explosions of collective pugnacity. War has been considered as a regression of the group mind.²

Every regression is determined by an obstacle. When it is the individual that is concerned, each of the various schools of psycho-analysis conceives the nature of this obstacle in its own way. According to Freud, it is always to be sought in the sphere of sexuality—this word must be taken in a very wide sense—that is, in the order of obstructed affections. According to Adler, what is thwarted is the consciousness which the subject has of his own value. According to Jung, there is conflict between the conservative tendencies urging the subject to persevere in his comfortable routine, and those other tendencies urging him to open up new paths for himself and develop his own life. In individual psychology, all three interpretations are very often valid at the same time ; and Pfister thinks that, if we consider war as the expression of collective psychology, all three apply equally there, too. There is no need to demonstrate this for Jung's theory—a political State has to expand—nor for Adler's—there have been nations anxious

¹ *The Passionate Friends*, I., ch. vi., § 12.

² We allude especially to two articles by Pfister, in *Wissen und Leben*, December 1914, republished separately under the title, *Zur Psychologie des Krieges und Friedens*. But we are satisfied that the ideas therein contained are usual in psycho-analytic circles.

to spread their own particular form of *culture*. Freud's theory has been linked up by Pfister—very artificially, as it seems to me—with the principle of nationality, tender feeling for *the race*, the common family strain running through different peoples—the feeling which is at the root of the great ethnical movements of the nineteenth century, such as Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, and so forth.

That being so, says Pfister, let us remember also that a regression is never simply a regression. Whatever be the observed *retirement*, we have never to do with a simple turning-back. The subject does not just become a child again; from his later development he retains the wishes and needs of an adult, and these he mixes up with the childhood recollections haunting his memory. Similarly, regression does not bear simultaneously on the whole man. It is his manner of feeling, or his manner of speaking, or his manner of acting, which marks the retirement; there is never regression bearing on the whole conduct of the individual. Now, the phenomenon of war shows all these characters, too. It leads nations back into barbarism; but the developments of science are not thereby abolished; on the contrary, they are put at the disposal of this barbarism. Similarly, the regression is not total; *within* the State, law and philanthropy continue to evolve.

The thesis, as is evident, is presented in a highly attractive fashion. It undoubtedly contains a great part of the truth.

Yet it would seem that the same facts are susceptible of a slightly different interpretation, in many ways also preferable. For the notion of regression, substitute that of arrest of development, or, as we said in the preceding chapter, incomplete sublimation.

We hesitate to consider the war of 1914-18 as a regression, because the European States had not yet passed beyond the war stage. The state of armed peace which existed before the cataclysm broke, represented, from the point of view of psychology, that is, from our point of

view at present, the same stage in the evolution of pugnacity as warfare itself. It testified to a complication and intellectualisation of pugnacity, which had certainly been pushed very far. But it testified to nothing beyond that. James was right when he said :

“ Every up-to-date dictionary should say that ‘ peace ’ and ‘ war ’ mean the same thing, now *in posse*, now *in actu*. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive *preparation* for war by the nations *is the real war*, permanent, unceasing ; and that the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the ‘ peace ’ interval ”.¹

There were many indications, no doubt, that evolution was going on. In the mind of each people and each political State, there was an inward conflict ; and with several of them—to continue the psychological metaphor—it was possible even to diagnose a profound dissociation of personality, occasionally revealed by an alternation of contradictory volitions. They wanted war, and they did not want it ; they were preparing for it, and they were not preparing for it ; they accepted it, and they did not accept it. On the one hand, they laboured to render it ever more horrible by perfecting their armaments ; on the other hand, by signing the Geneva and Hague Conventions, they aspired to make it more humane or to abolish it.

In this respect, however, they differed widely among themselves. Belligerent pugnacity was dominant with some, and the wish for sublimation latent. With others, on the contrary, the will to sublimation was manifest, although the older tendencies still growled in the background.

This coexistence of elements of barbarism and elements highly evolved, which Pfister compares to the inward contradictions of certain pathological regressions, did not appear only with the European War. It is due to the *progress* of human societies, rather than to their *retirement*.

Regression ? or incomplete sublimation ?—Perhaps not

¹ “ The Moral Equivalent of War ”, in *Memories and Studies*, 1910, p. 273.

much interest is to be found in this debate. Let us be allowed, however, to show what advantages we see in preserving the exact meanings of the words.

THE SUPPOSED GROUP MIND.

It seems very difficult to accept the attractive theory of Pfister without giving to the words *group mind* a value that is more than metaphorical. This phrase is convenient, but very dangerous. It is well known with what ease creations of speech transform themselves into metaphysical entities. We must guard with all our might against the resurrection, in the province of the social sciences, of those entities, born of words, which the Positivist Philosophy hounded so ruthlessly out of the physical sciences.

The fundamental argument in favour of the group mind is that which was expressed by Dr. Gustave le Bon in the following terms :

"The most striking peculiarity presented by a psychological group is the following. Whoever be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a group puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them *would* feel, think, and act, were he in a state of isolation".¹

The fact is very well noted, but there is nothing surprising about it. It is wholly explained by individual psychology. The individuals do not think *as they would think* outside the group, because a state of mind is never other than what it is *at a given moment and in given circumstances* ; it never is what it would be if the circumstances did not exist. The number of factors modifying a state of individual consciousness is, so to speak,

¹ *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, twelfth impression, London, 1920, p. 29. [Certain modifications in translation, adopted by Mr. James Strachey in his English edition of Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, London and Vienna, 1920, have been followed. In this whole connection see especially the following recent works : McDougall, *The Group Mind*, Cambridge, 1920, Freud, *op. cit.*, and Austin Freeman, *Social Decay and Regeneration*.—TRANS.]

infinite. The fact of being in a group is indubitably important; but most of those who speak of the group mind, and who invoke this notion to account for the facts, "do not appear to have devoted enough attention to the psychological explanations that can be given of social constraint".¹

The distinction we claimed to make a moment ago between regression and incomplete sublimation, leads us to make other distinctions, between two modes of social constraint, two types of group, two forms of collective pugnacity, and, in the end, perhaps, two ways of conceiving the part played by the fighting instinct in the evolution of the individual and of society.

In speaking of *social constraint*, we have purposely made use of a very general term. We have borrowed it from the sociologists, who, as is well known, seek to explain a number of individual states of mind by something which goes entirely beyond the individual. But there is constraint and constraint. It is important for us to distinguish two types—which will interest us, however, only in their psychological aspect. The one is, if we may so call it, *the psychological reverse* of the biological fact of instinct; it is the consciousness the individual has of certain forms of physiological determinism. The other is the consciousness the individual has of certain more or less vague social sanctions. The first is perceived as a necessity, the second as an obligation. We are about to see examples of them.

IMITATION.

The mode of action *par excellence* of the group on the individual, and the chief agent of social constraint, is imitation. Now, to be precise, there are two sorts of imitation; the one is a necessity and an instinct; the other, a duty and an obligation.²

¹ Henri Bois, "La sociologie et l'obligation", *Revue de théologie*, Montauban, 1914, p. 231.

² These pages were already written when we read those of Claparède (*Psychologie de l'enfant*, pp. 475 ff.) who also distinguishes two sorts of imitation, and whose distinction may be compared with ours.

Imitation as an instinct is related to a psycho-physiological mechanism, the ideo-motor power common to all the representations of a movement, and consequently to all perception of gestures and acts. Perette thinks of the calf she is going to see leaping in the midst of the herd,

And Perette leaps herself, enraptured, at the thought. . .

Seeing someone yawn, we yawn ourselves; hearing someone shout, we shout; let someone begin to run in our presence, we run. There is something in us which urges us to act, without having to think about it, in the way the individual acts whom we are watching. If a crowd, in which we happen to be, touches off this instinct of imitation in us, it is not, strictly speaking, because it is a crowd, but because it moves, and we see it move.

In thus relating the instinct of imitation to the motor power of the representation, we have *ipso facto* explained the contagiousness of emotion, so characteristic of crowds. An emotion exists only if it can express itself outwardly; despair by tears, joy by shouting, anger by a frown and a clenching of the fists. Emotion is propagated by provoking the imitation of the gestures that translate it. By the same token, we understand why an emotion is the more easily propagated, the more violent it is, and why a crowd naturally reaches a paroxysm of emotion. By virtue of the mechanism in question, it is inevitable that, if no contradictory action, acknowledging other laws, makes itself felt, the maximum individual emotion becomes, after a lapse of time, the emotion common to each person in the crowd.

Quite different is imitation that is determined, not by an instinct, but by a duty, imitation accompanied by the feeling of obligation.

Spinoza very clearly distinguished the two cases:

"He that runs away because he sees others do so, or who is afraid because he sees that others are, or also he who, because he sees some other burning his hand, draws his hand towards him and moves his body as if his own hand were burnt, is said to

imitate the emotions of any other, but not to emulate him : not because we know any difference between the cause of imitation and the cause of emulation, but because it has become customary to call him who imitates what we think to be honourable, useful, or pleasant, emulous".¹

"Emulation is the desire of anything which is engendered in us from the fact that we imagine others to desire it also".²

This distinction retains all its value. Along with cases of instinctive, ideo-motor imitation, which may be unconscious, there are others, in which the representation of others' wishes plays an essential part. What Spinoza does not expressly say is that we imitate in this way the wishes and acts only of those who have prestige in our eyes. But judgment of value bearing on the person imitated is implied in all cases of this kind. This judgment of value creates a special affective relationship between the model and the emulator, a relationship the most habitual constituents of which are love and fear, in unequal doses. Conversely, wherever relations of this type exist between person and person, a certain uniformity of action will be seen to be established by emulation. "To do as the leader does, to imitate the *best* people, to think, feel, and act like them"—these will become the typical formulas creative of obligation.

TWO TYPES OF GROUP.

This brings us to the recognition of two kinds of group, which—following the late regretted Waxweiler—we may distinguish by the epithets *acephalic* and *cephalised*, or call simply *crowds* on the one hand, and *societies*, on the other.³ There is a *cephalised* group or a *society* whenever the prestige of one or more leaders is recognised.

Several degrees may be distinguished in the *organisation* of a group. A crowd of individuals collected in a

¹ *Origin and Nature of the Emotions*, Boyle's translation, Everyman's Library, art. xxxiii.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ Cf. Varendonck, *Recherches sur les sociétés d'enfants*, Brussels, 1914; Institut Solvay, *Notes et mémoires*, No. 12.

public place is cephalised as soon as it finds leaders. But there is a great difference between this *crowd*, even though it be *led*, and a *band*, the members of which meet at regular intervals; between this permanent band and an *association*; and, finally, between this last and a political *State*. The acephalic group, the crowd properly so called, is thoroughly unstable. It may be noticed, very soon after the first grouping has occurred, that a hierarchy has already been set up, and that there are already leaders and led. This is as good as to say that instinctive imitation is very quickly duplicated by obligatory imitation; and from imitation felt as a duty it is but a step to obedience, properly so called.

Instinctive imitation propagates the repetition of a gesture in all directions. That is the imitation which characterises the crowd. In the cephalised society behaviour is propagated by imitation in only one direction—from above downwards.

To these two modes of imitation, these two types of group, there correspond, if I am not mistaken, two kinds of outbursts of pugnacity, which no doubt have very numerous points of contact, but which must be distinguished if we are to see our way about in the present discussion. There is, first, the spontaneous explosion, and, secondly, the provoked disturbance. In civil troubles, the first may be called *riot*, and the second, *insurrection*. In international relations, the first is an unavoidable frontier incident, and the second, a war that has been organised. A riot is really the instinctive pugnacity of a crowd, whose feelings, carried to their paroxysm by the processes of reflex imitation, take external shape, and let themselves loose on an enemy who is often symbolic. The leaders are often created by the crowd itself. Before the crowd was collected, they had no prestige at all. Nor does their prestige survive the crowd's dispersal.¹

¹ Varendonck, *op. cit.*, p. 89, studying children's crowds, quotes a case of this kind. His account is unfortunately too long for me to transcribe here.

Insurrection and war are quite a different matter. They have been advocated beforehand. At a given moment there has always been someone consciously to urge on the others. The movement has no doubt caught the crowd, but not through ideo-motor imitation. The acts imitated had value for everyone.

The two cases are psychologically very different. Only in the first are we justified in speaking of an instinct of the crowd and of a blind explosion of collective pugnacity. In the second, there are one or more conscious wills, on the one hand, and, on the other, obedience accompanied by sentiments of value and duty. Taking up again the old Platonic comparison, we may say that, while rioting and brawling are due to the predominance of the lower faculties of the soul, to the appetites, and to natural aggressiveness, insurrection and war are the work of the governing faculties, the outcome of reason, of reason reasoning at least, if not of reasonable reason. Aggressiveness, as in several of the examples given in our second chapter, is now subordinated in its purposes to another tendency that is strongly intellectualised—especially to acquisitiveness. War is no longer made just for the pleasure of fighting.

All those who do not go off to chase wills-o'-the-wisp agree on this point, to whatever camp they may belong. Let opinions be what they may on the origins of the European War, for example, someone will always be blamed for having willed it, for having intrigued to bring it about for definite aims.

On this view, it is no longer possible to separate war from armed peace. There is no longer any psychological difference to be discovered between the moment when hostilities are touched off, and the long period during which they are being prepared for by those who want the war. There cannot at least be that distance between them which separates regression from sublimation.

CONCLUSIONS.

War cannot be considered as a spontaneous explosion of the fighting instinct. Nor can it be regarded as a regression of the group mind.

But it is not in doubt that the collective movements to which war gives rise, not only in groups behind the line, but also in the actual battles, determine a large number of regressions of the fighting instinct in individual minds in which this instinct was completely Platonized or even sublimated in time of peace. The regressive character of the phenomenon is particularly apparent when the conflict throws into relief the secondary components of pugnacity, namely, cruelty—often sadistic—the instinct of destruction, and so on.

We do not escape from the postulate of scientific determinism by distinguishing the instinctive from the voluntary. Determinism may find its use in connection with the conscious choice of a leader, just as in connection with the blind movement which stirs a crowd. It remains none the less true that the two processes are widely different. Nor are we the more likely to be induced to renounce our way of looking at things, because it appears more compatible than the other way with moral judgment on the role, importance, and responsibility of individuals.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PART PLAYED BY EXAMPLE

WE have spoken so far of the fighting instinct and its development, as though we were concerned with the growth of a wild plant, whose history depended only on the nature of its seed and on climatic conditions. It is high time to ask ourselves whether human factors are not brought to bear on this plant from outside, so as to stimulate its development.

Pugnacity is innate in children; as they grow, it grows; but, to understand its development, we must not study it merely in the growing child. The same instincts are to be observed, fully alive, in their parents, in their schoolmasters, and in the society that hedges them about, and are thus fostered in the child by his tendency to copy the adult.

In the preceding chapter we set ourselves to distinguish *imitation*, properly so called, which is reducible to an ideo-motor process, from *emulation*, the essential of which is a sentiment of admiration for what is done by someone who is greater than oneself. Now that we have returned to child psychology, this distinction is of less importance. Imitation in the child is nearly always emulation. He has a certain respect for those older than himself, for his father, mother, elder brothers, or older companions—for *big people*, as such. He aspires to be like them. The natural division of our study was not made for us by the inner attitudes of the child imitator, but by those of the sophisticated adult.

The action of the environment on the child's instincts, and particularly on his pugnacity, is exerted in two ways—by *example* and by *education*. Example is the

involuntary stimulus to imitation, education is its conscious and voluntary provocation.

EXAMPLE IN TIMES OF PEACE.

How does the environment in which the child grows up exert an influence on the development of his instincts, through the pugnacity manifested round and about him?

Let us treat separately, first the manifestations of individual pugnacity in everyday life, and then the unchaining of collective pugnacity in time of war. The subject is immense; we can but skim it.

Even in time of peace the child has fighting scenes constantly before his eyes. He watches brawls in the street. Brutal and cruel games are organised for the pleasure of the adults surrounding him. The books and newspapers that come his way are filled with accounts of assaults and quarrels. On the showy posters outside cinemas all manner of murderous dramas hold the place of honour. There is no doubt that in these various ways example exerts a great influence on the child.

In the notes he has been good enough to send me, M. Alaeddine¹ writes:

“One day, one of the best disciplined of my pupils fought with a companion, and broke the latter’s arm. It turned out that the same morning, before coming to school, he had been beaten without cause by his father”.

This is a striking case. It typifies and epitomises the influence of example. This influence may take very different forms. Several of our former chapters might be re-written from this point of view. In speaking of organised fighting games—boxing, football, fencing—and of various alterations of the instinct—mountaineering, chess, novels of adventure—we implicitly noted the influence of society on the individual. None of these games are invented by the child of to-day. As he grows

¹ See p. 90 above.

up, he finds them already established. Clubs already in existence claim him for membership.

Even when he plays with lead soldiers, the child is under a tradition that comes down to him from adults. As we saw, these miniature figures correspond none too well to the aggressiveness of his age. A passion for tiny soldiers testifies rather to a repression of the belligerent instincts of the child. But we need not be astonished that great men of war, in the intervals of their campaigns, have been interested in these toys.

Frederick II gladly stopped at Nuremberg to admire the miniature battalions in the establishment of Georges Hilparth there; and this objectification of his tastes was of the same order as the passion of Ignatius Loyola for *Amadis de Gaule*. Colbert's letter, which is quoted by historians of toys,¹ proves nothing about the spontaneous tastes of the Duke of Burgundy, but it shows the place that military toys may come, through the agency of adults, to take in education. The play of children very often witnesses to the tastes and ambitions of the parents, rather than to the instincts of the children.

The same is true of the choice of a career. In many families the calling of arms, or some other one of the occupations we related to the fighting instinct, passes from father to son, less through inheritance of tastes than through influence of example. The child finds the way all prepared for him to follow.

In this connection, it is interesting to recall the biography of William Penn, perhaps the greatest of the pacifists. For it must be admitted that it was to the example of his father, the admiral, that his belligerent instinct owed the form it took at first, the form of a passionate liking for the career of arms. And it was certainly to another example, that of the Quakers, that was due the sudden and complete sublimation of the same instinct at the moment of his conversion. Indeed, his conversion must be characterised in just this way, as a sublimation of the belligerent instinct, of the taste for struggle and victory. It was brought about by the following remark, heard in the course of a sermon at Cork: "There is a faith over which the world is victorious, and there is a faith which is victorious over the world".

¹ Cf. Parmentier, *Jeux et jouets*.

I shall not insist on these various facts. I am concerned only to make it plain that example plays its part in all the domains we have so far passed through, and that this part is often the decisive one.

THE EXAMPLE OF WAR.

Let us pass on to manifestations of collective pugnacity. What is the influence of war on the child and on his instincts of the fight? We must carefully distinguish the place taken by images of war in the mind of the child, from the influence exerted on his conduct by war examples. Independently even of the efforts everywhere made in school to keep children up to date about the war, as it is going on, or to invest the different branches of the curriculum with such interest as each may borrow from it,¹ everything relating to the war enters largely into the children's imagination, and that in neutral countries, as well as in countries actually engaged in the war.

To give an idea of this, I cannot do better than transcribe a note, dating from December 1915, in which Mlle. Evard was good enough to detail for me the observations she had made on this subject at Le Locle.²

(a) The child's *vocabulary*. This reveals military terms, which are precise, not to say technical, which are occasionally unknown to the teacher, and which testify to a lively interest in engines

* The bibliography of the subject is immense. The following are the titles of some articles, monographs, and books that we have found interesting:—

France: Mme. Hollebecque, *La jeunesse scolaire de France et la guerre*; Sarraut, *L'instruction publique et la guerre*, Paris, 1916; *Nos enfants et la guerre*, being an inquiry conducted by *La société libre pour l'étude psychologique de l'enfant*, Paris, 1917.

Germany: *Schule und Krieg*, Sonderausstellung im Zentralinstitut für Erziehung und Unterricht; Heinemann, *Kriegsthemen für den deutschen Unterricht* (553 subjects of composition on the war), Schulwacht, May, 1916; Engel, *Leipzigs Volksschulen im Zeichen des Weltkrieges*.

England: "How the English Teach the War", *Pedagogical Seminary*, May, 1915.

America: McCorkle, "Instruction in City Schools concerning the War", *Ped. Seminary*, March, 1915; "The Teaching of Current Events", *Ibid.*, September, 1915.

² [A Swiss town on the borders of France.—TRANS.]

of war. The insults the youngsters hurl at each other have absolutely changed since 1914. Now it is nothing but 'Bochel' and 'Dirty Bochel' and threats to 'jab their — bayonet into . . .' etc., etc.

(b) The child's *lessons*. Everything in these comes round to the actual war, thanks to the digressions provoked by the children, and to their stories, etc. When the anniversary of the Morgarten¹ is celebrated, the episode is a real one to the children; for them, it is an actual victory by the Swiss of to-day over the Austrians, the Boches!

(c) The child's *free drawings*. Warlike motives of to-day are regularly to be found in these—the European War, the war in the air, the war under the sea, the war in the trenches, etc., the frontier guards, or the industrial work that is so active in Le Locle, the manufacture of shells.

(d) The child's *collections*. In certain classes, the pupils bring along special documents from near relatives—letters, quotations, war decorations, objects constructed in the trenches, etc.

(e) The child's *turn-out*. In this, everything is adapted to suggest the idea of uniform, particularly in matters of head-gear. Police-caps, and the military caps of all nations—except pointed helmets!—are the delight of our scamps.

(We shall reserve until later a paragraph on the children's games.)

This place taken by war in the thoughts of children has been systematically studied by many methods.²

What are the images borrowed from war which install themselves particularly in the child mind? An inquiry by Dr. Kimmins,³ of the London County Council, gives us a certain amount of information on this subject.

¹ [A small mountain in the Canton of Zug, where, on November 15, 1315, 20,000 invading Austrians were repulsed by the Swiss of the three cantons, who had federated seven years before, for independence.—TRANS.]

² Cf. Döring, "Zur Erforschung des seelischen Verhaltens der Kinder im Kriege", *Archiv. für Pädagogik*, iv. 4, March, 1916; "Die experimentelle Pädagogik in der Kriegszeit", *Pharus*, vii. 1, January, 1916; "Die Beeinflussung der Gedankenwelt des Kindes durch den Krieg", *Pharus*, v. 10, October, 1914; Evard, "Le test d'association couple à l'école primaire", *Archives de psychologie*, xvi. 1916.

³ C. W. Kimmins, "The Special Interests of Children in the War at Different Ages", *Journal of Experimental Pedagogy*, III. 3, December, 1915. Cf. also Kimmins, "The Interests of London Children at Different Ages in Air Raids", *Ibid.*, III. 4, March, 1916, and "An Investigation of London Children's Ideas as to How They Can Help in Time of War", *Ibid.*, IV. 2, June, 1917.

Kimmins collected over 3,000 school essays, written by London school-children. The children had been set the task of writing as much as they could about the war in fifteen minutes. From this material he compiled a summary which is illuminating on what specially interested boys and girls at each age from eight up to thirteen. He found that interest shifts from year to year, and that boys' interests are radically different from girls' from eight to twelve years of age. An unexpected discovery was the very bellicose attitude of little girls at the age of ten; by the age of eleven, this attitude had disappeared; but it recurred at the age of twelve, combined with pride of race. "Such expressions as 'I would not like to be a German; I am proud to think I am an English girl,' are characteristic". By the age of thirteen, a certain maturity of judgment was to be found in the girls, who, in this respect, were at least one year ahead of the boys.

WAR AND GAMES.

The influence of war on children's games deserves to be considered separately. Play represents the transition from the plane of ideas to the plane of conduct; it is imagination moulding action.

Children's games have assuredly been strongly influenced by war. This is what strikes us at the outset. But, as soon as we look closer, we see that this influence has been superficial enough. While war furnishes the child who plays with a new stock of ideas, it does not seem to alter the nature of the games that are played. Just as the child's class exercises remain, at bottom, the same as before, although more is said about the homeland, and the problems discussed refer to shells and not to oranges, so, games in the street take on a military colouring without losing their former variety.

The two extracts about to be quoted appear to me very significant in this respect, for the intention of the authors was certainly to emphasise the influence of the War on the occupations of children.

Mlle. Evard, writing from a neutral country, says:

"The small boys think of nothing but *fighting*; in summer, they form themselves into bands, take provisions, and pitch camps for a whole day in the woods; and they form cavalcades in numerous groups (here you have a reminiscence of the passage

of dragons). They organise ambulances for the wounded, sanitary squads, etc., with various weapons, divisional signs, ranks, *packs*, field-dressings, the Red-Cross, music, drums, etc. In winter, the snow lends itself admirably to trench warfare and the throwing of hand grenades. And anything at all serves for the construction of aeroplanes, to be launched in the street, in class, anywhere at all.

"The little girls are no longer anything except nurses, dressed in white cloth, with mob-caps, and the red cross on their aprons. Stretchers are improvised, and hospital trains, with the smaller children to act as the wounded. Often, too, the girls agree to impersonate the Germans, that is to say, the vanquished, the prisoners".

The observations of Mme. Hollebecque¹ relate to Parisian children :

"Since the beginning of the war, games have been transposed into a new key. Horses now drag only guns ; all the cabmen have become artillery drivers ; there are no more policemen and thieves, but only Frenchmen and Germans, soldiers and spies. If you are chased and caught nowadays, you are not just clapped into prison ; you are brought before the Council of War, and you undergo the supreme penalty".

Thus, all kinds of games—running games, hunting games, constructive games,² fighting games, imitative games, and so on—borrowed their imagery from the war. But did the war have the effect of increasing the number of fighting games ? This is less certain than would appear at first.

Perhaps, for a complete answer to this question, we should have to distinguish between neutral and belligerent countries, and between one period of the war and another.

Herr Dix, a German teacher, already known through his psychological works, made some curious observations in this matter at Meissen.

"When mobilisation began, I supposed that the children would set about playing at soldiers, as they used to do during manœu-

¹ *La jeunesse scolaire de France et la guerre*, p. 86.

² When Saint Theresa and her brother built little hermitages at the bottom of the garden, they were putting the images furnished by their surroundings at the service of the same interest as the youngsters who played during the war at digging trenches.

vres. To my great astonishment, nothing of the sort came about, within the range of my observation. Was it that the seriousness of the time impressed itself on the children at school and at home? With the exception of the very small ones, the Meissen children did not really play, at first, at any soldiering game. I went all through the streets and the public squares. . . . It was not until after Christmas 1914, when uniforms and articles of military equipment were given as presents, that such games began. But they did not go on to the same extent as in peace time. In the spring and summer of 1915, no more trace of them was to be found".¹

This has remained an isolated observation. It calls for the following remarks: ² The fighting instinct, as we saw, is expressed notably in two complementary forms; it creates either fighters or spectators of fights. And here we may recall the memoirs of the President of the Republic of Cravifie, in whom suppression of the opportunities for fighting developed an interest in imaginary battles. The school-children of Meissen would seem to furnish an instance of the converse. Their minds were completely absorbed in the great battles which they were watching from a distance; their fighting instinct was wholly turned in that direction, and no longer issued in belligerent *activity*.

As the war went on, and the various fronts became relatively fixed, the child's imagination found less and less to feed on in current events, and his taste for fighting found better expression in games where he could be active.

The observation of Herr Dix also brings toys into the case, and the influence that adults have exerted on the child by their means. Military clothing, above all, was responsible for the renewal of battles: the habit makes the monk, the uniform the warrior, more than the proverb would lead us to think.

Dr. Th. Simon,³ without confirming the observation of

¹ Dix, *Beobachtungen über den Einfluss der Kriegsereignisse auf das Seelenleben des Kindes*, in Stern, *Jugendliches Seelenleben und Krieg*, p. 173.

² Claparède has already called attention to this in his *Psychologie de l'enfant*.

³ *Nos enfants et la guerre*, p. 52.

Dix, remarked that the child's interest in war games was transient :

" It was maintained only during some months, for a year at the most. Then it diminished, and little by little the old games . . . reappeared, and even took precedence. . . . The war game is, above all, an imitative game ".

THE MORAL EFFECT OF WAR.

The influence of war on the temperament of children is outside our subject. Similarly, we shall leave on one side all reference to the recrudescence of juvenile criminality. The factors in operation here are so numerous that it would be extremely difficult to isolate the part played by the fighting instinct. A special study would have to be devoted to this topic.

Teachers and parents assert often enough, in our hearing, that since the War, children are more insubordinate, less easy to control, more *difficult*, to use the consecrated term. And of this fact, which is none too easy to make precise, we are given an explanation which appeals to the laws of example. War, we are told, represents such an unchaining of animosity and hatred, such barbarity, such cruelty, such degradation and violence, that it is not to be wondered at if, so many essential principles being turned upside down, children conclude that there is no longer either good or evil, and that everything is permissible.

I do not think this explanation is correct. It attributes to children a form of moral judgment which is not theirs. It is not their way to look for a universal *maxim* for human actions, in the Kantian sense of the word. They are not shocked by rules that have exceptions, provided the former are taught before the latter. And so they have no difficulty in admitting the exceptions which current morality enters against the principle of respect for human life.

I do not think, therefore, that it is through a sort of condemnation passed on adults that children come to despise the authority of their parents and teachers. We

ought to begin by examining a simpler psychological explanation. Might their attitude not be simply an effect of distraction? They have other things at heart than the little daily duties. The passionate interest they take in the affairs of the Great War—how could they devote this to the minor tasks of the home?

CONCLUSIONS.

In short, on the strength of actual observations, we are brought to the following conclusions.

War enters considerably into the preoccupations of children. It furnishes them abundantly with new images, words, ideas, and feelings, which are immediately assimilated, and which reappear in the different spheres where children are creators—in their drawings, their essays, and their games.

But it would not seem that war particularly stimulates the fighting instinct in them, or that quarrels amongst them are more frequent because peoples are at grips.

This is apparently due to various causes.

In the first place, perhaps, it is due to the rivalry of the fighting and the spectator instincts. Then again, warfare of to-day is something so complex that it makes its appeal to many other instincts than that of the fight—to the instincts of construction (aeroplanes, huts, trenches), as much as to those of destruction, to pity as much as to hatred. What the child of the people has immediately before his eyes leads him, in several countries, to think more often of the bread he is to eat, than of the enemy he is to tear to pieces.

Nor, finally, does the child's reason, any more than that of the generality of adults, compare individual struggles (brawls) with group struggles (wars). It does not grasp the absoluteness of the principle of respect for life. It adjusts itself to the contradictions of our civilisation; and, from the fact that war—which in every country is presented to it as defensive—is permissible, or even holy, it does not conclude that brawls and aggressiveness have thereby become legitimate.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FIGHTING INSTINCT AND PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION

If example acts in the way we have seen, on the development of the fighting instinct, what are we to say of education? We have dealt so far only with theoretical problems; it is time to consider the practical bearing of our researches.

We observe the existence of the fighting instinct in man, and its persistence throughout the development of the individual and the race. In setting out in parallel lines the successive forms it assumes, in individuals on the one hand, and in societies on the other, we observed two evolutions, pointing in the same direction, but unequally advanced.

The evolution of societies is like that of individuals in witnessing to an intellectualisation of the fighting instinct. Brute force no longer suffices of itself; pugnacity is more and more frequently *raised* and ennobled by a high moral ideal. But, in the case of political states, this raising of the instinct does not reach as far as sublimation, as it does in an already considerable number of individuals. Further, wars, which in certain individuals determine regressions—in the strict sense of the word—must, in the case of States, be considered as indications of unfinished moral development.

It results from this, that the psychological facts and laws with which we have been dealing give rise to educational applications, which vary not a little, according as we consider only the adaptation of the individual to the state of actual society, whether in peace or war,

or as we envisage that other end, still remote and ideal, the peaceful society of nations.

It is the affair of the philosopher and the moralist to assign each of these aims to its appropriate place in the realm of ends, the hierarchy of human values. That is not our concern. We shall simply take these different aims as *given*—it is a fact that they do impose themselves, either separately or together, on a large number of minds and wills in society of to-day—and we shall show, by examples, that the methods suggested for the reaching of each of them are nothing but the instinctive application of the laws we have begun to induce.

THREE EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS.

And first of all, let us formulate the three problems with which the educationist is faced, as soon as he recognises the primordial importance of the fighting instinct, and its persistence.

The first, which I shall call simply *the problem of moral education*, is presented, in connection with this instinct as in connection with all the others, nearly in these terms: Since the fighting instinct exists in every man, and is capable of being expressed in very different ways, how shall we contrive that it issues in acts which are useful, instead of harmful, to other people? What must be done to utilise the fighting instinct in the individual for the general good? Or—to take up again a word to which we are now accustomed—how shall we contrive the *sublimation* of the fighting instinct?

But the existence of the fighting instinct raises a second problem in education, a problem of altogether special character. At the point we have reached in social evolution, the political society, the State, has not completely sublimated its collective pugnacity; it still wages armed conflict against its neighbours. It is important, therefore, for the State, that the fighting instinct of its members shall *not* be wholly deflected and Platonised, but shall rather be canalised, and raised, for the profit of the restricted community to which they

belong. With times of war in view, the State is thus careful over *the military education* of individuals. It is anxious to turn the individual fighting instinct to the service of collective pugnacity. At times, this anxiety about war dominates the mind of a group to such an extent that the whole problem of civic education is reduced to one of military education; at other times, the idea of war is so remote that civic and moral education become one and the same.

Thirdly, the ideal of a society of nations, a League of Nations—to adopt the current term—in which the fighting instinct of each of the political groups would be utilised for the greatest good of all, raises a problem of collective education which we shall call by its most usual name, *the problem of pacifist education*. How shall we contrive the sublimation of collective pugnacity itself?

It is obvious that the three questions are sharply distinct. They seem to us to be of very unequal difficulty; and this is due, no doubt, to their having been presented to the human mind at moments in its history that are very remote one from another. While the first question, of moral education, was already in process of solution at the time when the earliest of human societies were emerging from the animal state, the third appears still premature to a large number of men of the twentieth century. As for the second, it is like the first in belonging to every period of evolution, but the development of the human mind and of society, by *complicating* the fighting instinct, changes the modalities of the collective struggle, and, consequently, forces society to be ceaselessly finding fresh solutions for the same problem, as its data are being slowly transformed.

THE EFFECTS OF CHILD'S PLAY.

Before broaching each of these three problems in succession, we must be still further delayed by a preliminary and general question.

Pedagogy can claim to be scientific only by taking its stand as an *applied* science. In order that the educa-

tionist may discover what means will lead him most securely to the aims he sets before himself—and we have just seen that these aims are many and various—he ought to know what laws of human development he can take advantage of. He is well aware of this duty, for, in the absence of propositions methodically laid down for him by the psychologist, he formulates more or less premature generalisations for himself, on the strength of his limited experience and of the children who come under his notice; and on these generalisations, for want of better, he regulates his conduct. The danger in this is, that he attributes an impossible value to these propositions; whereas the psychologist is at pains to discover an impartial method which will enable him to establish definitively the good or ill foundation of these empirical formulas, that vary so much from one practitioner to another.

To solve the educational problems we have indicated—and problems of education in general—nothing is more important to know than the laws which control the expressions of deep-seated instincts in the child. We hope that the facts to which we have drawn attention will help towards the formulation of such laws, but, for the present, it must be admitted, they have not yet been established. It is not yet possible to give an answer, which shall be founded on a methodical induction, to the question, Will a child who likes to fight be more bellicose than another, when he becomes an adult? Three theories on the *effects* of play are in vogue. If each is considered in isolation, they will lead us to adopt three contradictory attitudes.

Let us first run over them rapidly. After that, we shall say why it is improper to envisage them separately.

(i) Child's play may be considered as having *no significance for the present day*. The instincts expressed through it are essentially survivals, reverberations of a bygone social condition in which they were of marked utility. If the child of to-day climbs trees, this is because his ancestors were formerly men of the woods;

if he fights, this is because there used to be a time when the hand to hand conflict was a duty imposed on primitive peoples by the conditions of savagery in which they lived. Play, and the instinctive tendencies manifested therein, recapitulate the great chapters in the history of human civilisation. They do not prepare for future stages.¹ Consequently, the educationist has neither to repress nor to encourage them. The child, left to himself, will outgrow them naturally.

(ii) Other authors, of whom we have already spoken, recognise *positive, significance for the present day* in the instinctive tendencies manifested in the child, and especially in the fighting instinct. The play of the child is a preparatory exercise, a *rehearsal*. The child fights because he will have to fight later on in life. The function and effect of play is to give rise to habits. If the educationist wishes to prevent these habits from arising, he will oppose the earliest expressions of the instinct.

(iii) But, curiously enough, a diametrically opposite theory has been advanced, at least in connection with certain forms of play, among which fighting play has been definitely included. Play has *significance for the present day*, but it is *negative*. The function of play is *cathartic*. Its aim and result is to eliminate certain socially harmful impulses from the individual. The educationist ought therefore to encourage fighting play, if he wishes to *purge* the child of his aggressiveness. The child fights because it is important for the race that he shall not fight any more when he grows up.

These various theories on the effects of play are not

¹ [The fullest exposition of this theory is, of course, that of Stanley Hall, in the first volume of *Adolescence*. Cf. the following extracts: "The view of Groos that play is practice for future adult activities is very partial, superficial, and perverse. It ignores the past, where lie the keys to all play activities. True play never practises what is phyletically new, and this, industrial life often calls for. . . . In play every mood and movement is instinct with heredity. . . . It is reminiscent, albeit unconsciously, of our line of descent, and each is the key to all the other. The psycho-motive impulses that prompt it are the forms in which our forefathers have transmitted to us their habitual activities. Thus stage by stage we re-enact their lives". *Op. cit.*, pp. 202-3.—TRANS.]

so contradictory as they appear to be. M. Claparède, in a recent work, has shown that their opposition is explained—and dissipated—immediately we understand that they are considering the manifestations of play from different angles.

"Play has been accounted for", he says, "by envisaging the child, now in a *longitudinal* aspect, that is to say, in relation to what he is to become later on, now in a *transversal* aspect, that is to say, by considering only the processes that are going on in him at the present moment".¹

From the first of these points of view, all the phenomena of play appear as preparations for later life, as agents of growth. It is only from the *transversal* point of view that we can properly speak of the *cathartic* effects of play.

As for the theory which makes child's play the survival of atavistic conditions, it is plain that this is easily reconciled with each of the others. The ancestral origin of our impulses does not in itself prejudice the question of their real significance now. The past is pregnant with the future, and it is therefore proper to suppose that such remnants of the past, resuscitated in the playing child, are not without influence on his later development. And, on the other hand, play, this half fictitious reminiscence of the by-gones of the race, may be the opportunity for the individual to satisfy needs of activity which cannot find useful outlets in the present. Claparède, who has been for fifteen years the most ardent propagator of the rehearsal theory of Groos,² Stanley Hall, to whose name is most intimately linked the atavistic theory of play, and Carr,³ the inventor of the cathartic theory, have all three advocated theories that are not mutually exclusive, and that find room for every one of the considerations we have just been advancing.⁴

¹ *Psychologie de l'enfant*, fifth edition, p. 449.

² Cf. Groos himself, *Das Spiel als Katharsis*, Zeit. für päd. Psychologie, 1911, p. 353.

³ *The Survival Value of Play*, University of Colorado studies, 1902.

⁴ [Cf. also an interesting monograph by Mabel Jane Reaney, *The Psychology of the Organized Group Game*, Cambridge, 1916.—TRANS.]

One fact especially appears to us important to emphasise. If, as we maintained, the various forms of play witness to the instinctive and specific tendencies of the human race, then, in studying the effects of play on the development of the child, we must never lose sight of those possible *alterations* of the primitive instinct, so numerous and multiform, to which we have devoted several of our chapters.

The problem is not how to purge the child of his aggressiveness. Such an enterprise would be chimerical. As Stanley Hall points out, we are concerned with something that we can neither uproot nor suppress;¹ all we can hope to do is to sublimate it.

The manner in which the child's instincts are deflected, objectified, and Platonised, enables us to give great educational significance even to his games, and to base on these, habits which are without danger to others and even useful to society.

OUTLINES OF RESEARCH.

We might think to verify, in a precise manner, the theories to which we have referred, by employing psycho-statistical methods. But the variety of the *alterations* of the repressed fighting instinct would compel the inquiry to be pushed further than the summarising of biographies or inquiries generally allows. Let us outline some plans of research.

The *rehearsal* theory suggests a biographical inquiry into the childhood of famous men. This would consist in collecting records of the childhood of people whose psychology it has been possible to study in some detail, so as to see whether correlations might be established between the more or less bellicose pastimes of their youth and the temperament or occupation of their riper years.

It might be thought that this investigation should first be carried out on the lives of great commanders. But such a choice would not be particularly happy.

¹ In *Recreation and Reversion*.

The career of arms, as we saw, bears no constant relation to the instinct of the fight; and the generals who have made their mark on history have certainly owed their success to something quite different from their belligerent temperament.¹

There is no doubt, of course, that warlike episodes will be found in narratives of the childhood of many among them.² Duguesclin, we are told, played at fighting with the children of his village, and Marshal Boucicaut organised imaginary battles. Froissart tells us of the fights in which his companions engaged, turning their caps into helmets, and disguising themselves as knights.

But we must be on our guard against the more or less unconscious, *a priori*, assumptions of biographers, and, before drawing conclusions, be careful to set out a counter-proof, by contrasting great warriors in this respect with groups, say, of great scholars, great artists, and great men of peace. We have already brought to light the warlike tastes of William Penn as a child.

And, as a marginal note, I would remind the reader of the difficulties inherent in the biographical method—the poverty and uncertainty of the sources. A typical example may be given. In spite of all the anecdotes we have about Napoleon, here is the only authentic document we have on his combativeness during childhood :

“Nothing could put me down, I was afraid of nobody. I fought with one, *scrapped* with another, made myself feared by all. My brother Joseph was thrashed and bitten, and I had lodged a complaint against him almost before he had recovered. It was well for me to be beforehand; mother Lætitia would have restrained my bellicose humour; she would not have put up with my outbursts; she was kind, but severe. My father, an enlightened man, but too fond of pleasure to bother himself about my childhood, sought to find excuses for my faults”.³

It will be admitted that this is not much to go upon.

The theory of compensation suggests a research of a different order, a *transversal* inquiry. One might take annual publications about people, such as *Who's Who*,

¹ Cf. Ziehen, *op. cit.*

² Parmentier, *Jeux et jouets*, p. 8.

³ Chuquet, article, “Napoléon” in *La grande encyclopédie*.

extract the amusements preferred by notabilities of various kinds, and, grouping these according to the instincts to which they make their appeal,¹ discover whether certain types of recreation habitually correspond to certain vocations and careers. Are such recreations psychologically in harmony with the dominant note of these careers? Or, on the contrary, do they make their appeal to activities which find no outlet in everyday life? Viscount Grey and Lord Balfour are both of them diplomatists and, incidentally, tennis champions. Suppose the coexistence of these two qualities was observed a considerable number of times; should our attention be caught by the contrast between the two occupations? or, on the contrary, by their resemblance? Are they not both a well-mannered contest, depending on agility and skill, both, a balancing sport as well as a fighting one?

Statistical inquiries of this kind would obviously gain by being completed and controlled by the minute analysis of individual cases.²

We shall speak of yet a third method, the ethno-psychical, in connection with the problem of military education.

¹ Cf. De Coubertin, *op. cit.*, and the Report of the Congress on the Psychology of Sport, Lausanne, 1913.

² To be conclusive, they ought to be borne out by a very large number of cases. An abstract from *Qui êtes-vous* for 1908, which I have before me, gave me 374 cases. That is not enough for trustworthy results to be drawn from it.

CHAPTER XV

MILITARY EDUCATION

WE shall begin our summary review of the problems with which the existence of the fighting instinct confronts the educationist, by studying those of military education. Of the three kinds of education which we distinguished, this is the one which rests most directly on the *given*, and which causes the least marked *alterations* in the instinct. While on other occasions the instinct has to be deflected and Platonised, on this, it is enough that it be canalised.

AN ETHNOGRAPHICAL SURVEY.

To write the history of military education, we should have to go back to the origins of mankind; and even among animals we should probably find behaviour designed to inure and train for fighting. We quoted one or two cases of fighting play that appeared to be encouraged, perhaps even organised, by the parents or by the seniors of the clan. The single combats observed among the ants by Huber are interpreted by Letourneau as "lessons in a kind of warlike fencing".¹

The comparative study of military education in various civilisations would be extremely fascinating. It would form a chapter of sociology still more than of comparative ethnography. Until division of labour becomes the rule, war service remains the lot of every youth; later, it becomes the business of a single class. This class may be composed of all the free men, as in Sparta and ancient Persia, or it may be sharply defined, as in ancient Egypt or among the Incas. Sometimes it is the govern-

¹ *Évolution de l'éducation*, p. 11.

ing caste ; sometimes—in India and China, for instance,—it is only one class among several others. If we were jokingly to apply our modern administrative concepts to such remote social conditions, we might say that sometimes military education formed part of the education given to every one, entering into the *primary* curriculum ; that sometimes it was the privilege of a few, a branch of the *secondary* and *higher* curricula ; and that sometimes again it had the definite character of *vocational* instruction.

But this is not the place to enter upon such researches. We should have undertaken them earlier, if we had had the necessary ability.

XENOPHON AND PLATO.

We are concerned at present only to detail some of the various ways of procedure which, from the time when men first began to reason about educational methods, as these were transmitted by tradition, have been put consciously in operation to increase the military value of young men.

We find the problem raised at the very beginnings of pedagogy. Military questions entered largely into the earliest doctrines of education among the Greeks, as witness the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon and the *Republic* of Plato—to mention only works that have come down to us.

Unequal and different in genius as these two Athenians were—it was Taine, I think, who said of Xenophon that he was possessed of the medium intelligence of a cavalry captain—they were both preoccupied with the idea of giving their city, so great in matters of art, other qualities that it lacked. Its people might be brilliant ; it was important that they should be dowered with military virtues, too.

The educational Utopias of these two men are the better understood if we bring them into relation with certain preoccupations of the present day. While reading them, we should have in mind the title of a book

that made a great stir some twenty years ago—*Wherein Lies the Superiority of the Anglo-Saxon?* Substitute the thought of the Lacedæmonian hegemony for the thought of the British Empire, which haunted the mind of Edmond Demolins. Nor do I think I do wrong to the ideal of Xenophon—that gay cavalier, lover of sports and the chase, who proposed to the Athenians that they should adopt a form of gymnastics imported from abroad—when I say that it reminds us of the ideal of M. de Coubertin.¹ Undoubtedly there are great differences between the Greeks and ourselves. So there were also between Xenophon and Plato. Both the *Cyropædia* and the *Republic* no doubt take the point of view of the State, as do all treatises on military education. But their two programmes are distinguished in this especially, that the first proposes to militarise the whole nation, while the second, outlining a programme for the education of the *Guardians*, indicates the most effective means to form a class that shall in some sort canalise the fighting instinct of the city, without unduly interfering with its destinies. It is to be remarked, however, that, for Plato, military service is an indispensable preparation for, and a necessary stage in, the career of the philosopher-king.

THE CONSTANT PROBLEM OF MILITARY EDUCATION.

From the time of these theorists on military education, down to our own day, the procedure advocated has no doubt varied in detail with the changing conditions of warfare. But that does not prevent us from grouping it all under the same psychological rubrics.

The problem has remained the same. Given, on the one hand, the existence in every individual of a tendency towards fighting, and, on the other, the needs of social life and the prospect of armed conflicts between the political State and its neighbours—how shall the child be brought up with a view to war?

Obviously, the question is, not to eliminate the instinct

¹ See p. 198 below.

of the fight, but rather to stimulate it, and yet, at the same time, to bring it firmly under the control of the collective will. The individual ought to be in a fit state to fight; it is well that he should even have a liking that way, provided he yields to this liking only in the interest, and in accordance with the express will, of the group.¹

Hence, apart from *instruction*, properly so called, which varies from age to age as the art of war varies, every curriculum of military education has to perform two essential tasks—to stimulate and to canalise.

EDUCATION FOR STRENGTH.

Martial education is originally only a more or less systematic training of the individual for the instinctive behaviour released by the fight. It is chiefly concerned to increase the *strength* of the subject, that is to say, to render him as capable as possible of dealing blows on his opponent. It is, above all, his muscles that have to be developed.

When skill is added to strength, and the invention of ever more perfect weapons compels those handling them to serve an ever more complicated apprenticeship, we may begin to speak of *instruction* with a view to combat. All we are concerned with at the beginning is exercise.

But physical education secures still further results. Not only does it render the individual stronger, it also renders him more fully conscious of his strength, and consequently—unless some action thwarts it—more disposed to show it off in the manner nature has appointed for that purpose, that is to say, more pugnacious. It will be necessary to resort to many and various devices

¹ Marshal von der Goltz, the chief instigator of preparatory military education in Germany, distinguished very clearly between quarrelsome (*handelsüchtig*) and martial (*kriegerisch*). The State has no interest in making its citizens quarrelsome; it will therefore set itself to canalise their fighting instinct as much as to stimulate it. Cf. Fisch, *Erziehung zur Wehrpflicht*, Frauenfeld, 1913, p. 46, analysing an article from *Der Deutsche Rundschau*, "Jungdeutschland: ein Beitrag zur Jugendpflege".

to prevent strength accumulated in this way from bursting out at once at the expense of the community, and to turn it into a reserve which society may use at the opportune moment for its own advantage.

But again, physical exercise very soon discovers another object. Along with muscular strength, essentially aggressive, another form of strength is found to be indispensable, namely, the strength of resistance, which is in large measure nervous and voluntary. And from the point of view of preparation for fighting, the main advantage of physical education is to be seen in this, that it inures to hardships.

To harden, to inure, is to relegate to the background a primordial instinct, the tendency to avoid and flee from pain; and to give precedence to another instinct, pleasure in showing off one's strength.

This pleasure is originally, as we saw, the joy taken in hitting one's adversary and getting oneself admired by the spectators. But at a later stage its meaning is greatly enlarged by our capacity for subjectifying our instincts; it becomes the joy of defeating oneself, triumphing inwardly over the natural cowardice of the flesh—a victory of which one is at the same time the hero and the sole witness.

WAR AND SPORT.

The relationship between sport and war was studied in April 1912 in an article by M. de Coubertin. He remarked upon "the evident zeal" with which youth had taken part, ever since the dawn of the twentieth century, in "a series of wars, all of which presented this remarkable character, that they were *not* undertaken for the defence of the soil and the essential rights of the home country"; and he put to himself this question, "Has the belligerency of young people not been influenced by the fact that the taste for, and practice of, sports have been developed so intensively?" He saw several reasons for answering in the affirmative.

"One of the causes for this impetuosity of youth, the vigour of which we have just mentioned, may have lain in the indirect preparation for war that every sport admits of. It is certain that the muscles have been trained, and habits of physical life contracted, in such a way as to render man much more capable of facing the fatigues of a campaign. Sports have caused all those qualities to thrive, which serve for war—coolness of head, good humour, habituation to the unexpected, exactitude in estimating the effort to be put forth so as not to waste energies. . . . The young sportsman obviously feels himself better prepared *to join up* than his elders were. And when we feel ourselves prepared for something, we do it the more willingly".¹

After having set forth these arguments, M. de Coubertin urges, "on the other hand", that sports have contributed to spread abroad what he calls "the play feeling", love of fair play, a way of regarding battle which is "rather fine and chivalrous",—"a state of mind which modifies war itself, because it tends to diminish its barbarity and ugliness". He concludes in these terms:

"Sports do not tend to render youth more *bellicose*, but only more *military*; that is to say, they give youth the feeling of strength without the further incitement to use it. They have therefore not increased the chances of war; neither have they diminished them".²

I think M. de Coubertin is right in his conclusions, but it does not appear that he has proved them. From the point of view of a pacifist, the facts he quotes are decisively against sport. All sports make in the same direction; they prepare for war; "and when we feel ourselves prepared for something, we do it the more willingly". To feel, besides, that we may do it in a manner "rather fine and chivalrous", is but to add a further motive for flinging ourselves into it. The hesitating, non-committal answer that M. de Coubertin gives to the question he put so clearly, is justified, only if no account is taken of a fact that he does not even mention, namely, the property inherent in physical exercises to become an end in themselves. So much

¹ *Essais de psychologie sportive*, 1913, pp. 259-61.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 261-4.

may strictly be said of all exercise whatsoever; but the remark has a quite special importance for us in connection with physical education. Physical struggle is the natural end-result of this increase of strength through exercise; but this end-result has to compete with the other aims pursued by the fighting instinct, once it has been *altered*. The tendency to fight is diverted in sport towards objects that are in no wise those of pugnacity. Not only, as M. de Coubertin has well shown, is the tendency *canalised*, through constant thinking about "the rules of the game", that must never be infringed; it is also *deflected*, in a series of sports in which the opponent is quite fictitious;¹ and, as we have already said, it is in very large measure *subjectified*, whenever one is involved in a fight with oneself, watching one's progress therein. While it is certainly true that indulgence in sports, through augmenting young people's consciousness of their own strength, risks making them more bellicose, it is not less true that, wherever sports are organised, they give youth the chance to divert the fighting instinct towards something other than war. I do not know whether it is correct, as M. de Coubertin alleges, that, at the time of the Crimean War, and during the French campaigns in Africa, "nothing apart from the war would satisfy the muscular instincts of those sportingly given"; but assuredly we must agree with the same author that "under present conditions, the sporting instincts find abundant means of satisfaction within the pleasures of civilian life".²

PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND WAR.

If our analysis is correct, it is permissible to think that the various methods of physical education have not all the same military import. It is worth while to study their psychological, as well as their physiological, effects. Once again it is no use to proceed by definition and the contrasting of one concept with another. An historical and inductive inquiry is the better method.

¹ See Chapter VIII. ² *Essais de psychologie sportive*, 1913, pp. 259-60.

As a counterpart to the biographical method of individual psychology, our concern would now be with hardly less delicate researches of the ethno-psychical kind. Instead of studying individuals, we should take peoples, and seek to determine the relationship between the expression of the fighting instinct in national games, in which the whole youth of the country participates, and the more or less warlike character of the political society concerned. The classic parallel of Sparta and Athens might be completed by studies bearing more directly on ourselves. Take England. Sports have always been held in honour there; and distinct periods might be remarked in the history of several of them, notably perhaps in the history of football, which interests us more than other games. For example, there is the period of professionalism, which has already taken possession of Association football, of cricket to a great extent, and of other games also. To what do such periods correspond in the history of the nation's public spirit? In Germany, we know the part usually attributed to gymnastic societies and to *Father Jahn* in the awakening of national feeling and in the War of Independence. To what extent has the development of Young France in matters of sport contributed towards those military qualities, the sudden blossoming of which in 1914 compelled our admiration? The so-called *little nations*, too, would lend themselves to interesting researches. What influence has the extraordinary vogue of Ling gymnastics had on the national mind of Sweden? And finally, take Switzerland, with its national wrestling games and shooting matches. Have these, in the course of the centuries, known periods of glory and periods of disfavour, which might be related to fluctuations in the military spirit of the Swiss? ¹

It must be understood that I am raising these questions, without trying to answer them.

Further, it will be seen that physical exercises do, or do not, have the effect of encouraging belligerency,

¹ Cf. K. Fisch, *Erziehung zur Wehrpflicht*.

according to the spirit in which they are proposed to young people. It is highly probable that gymnastics, proposed to the adolescent only as a means towards the normal development of his body, and kept in touch with æsthetic modes of thought and feeling by example, will not have the effect of extending his fighting instincts, even although his strength is increased thereby. The course given to his thought will deflect his instincts naturally. On the other hand, it is indubitable that exercises bearing on the same muscles of the body will have quite a different effect, if they are continually accompanied by the thought of combat. This will act little by little as a suggestion, and will release fighting wishes.

THE MILITARISATION OF YOUTH.

A study by Hans Reichenbach on the militarisation of German youth, published ¹ one year before the European War, is instructive in this regard. He analyses the tendencies behind the great federation of German societies for the physical culture of the young, which was founded in 1911 at the instigation of Field-Marshal von der Goltz, under the name *Jungdeutschland Bund*; and he quotes a very characteristic passage from Count Bothmer, a founder of one of these federated societies.

"We must stimulate in the masses," says this writer, "the martial instinct which keeps alive the conviction that a young boy, and later on a man, are in this world to defend their fatherland. This instinct is threatened on all sides to-day. A period of prolonged peace, together with the increase in general well-being, are themselves debilitating in their effects; to these is to be added the highly dangerous influence which apostles of international peace exert—less, thank heaven! on the healthy masses, than on a section of so-called *cultured* society. After the manner of sensitive ladies, these depict only the horrors of butchery, and have nothing to say about the ideal power which is manifested in a heroic death, be the man who suffers it great or small. They enfeeble us by preventing this our soft-hearted generation from facing a war that will come, that ought to come, and that, when it does come, will be more terrible than any that has gone before".

¹ In *Die freie Schulgemeinde*, July 1913.

And it was from one of the earliest numbers of the recognised organ of *Jungdeutschland* that Wyneken extracted phrases like the following: "For us too the grand and joyful hour of conflict will strike. . . . Yes, it will be a joyful hour, a grand hour, which we have every right to pray for in the privacy of our devotions. A desire for war, openly voiced, turns often to vain pride and a ridiculous rattling of sabres. But, silently, at the bottom of German hearts, there must always live the love of war and an aspiration towards it".

Young Germany aimed at "fortifying German youth physically and morally, by methodically organising bodily exercises in a patriotic spirit". If the spirit was what Reichenbach and Wyneken said it was, it would be unjust to ascribe the belligerent effects of this enterprise merely to the bodily exercises.

DISCIPLINE.

But physical education has never been more than a part of military education.¹ In proportion as warfare has become more and more complicated, battles have moved further and further away from the primitive hand to hand conflicts, and the political State has been less and less able to content itself with stimulating the pugnacious tendencies of the individual and storing them up against the arrival of the opportune moment. Not only has the State had to stimulate the instinct of the fight; it has also had to bring this into alliance and combination with tendencies originally quite foreign to it—the social tendencies. This part of military education aims at inculcating absolute obedience in the soldier, so as to bring his instincts, wishes, and volitions, into utter dependence on the group, and turn him into its docile instrument; and, little by little, this has become by far the most important part of the soldier's training. Competent authors maintain that physical culture ought to continue throughout the period of adolescence, and that military instruction, properly so called, may be

¹ In spite of what a French specialist, Coste, has to say on this: "*Military preparation is identical with physical education, and the latter is the very basis of the integral education of a man and a citizen*" : quoted by Fisch, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

reduced to a few weeks ; but that several years of continuous service are not too much to break the individual in to those physical and moral habits of immediate and passive obedience which the conditions of modern warfare make indispensable to success.

It is easy to see that such education is not related to the preceding by any psychological and inner link. And the proof of the matter lies in this, that it has been realised nowhere so perfectly, and through exercises of so wise a psychological kind, as in an army without arms, the *company* of Saint Ignatius Loyola. It is not to the fighting instinct of his recruits that the leader will address himself, who wishes them to reach perfection in discipline. If he does not content himself with wholly external methods, such as constraint, punishments, and rewards, he must make appeal to their reflection, to their reason, and let them see what results the individual may expect from perfect co-operation of each with all. But the authority of the group is rather imposed on the individual than consciously accepted by him ; and wherever this kind of education succeeds, reasoning enters into it but little. Indirect methods are of the logic of this system. Such were the methods advocated by Plato, when he insisted that the *Guardians* should have nothing of their own, not even a family, so as the better to identify their own interest with that of the State. Whatever is added to the private property of the individual, be it wealth, affections, friends, or liberties, contributes to make more difficult that part of military education which aims at drilling a man into obeying like a stick or a piece of inert matter.

The danger of military obedience lies in its being secured only by threat of punishment, that is to say, by appeal to the instinct of fear. Plato himself spoke of those men who were brave only out of cowardice. The conditions of modern warfare, by turning the combatant only too often into *human material*, risk the detachment of military education from human education in general, and the opposition of one against the other.

Obedience to the commands of conscience is considered to have moral value, because such commands are *categorical imperatives*, and the idea of *sanction* does not enter into them. Men have not been slow to measure systems of religious morality by this standard; and in proportion as these have motivated good deeds by the fear of hell, they have been regarded as morally worthless, and as mere policies of calculation. There is a risk that military discipline, more than anything else, will be secured without this inner consent of the subject, and will consequently remain altogether outside of moral education.¹

CADET CORPS.

Along with physical exercises and training in obedience, military education includes technical instruction—knowledge of the various arms, practice in swordsmanship and shooting, notions of tactics, map-reading, and so forth.

Now it is curious to observe how steadily the place taken by such instruction has decreased in curricula of general education. Military authorities² make little enough account of the efforts that have been put forth, to some extent everywhere, to give such knowledge to young men before the army actually takes them in hand. The history of the cadet corps in Switzerland is instructive in this respect.

These date from a time when the other forms of physical culture that are now familiar did not exist, and their promoter, Johann Conrad Escher, put them forward chiefly as a method of gymnastics. It was necessary to take care of the physical development of young people, as well as of their studies.³

The second mission of the cadet corps was moral. They were to inculcate punctuality, good order, obedience.

¹ In this connection we would refer to the admirable book of F. W. Foerster, *Schule und Charakter*, Zürich, 1912, French translation in *Collection d'actualités pédagogiques*, Neuchâtel.

² Foerster quotes curious judgments passed on this matter by German military leaders, in *Westdeutsche Lehrer-Zeitung*, April 15, 1916.

³ Escher, *Geschichte der Entstehung und des Fortgangs eines Cadetten-Instituts zu Zürich*, Basel, 1790.

It was only subsidiarily that Escher put forward professional considerations in claiming the support of the civil and military authorities "for a sort of war school, a nursery for the young defenders of our country, the great majority of whom are destined to become officers in our national militia".

Despite this programme¹ the cadet corps are not held in much favour by the higher ranks of our army officers. It is urged against them that they teach schoolboys to *play* at being soldiers; that other kinds of gymnastics have the same advantages, without the same disadvantages; that the military instruction of the soldier is not so complicated that it need be begun so long before the time of its application, and begun, not for everyone, but only for some; that weapons of a reduced size, miniature formations, and Lilliputian manœuvres, induce habits that are more harmful than useful; and, above all, that discipline cannot be taken seriously in an army in which the officers are on friendly terms with the *other ranks*.

These objections were so generally advanced that, in spite of the picturesque and almost glorious traditions of the cadet corps, a wholly new departure was attempted in 1908, when preparatory military education in Switzerland was reorganised.

Judged defective from the military point of view, the cadet corps have, nevertheless, been judged dangerous, too, on the ground that they exerted a belligerent influence. It has been feared that young men, by playing at war, would acquire a taste for war.

GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND.

Like reproaches have been levelled at the patriotic associations of Young Germany by Herr Wyneken, in pages of very remarkable psychological penetration. We quote somewhat at length.

"The fighting instinct belongs to the depths of the human mind. It is closely attached to other elementary instincts, like that of sex. These instincts are rich sources of psychic energy, but they are also the most dangerous of all. They must never be allowed to break out in their primitive forms; they must be ennobled, their quality increased, and what they contain of spiritual life borrowed from them. . . .

¹ Exactly the same ideas may be found at the basis of Australian military service, which retains the citizen from twelve to twenty-six years of age. Cf. A. B. Wood, "The Military Training of Youth in Schools", in *The School World*, October 1915.

"It is instructive to compare this over-heated national education [of Germany] with the quiet way in which the youth of Switzerland apply themselves to physical exercises as to something quite natural. The youth of a nation may be put into a state of self-defence without urging them on to war, and without resorting to wild fabrications. . . .

"We know the biological significance of the child's fighting instincts. Like those of animals, they are a natural preparation for future vocations. But in the life of man, struggle, properly so called, has gradually given place to work; and children's play allows them to take this into account. Fighting play, therefore, from the biological point of view, has no longer the importance it had at a lower stage of social development; nor has it the same purpose. Such fighting play develops naturally in two different directions; either it gives rein to imagination, as at all times in the free games of *brigands* and *Red Indians*; or—and this is generally somewhat later—it acts as a stimulus to organisation, to the formulation of rules, and takes the form then of competitive sports.

"In the first case, we shall leave youth alone, taking care not to give the games a reality the young people do not give them. In the second case, there is no risk of falsifying reality in the same way; for the fight is quite real, and not just symbolic; the opponent is a true opponent, and not an imaginary enemy; the game has no hidden meaning, no accessory and mysterious import; it is its own end. But, properly speaking, we are not now cultivating the fighting instinct, since this is now subjected to laws, deprived of its will to harm, and wholly directed towards a material result. . . . We have here a direct method, then, for the purification and sublimation of the fighting instinct, without its being necessary to forbid fighting—in the strict, physical sense of the term. In many of their forms such competitive games give more opportunity for the display of martial virtues—physical courage, discipline, presence of mind—than *field days*, that ape real warfare. (I have nothing to say against the latter, however, so long as they remain play.) Competitive sports, in my view, play an essential and very valuable part in the culture of youth.

"But if, for political reasons, it is really necessary to give military training to youth . . . let it be done with all the seriousness that is brought to teaching, properly so called; without unchaining atavistic and savage instincts, and without gambling on the immaturity of judgment in young people; on the contrary, let the insistence be on the terrible seriousness of a decision that is left to be made by force of arms. One may undertake fire-drill without privately wishing that a fire will break out".¹

¹ Wyneken, in *Die Militarisierung der deutschen Jugend*.

This last remark, the analogy of fire-drill, raises a formidable question, into which we shall enter more fully when we come to speak of pacifist education. In the mere fact of concentrating the attention of young people on a specific activity, and preparing them for it, is there not a factor of suggestion which will naturally make them anxious to show their capacities in this direction ?¹

I think it must be admitted that this danger exists. But a suggestion of this kind acts only if nothing in consciousness opposes its action. Our youthful citizens in Switzerland are periodically called together for fire and salvage practice, yet it is not difficult to prevent this from acting as an incitement to them to set fire to their neighbours' houses. It is enough to make the penal code known to them.

Similarly, we ought to recognise that, under certain definite conditions, the military instruction of youth may be pushed very far without producing a generation of belligerent adventurers.

I am thinking of the programme of military instruction in school which Welter sketched out in a message from the Swiss Federal Council to the Chambers on June 13, 1874, and which he had put into force in the cantonal school at Aarau in 1868, when he was Director of Public Instruction for the Canton of Argovie.

Doubtless, the idea of putting the school at the service of the army was never pushed further than in this programme. Napoleon, it is true, required his secondary schools to prepare officers for him. That is exactly what Welter required them to do also. Speaking of preparatory military instruction, he writes: "What we demand from the middle schools is not something supplementary and parallel to the rest of the teaching; it ought to be the result of the general teaching in the school".

The Aarau programme is very precise. "The teachers of languages, history, geography, mathematics, physics, and chemistry, and in particular those of mechanical drawing and gymnastics, are to take advantage of those parts of their syllabuses which lend themselves to this purpose, so as to contribute to the greatest possible extent to the military training of their

¹ Cf. below, p. 230, the opinion of an American Director of Education,

pupils". It enters into detail, suggesting: judging distance, mathematical and drawing exercises based on the artillery manual, a special study of ballistics, and instruction on powder and other explosives.

All this implies that the masters will have the necessary knowledge themselves. A little more, and they would all have been required to be army officers. "The master must take full account of what we are demanding from the school in the sphere of military education, and must be capable of fulfilling the demand. For the military exercises of our cadet corps to have an appreciable result, they must be conducted by the ordinary masters in the school".

And yet this project, had it been adopted, would not have endangered the peace of Europe. It went along with a firm resolve in the mind of Welti to respect the pledges constitutive of modern Switzerland. There was nothing aggressive in such military education; and when another Argovian, Dr. Ernst Zschokke, an admirer of Welti, recalls to our minds the words of Field-Marshal von der Goltz, by writing, "We must cultivate the martial spirit in our people, and, with this in view, must, before everything else, awaken the martial spirit in our youth", it is a case for the application of the adage, *Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem*.

The environment in which military education is given determines its moral and human significance, much more than this education itself.

CONCLUSIONS.

In the course of our study of some of the questions connected with preparatory military education, we have distinguished three elements—physical exercises, training in army discipline, and specific military instruction.

It has appeared to us that military education, through two of these articles in its programme, risks, not merely preparation *for* war, but preparation *of* war. Physical exercises make the young man conscious of his strength, and thereby easily encourage him to abuse it; while military instruction concentrates his thoughts on war, and thereby risks creating in him the desire for it. But

the organisation of sports provides an inoffensive diversion for accumulated strength; and suggestions may be implanted in the public mind which thwart the idea of war. From neither of these points of view does military education necessarily come into conflict in its aims with moral, nor even with pacifist, education.

Is the same true of discipline? After quoting a saying of Nietzsche, "I see many soldiers, I should prefer to see many warriors", Wyneken, still in connection with the militarisation of German youth, writes: "Every individual who acquires the soldier's mind in his youth is a warrior lost for the struggles of the spirit".

This is a hard saying. It is justified, assuredly, when we come face to face with some of the methods advocated to stamp the soldier's mind on men. But are such methods, utterly at variance as they are with the moral ideal which every man holds within him, really the best, from the military point of view? Fortunately, this may be doubted. The question is of crucial interest. The moral and social philosophy of the majority of our contemporaries undoubtedly depends on the answer which facts are going to give to it.¹ In any event, it will not be solved by the psychology of instinct, for the army makes its appeal here to tendencies of quite another order.

¹ This was written in 1916. The answer of the facts has been what we hoped it would be. And the moral ideal has now, besides the military spirit, new adversaries to fight—cowardice and greed.

CHAPTER XVI

MORAL EDUCATION

PUGNACITY AND GENERAL EDUCATION.

It is not only in order to train soldiers that we have to take the pugnacious impulses of the adolescent into account. Education, understood in the widest sense, is continually face to face with these instincts. It is not possible to be unconscious of them, nor can it ever be a question of suppressing them. The fighting instinct is nothing but the form in which the individual primitively asserts his will to live and to propagate his kind. No form of social morality can leave this tendency on one side.

An instinct tends to engender a habit. It is to the interest of all, and to the interest of the child himself, that the latter should not be allowed to contract habits of assaulting his fellows which he would retain in the sequel of his life. It is important that this instinct, which is manifested in him so forcefully towards the age of ten, shall not continue in the same form during adolescence and adult years. What is to be done to prevent that?

In truth, the question has been partly solved already by the development of human societies. The number of brawls and violent crimes has diminished both relatively and absolutely with the progress of civilisation. We have already noted the fact. During hundreds and thousands of years, very powerful taboos have been at work, conspiring little by little to eliminate physical violence and to compel instinctive aggressiveness to take other paths. In making extracts from the narratives of our schoolboys, we caught these social prohibi-

tions, as it were, in the act of insinuating themselves bit by bit into the minds of the children. "You mustn't fight", "It is ugly to fight", they say—for all that they still fight often enough. So starts repression of an instinct.

But the natural fruits of this repression—aggressiveness intellectualised, cunning substituted for violence—are precisely the ones which in no wise encourage the educationist to let matters slide. While he can foresee that the fighting instinct will be altered naturally in the great majority of cases, merely by force of social sanctions, the mode of this alteration is far from being a matter of indifference to him; his action may do much to determine it.

It is not the *organic resonance* of the fighting instinct which alarms the educationist, but its outward effects. There is an acceptance of risk in the struggle courageously undertaken, which comes near to being self-sacrifice, which stretches the springs of volition to their utmost limit, and which leads a man to give all that he is capable of. Let such heroic sentiments be put at the service of a great cause, and the moralist cannot but rejoice at the enrichment of life which results.

MORALITY AND GAMES.

Now, as we saw, the fighting instinct, though wholly selfish in its original simplicity, is capable of being subordinated to other tendencies which canalise and transfigure it.

We have already remarked that this is what happens in fighting games, which are wittingly regulated, and which are to be met with at all stages of civilisation. The organised game sticks closely to the instinctive game, but is distinguished from it, none the less, by an element that is extremely important from the standpoint of moral psychology. In an organised game each player submits to precise rules, which are either to *do* something or to *refrain* from doing it, and which are formulated as categorical and universal imperatives.

These rules, if accepted, presuppose that the one who gives them, or transmits them, has a prestige *sui generis*, in the eyes of him who obeys. Between the one person and the other, there is a special relationship of the affective order, to which fear, admiration, and personal affection may each contribute their share; this may be recognised in the typical cases of parents and children, masters and pupils, leaders and led.¹ And the rules, be they heavy or light, are the source of a sentiment extraordinarily important for the educationist—the sentiment of duty; whoever has once received and accepted them, owes to them various moral sentiments—scrupulousness, remorse, conscientiousness—which accompany the acts evoking the thought of the rule in him.

There are resemblances, which have often been remarked, between the rules of morality and those of organised games—especially fighting games—and, above all, between the individual's manner of feeling towards the first, and his manner of feeling towards the second. It would be interesting to gather the evidence of this together.

It is St. Paul who says: "And if a man also strive for masteries, yet is he not crowned, except he strive lawfully".² Jacques de Cessoles, a Dominican of the thirteenth century, deduced, in his sermons, precepts for the conduct of life by all classes of society, from the rules of the *ludus scaccorum*. Nearer to our own time, Huxley, in a famous passage, identified human life with a great game of chess played by man against an angel who is both strong and unmoved; education consists in learning the rules of this complicated game, that is to say, the laws of nature, identified, it would seem, with the laws of morality. And, again, we might cull the following remark, made about the young people of to-day, from an inquiry that caused some stir recently: "They appear to me to have retained this stable idea from their games, namely, that there must be definite rules in the great game of life".³

Continue along the same path, and the whole code of chivalry will open before you, and you will grasp its

¹ Cf. Varendonck, *Recherches sur les sociétés d'enfants*, ch. 2, on Leaders, and our own studies quoted above, p. 87.

² 2 Tim. ii. 5.

³ Georges Rozet, *La jeunesse et le sport*, in Agathon, *La jeunesse d'aujourd'hui*.

educational significance. In the social order, you will come upon the Truce of God—that ingenious device for canalizing collective pugnacity, with which the Church had willy-nilly to be content, when, having abandoned its first principles, it could no longer very openly advance its ideal of integral sublimation. You will come also to the Geneva Convention, and the Hague Conventions, about all of which, alas! . . .

But, to return to the individual. Education in chivalry is not simply a canalization of the instinct through restrictive rules. It exalts the fight by giving it an altruistic or ideal aim. And so "Fight!" we shall say to the child; "it is right and proper not to be afraid of hard knocks; but never fight except for the sake of others". Such tactics have great moral effect.

Foerster quotes several striking examples of this; such as that of Judge Lindsay, who succeeded in wholly suppressing a band of young thieves in Denver, by proposing to their leader that they should constitute themselves a civic guard for the maintenance of good order in the town.

Foerster related to me how, one day in the course of a journey in the United States, he had occasion to apply this expedient himself. He was visiting the Negro quarter in Washington, with the idea of bringing away some photographs. He had set up his camera-stand on the edge of the pavement, but certain bulky individuals, and particularly one with an ugly bearing, kept tilting against the instrument and the operator, as if by accident. Foerster hesitated to entangle his head under the black cloth of the camera, in the midst of such an uncertain company. Now was the time to practise what he had admired in other people. He accosted the most threatening of these black *toughs*, and, "Mister", said he, very politely, "I'd like to take some snaps; would you be good enough to keep this lot in order"? And immediately the other's aggressiveness was diverted; with the greatest zeal in the world he set about driving away the intruders, and acquitting himself of the task with which he had been honoured!

"Neither prohibitions nor vows, nothing, in short, so effectively protects a man from his evil instincts, as having a woman under his care to whom he has to lend the aid of his strong right arm. If she leans on him, he will not let her fall. . . ."

* Foerster, *Schule und Charakter*, pp. 98, 279 ff.

Similarly with the instinct of the fight; if he puts forth his strength in the defence of the weak, he will not attack them.

THE BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT.

The most strikingly successful example of methods which are based on the fighting instinct, but only in order to rise above it, is furnished by the Boy Scout Movement. In less than twenty years it has spread to nearly every country. If, as is but natural, we allow ourselves to judge the intentions of the founder by the concrete examples we have in front of us, we shall no doubt arrive at various conclusions, according to the various countries and towns concerned; and some of these conclusions may be less favourable than others. One village will complain of having been startled by a band of young ruffians pretending to attack it in armed force; elsewhere it will be related with gusto how a patrol, left to their own devices, took it into their heads to play at highwaymen, and set about maltreating the passers-by. Do not let us judge the Gospel by the Churches. If we are to appreciate the educational value of Baden-Powell's methods, we must go to his own exposition of them.¹

On occasion, the movement has been held to be specifically military, and, it is true, the applications that have been made of it may have fostered this mistake. The sub-title of Baden-Powell's book is, *A Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship*. In several countries the word *citizenship* has been given rather a narrow meaning, and the educational programme has met with a particularly warm welcome in military circles. So it was in Germany before the war, and in Chili, where the Minister of War freely distributed yard after yard of khaki cloth for the clothing of the young troops. No doubt much the same might be said of other countries, too. That proves that the method does have military value. But

¹ See my booklet, *Le génie de Baden-Powell*, Neuchâtel, 1921.

it is only just to observe also with what warmth the English general's programme has been accepted by organisations interested in moral education, denominational and otherwise. The very first Scout patrols to be formed in France, and in French-speaking Switzerland, were formed under the auspices of the Y.M.C.A., an institution which is far from being jingoistic in its conduct. In England, religious circles promptly took them up. The very Quakers, the intransigent pacifism of whom is well known, recognised that there was nothing martial in Scouting.

Baden-Powell himself is perfectly explicit.

"By 'scouting' I do not mean the military work as carried on on active service. The scouting we are considering has nothing to do with this. There is another form, which one might term 'peace-scouting', such as is usual with frontiersmen of our Empire in every corner of the world. The pioneers of civilisation . . . are all 'peace-scouts', men accustomed to live on their own resources, taking their lives in their hands, brave and loyal to their employers, chivalrous and helpful to each other, unselfish and reliable; MEN, in fact, of the best type. These are the peace-scouts of the Empire, and there is no reason why we should not train a large number of boys to follow in their footsteps as regards character and manliness. . . .

"Two or three prominent authorities have written deprecating my attempt to 'foster among the boys of Britain a bloodthirsty and warlike spirit'.

"I can only fear that either these gentlemen have not read the handbooks very carefully, or that I have expressed myself very badly. The whole intention of the Boy Scouts' training is for peaceful citizenship".¹

Drill instruction is reduced to a minimum. What Baden-Powell wants to form in his Boy Scouts is character, self-discipline; and this, he maintains, is not to be secured by repressive measures.

"Insist on discipline and strict obedience. . . . This cannot be got by repressive measures, but by educating the boy first in self-discipline and in sacrificing of self and selfish pleasures for the benefit of others. This teaching is largely effected by example, and by expecting it of him. There lies our work. . . .

¹ *Scouting or Boys*, complete edition, London, 1908, p. 265.

"Discipline is not gained by punishing a child for a bad habit, but by substituting a better occupation, that will absorb his attention, and gradually lead him to forget and abandon the old one".¹

Military education, as we saw, gets the advantage of everything that strengthens the boy. Consequently, there is nothing astonishing in the attention of army officers having been caught by such a programme as the Boy Scouts'. But Baden-Powell has shown himself very anxious to avoid the dangers that are so liable to wreck education which is specifically military.

By holding out the knightly ideal to boys, and by laying it down that they shall do a good turn to their neighbour at least once a day, he directs accumulated energies towards an altruistic goal.

Far from turning out machines by training in passive obedience, he stimulates initiative and reflection. And so his camp-fire yarns are not exclusively stories of battle. Peace-scouts are always put on an equal footing with military scouts; indeed, as was but right before 1914, they are really on a higher footing.

"I suppose every British boy wants to help his country in some way or other.

"There is a way by which he can do so easily, and that is by becoming a scout.

"A scout, as you know, is generally a soldier who is chosen for his cleverness and pluck to go out in front of an army in war to find out where the enemy are, and report to the commander all about them.

"But, besides war scouts, there are also peace scouts, i.e. men who in peace time carry out work which requires the same kind of abilities. These are the frontiersmen of all parts of our Empire. The 'trappers' of North America, hunters of Central Africa, the British pioneers, explorers, and missionaries over Asia and all the wild parts of the world, the bushmen and drovers of Australia, the Constabulary of North-West Canada and of South Africa—all are peace scouts, real *men* in every sense of the word, and thoroughly up in scout-craft, i.e. they understand living out in the jungles, and they can find their way anywhere, are able to read meaning from the smallest signs and foot-tracks; they know

¹ *Scouting for Boys*, complete edition, London, 1908, p. 277.

how to look after their health when far away from any doctors, are strong and plucky, and ready to face any danger, and always keen to help each other. They are accustomed to take their lives in their hands, and to fling them down without hesitation if they can help their country by doing so.

"They give up everything, their personal comforts and desires, in order to get their work done. They do not do all this for their own amusement, but because it is their duty to their King, fellow-countrymen, or employers. . . .

"It is a grand life, but it cannot suddenly be taken up by any man who thinks he would like it, unless he has prepared himself for it beforehand".¹

It is by examining his work in detail that we come to discover all Baden-Powell's originality. Let us compare him with other educationists from among those who have best caught the ear of young people. Take, for example, a lesson on tidiness, as it would be conducted by Charles Wagner, Foerster, and Baden-Powell.

Wagner is a poet, and, more precisely, a fabulist. He appeals to the child's imagination. He makes familiar things talk on the child's behalf. Thanks to him, his small audience might listen to a dialogue between a pair of trousers and a shoe, that complain of not having been left tidy in the room where their small owner is sound asleep.

Foerster asks that the child shall be induced to observe and to reflect. I imagine he would open up the subject of tidiness in a familiar conversation, by putting to his schoolboys some such question as this: "In what circumstances do you benefit from being tidy?" Then he would lift the discussion to a higher plane, by letting them see the image of big things in little, and the mark and symbol of inner virtues in mere outward instances of order.

Baden-Powell, in very original fashion, combines the imagination of Wagner and the anxiety shown by Foerster to open schoolboys' eyes to the facts in the midst of which they are living. There is with him, as with Foerster, moral observation and reasoning; but

¹ *Scouting for Boys*, complete edition, London, 1908, pp. 5-6.

these exalted faculties deploy, if I may so put it, on the ground of a fable, which is always the same, and which the author has taken remarkable advantage of—the fable that the child is a warrior, that he has enemies, and that he must prepare himself for the struggle. Let the subject be tidiness; it is dealt with in the chapter on camping.

“The camp ground should at all times be kept clean and tidy, not only (as I pointed out) to keep flies away, but also because if you go away to another place, and leave an untidy ground behind you, it gives so much important information to enemy’s scouts. For this reason scouts are always tidy, whether in camp or not, as a matter of habit. If you are not tidy at home, you won’t be tidy in camp; and if you’re not tidy in camp, you will be only a tenderfoot and no scout.

“A scout is tidy also in his tent or room, because he may yet be suddenly called upon to go off on an alarm, or something unexpected; and if he does not know exactly where to lay his hand on his things, he will be a long time in turning out, especially if called up in the middle of the night”.¹

Then, and only then, Baden-Powell brings forward the good reasons for keeping a camp scrupulously clean in time of peace also.

This is his constant manner of going about it. He applies himself to habits of personal hygiene as to moral habits.

“A scout must be able to smell well, in order to find his enemy by night. If he always breathes through the nose, and not through the mouth, this helps him considerably. . . .

“By keeping the mouth shut you prevent yourself from getting thirsty when you are doing hard work. And also at night, if you are in the habit of breathing through the nose, it prevents snoring, and snoring is a dangerous thing if you are sleeping anywhere in an enemy’s country. Therefore practise keeping your mouth shut and breathing through your nose at all times”.²

The passages on tobacco must be quoted, too.

“A scout does not smoke. Any boy can smoke; it is not such a very wonderful thing to do. But a scout will not do it because he is not such a fool”.³

¹ *Scouting for Boys*, complete edition, London, 1908, pp. 126–7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

"The best war scouts don't smoke because it weakens their eyesight; it sometimes makes them shaky and nervous; it spoils their noses for smelling (which is of great importance at night) and the glow of their pipe, or even the scent of tobacco carried on them at night, gives them away to watchful enemies. They are not such fools as to smoke. No boy ever began smoking because he liked it, but because he thought it made him look like a grown-up man. As a matter of fact it generally makes him look a little ass".¹

It will not be denied that the method is original. What is it worth? Undoubtedly Wagner is more of a poet, and Foerster is spiritually more profound. But Baden-Powell, by making his appeal to the military tastes of the adolescent, has discovered a foundation that is particularly firm. With admirable boldness, and a faith in the boy which is worthy of a great educationist, he has subordinated to this instinct of honourable fighting, all the tendencies which can be made to collaborate towards the desired result: he has not scorned a single one of them. The instinct of constructiveness, the liking for tramps in the open air, interest in yarns about Red Indians and robbers (not omitting the sentence and the hanging), love of animals—he has provided food for all these forms of curiosity.² But he has made them all converge towards the same goal; they all serve the end that is summed up in the Scout motto, "Be prepared"—be prepared, that is to say, for conflict, understanding the word in the highest moral sense.

No doubt all this has a very definite age in view, the age just before adolescence. Wagner has more to say to whipper-snappers up to the age of eleven or twelve, and Foerster's methods are specially appropriate for older ones, from fourteen and fifteen on. But for the quarrelsome age, *par excellence*, from ten to fifteen, Baden-Powell, if I am not mistaken, is a very good

¹ *Scouting for Boys*, complete edition, London, 1908, pp. 16-18.

² Despite all the harm he has to say about stamp-collecting, one of the first pictures in his book is of the Making stamp.

master;¹ and it is well worth while to study his scheme in detail.

THE GIRL GUIDES.

The extraordinary success of Baden-Powell's Boy Scouts has given rise to a parallel organisation, adapted to the needs of their sisters, and known as the Girl Guides. This movement, too, is slowly spreading beyond the British Isles.

The very reasons which lead us to rank so highly the programme of civic education for Scouts, make us sceptical about the copy of it which has been made for the other sex. It really is a copy, for all Miss Baden-Powell warns the girls against their mania for imitating their brothers;² two-thirds of the Scouts' handbook have been simply transcribed to make the Guides'. Now it is not in doubt that the centre of interest in girls is by no means the same as in boys. Girls' taste for fighting is very transient; it appears to culminate in England at about eleven years of age;³ in Switzerland it is perhaps a little more precocious. Nor is there enough of it at any time on which to build up a complete programme of girls' education.

It must be understood that this criticism is not intended to discourage the efforts which are being made for the introduction of a more varied curriculum and a less prim and proper atmosphere into the moral education of girls. But, while we consider that teachers of boys will profit by following out Baden-Powell's programme very closely, and studying his methods care-

¹ The admirable knowledge of Baden-Powell of the psychology of the adolescent is displayed at still another point. His essential ambition is of the moral order; he wants to give his young people the sentiment of duty, and to attach this sentiment to the highest imperatives, embodied in the moral codes of every epoch. But he confides the instruction of the Scout only to those men who are possessed of the qualities that will give them prestige in the eyes of the adolescent youth. Along with the work of Baden-Powell should be read the exquisite pages of Ph. Monnier, where Blaise expresses his admiration for his friend Berton, and explains its causes.

² Agnes Baden-Powell, *The Handbook of Girl Guides*.

³ See above, p. 179, the inquiry carried out by Kimmins.

fully, we are tempted to think that our educationists will achieve greater successes with girls by emancipating themselves from narrow formulas of Scouting. Let them seek their centre of interest elsewhere. Let them seek it, for example, in that instinct so characteristic of women and mothers, the instinct leading them to the sacrifice of self, the service of others, and devotion to noble causes.¹

¹ There seems, indeed, very marked progress in that direction, if we are to judge by Sir Robert Baden-Powell's own book on Girl Guides.

CHAPTER XVII

PACIFIST EDUCATION

WE recognise that still a third problem exists in education, differing radically from the two we have just been considering. Their aim was to adapt the individual to society; and society was considered, sometimes in a state of war (military education), sometimes in a state of peace (moral and civic education).

The problem raised by pacifist education is of quite another order of ideas. We are no longer concerned to adapt the child to his present environment; we are concerned to bring him up with a view to a future society that we hope for, to make preparation for a better condition of things that we believe in, by putting the rising generation in a position to bring it about. The question now is: How shall youth be brought up so as to render possible a society of nations in which armed conflicts will no longer arise?

This care appears premature to many of our contemporaries. While they all recognise and appreciate the blessings of peace, they are nevertheless divided into two groups on the question how these are to be secured. One group holds by the old adage, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. They see the guarantee of peace in being fore-armed for war, and the problem of pacifist education, for them, is just the problem of education in general, including military education. The other group modifies the formula, turning the trivial paradox into a paradoxical truism. *Si vis pacem, para pacem*, they say.

This is not the place to detail the reasons given by the pacifists, nor to write the history of the great rationalist, sentimental, religious, and utilitarian cur-

rents that, one after another, have contributed to shaping the movement into what it now is. Pacifism interests us only in relation to education. And it must be admitted that up to the present the educational method has not taken the place one would have expected among the methods prescribed by pacifists.

ARISTOCRATIC AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION.

No doubt there is a long history of pacifist ideas. But the realisation of an era of peace was long considered as dependent on the coming of a philosopher-prince; and so pacifism was faced only with a problem of individual education—How was the taste for battle to be eliminated from the future monarch? This was nearly the same question as the one we dealt with in the last chapter; with this difference, that the resistance offered to the peace ideal by the environment was a great deal stronger, and that the results would have been much more important.

Curious details might be gleaned from the writings of men of the seventeenth century who occupied themselves with the education of princes—Nicole, Harduin de Péréfixe, La Mothe Le Vayer, Bossuet, Fénelon. Churchmen all, they were all thereby pledged to resist violence, and give their efforts an orientation towards peace. But they were all, in varying degrees, courtiers, too; it must have been difficult for them to speak slightly of military glory. Hence conflicts, glimpses of which are to be caught in their works. Despite his Christian intentions, La Mothe Le Vayer looked on hunting as a liberal art, because it was a training for war. No doubt the gentle Fénelon was the most self-consistent, and the most fully devoted to his task as an educator; and his *Télémaque*, with its description of the ideal republic of Salente, well deserves to be mentioned in a chapter dealing with methods of pacifist education.

With the coming of democracy, the pedagogical thinking of the pacifists necessarily changed character. Care for the education of the people replaced care for the

education of princes. But, speaking generally, we may say that, though they often assert the importance of the pedagogical problem, pacifist societies have not so far devoted any special attention to it. Pacifist education for them has consisted above all in *instruction*, and this instruction, that they propose to give to pupils in schools, does not differ perceptibly from the propaganda they carry on among adults. Take M. A. Sève's *Course in Pacifist Teaching*: "it is nothing less", as we are told in the preface by Frédéric Passy, "than a complete course in pacifism".¹

Of methods of *education*, inspired by this ideal, I can find three. But none of these has been incorporated in the movement, as such; no doubt, because the first appears too meagre, the second too dangerous, and the third too difficult. I should call them, the method of *starvation* (this is purely defensive and prophylactic); the method of *inversion* (this pursues offensive-defensive tactics); and the method of *diversion* (this is really original and properly offensive).

SILENCE AS AN EDUCATIONAL METHOD.

Since the suggestive power of stories was first brought to light, the importance of silence as an educational precaution has been fully recognised. It has sometimes been set up as a method of prophylaxis, and extraordinary virtues have been attributed to it.

The suggestive power of a story is particularly intense in those spheres of child life where we can count on an instinct that is lying dormant, only waiting for the stimulus to break out eagerly; and it is indispensable, there, that we should reflect what actions may be touched off by the images we are furnishing the child's mind with.

Here again, we come across the near kinship of the

¹ Placed in the first class in the competition opened in Paris in 1910, by the International Peace Bureau. See also, A. Delassus, *Précis d'enseignement pacifiste* (awarded a first prize in the same competition), Monaco, 1910; and A. Marinus, *L'Éducation morale et le pacifisme*, Brussels, 1910.

fighting and the sexual instincts, which we admitted before. The school of silence thinks it best to leave the child as long as possible in ignorance of the struggles, quarrels, disputes, and wars, in which men engage; and, similarly, of the appetites, passions, and crimes, to which they are driven by the search for sensual pleasure.

But there is one pointed remark to be made about this parallel. In matters of sex, it is the partisans of daylight and frank speech who claim the title of innovators. The partisans of silence hold fast by tradition; they but find a rational justification for the old taboos of shame, which have always demanded that a veil be drawn over sexual affairs. It is accepted wisdom in pedagogy, to keep the child away from all this order of reality, letting him come to know about it as late as possible. Ignorance equals innocence, innocence equals virtue; these equations were already traditional in the time of *L'école des Femmes*. Now, in pacifist education, the situation is exactly the reverse. Since ever schools came into being—and before—it has been traditional to rock the child in his cradle to the tune of battle songs. Stories about the struggles of gods, monsters, and heroes, stories about national wars and the sword play of mighty champions—these were the chief material for the epic tales which, as long ago as the Greeks, formed the starting-point for education. It was only very recently that the proposal was first made to turn the child aside from such matters, keeping silence about them as long as possible.¹

Let us distinguish education at home from teaching in school. Take the home first, and let the pacifists speak for themselves.

In a study of very worthy inspiration, Mme. Wilfred Monod² has related in moving terms the experience of pacifist parents who were very conscientiously carrying out this method of silence.

See the very interesting material gathered together by the Third International Congress for Moral Education in *L'esprit international et l'enseignement de l'histoire*, by some twenty authors, Preface by Henri Revardin, Neuchâtel and Paris, 1922.

² *Revue du Christianisme social*, December 1903

" They had tried, as long as possible, to leave this all too precocious boy in ignorance that war existed, that the few soldiers he had met wore a disguise of joyous colours for any reason other than their own good pleasure, and that their rifles were not intended for the hunting of lions and rabbits. They had proscribed warlike pictures. Well, at three and a half years old, the child, while at the seaside, saw a showman in the village square with monkeys dressed up as soldiers; they shot at each other, the showman accompanying their actions with loud bangs; one of the monkeys fell dead . . . for the hundredth time! The barrel-organ, which was used as the battle-field, was decorated with war pictures.

" It was the first initiation of this child. As it came to him through animals, he did not attach tragic importance to it, nor grieve overmuch about it; but, indubitably, it led quickly to worse discoveries—that men fought and killed each other on this very earth where Jesus Christ had preached the Gospel".

Conceived in this way, pacifist education implies a very definite attitude towards toys and games.

" No doubt we cannot remove our children from the world; we cannot prevent their seeing living soldiers in the street, nor their looking at lead soldiers in shop windows; but we can very well refrain from taking them to reviews of the troops, and from buying them military clothing and soldiers' boots. We can very well not allow them to play at soldiers, or rather, we can so act that the idea does not occur to them. It is wrong to maintain that every boy has an instinct that way; I have known boys who never showed the least inclination to play at war, nor even to drill. It is true, they were taken with a great desire to own weapons, pop-guns, and pistols to fire *caps*; but it was fully stipulated that these were hunting weapons; the children were forbidden ever to fire at one another. Their parents thought it logical, too, not to authorise them to use chick-peas for shells and shoot toy cannons at lead soldiers . . . offered to them by friends! The child should not learn to kill his like, even though the latter be only one inch high and made of metal or cardboard".

This, however, is not the attitude of all the friends of peace.

The Précis of Pacifist Teaching, by A. Delassus, has some degree of representative value; entered in a competition opened by the International Peace Bureau, it was awarded a first prize. It is of quite a different school from Mme. Monod's article.

" It is said that we should not give children boxes of soldiers, or other toys of the same character.

"But, honestly, we cannot believe that a man of twenty-one will like war, against all reason, because, at the age of six, and without being a strategist of genius, he has manœuvred highly obedient lead soldiers. We agree that other games may be more useful to children; and we hope they will take to them. But, after all, it is the business of a toy to please, and, if lead soldiers please a kiddie, by all means let us buy him these mercenary troops. How innocent they are! Perhaps their self-constituted generals will lose them, just as Soubise lost his. Even though they be jealously kept, do not let us imagine that a child has all the makings of a Genghis Khan or a Napoleon, if he wipes out whole rows of them. Ah, yes! But that is just the way reflexes are acquired. So be it! But we may see to it that other reflexes are acquired too, simultaneously, to neutralise the first. And, at bottom, the object of all education is to teach us to dominate our reflexes. We do not want to manufacture pacifist automata; it is *minds* we want, who will be the friends of peace".¹

A singularly liberal doctrine! To be sure, it appears to me not so much based on the psychology of the reflex, as on a very French liking for the happy mean, and an instinctive fear of ridicule.

If boxes of soldiers and military equipment force parents to come to some sort of an opinion in this matter in the home, it is history lessons which raise the same problem in a permanent form in school. It is certain that the hearing of battle stories in class has sometimes stimulated warlike activities in schoolboys. I borrow the following example from Rouma,² who personally observed it in a school in the environs of Brussels.

"The school comprises a Flemish section and a Walloon section.

"One of the masters possessed remarkable talent as a storyteller, and made particular use of it during history lessons.

"As a sequel to a lesson on Breydel and de Coninck, two popular Flemish heroes, who, with the militia of the communes behind them, defeated the French nobility on the plains of Groningen in 1302, the Flemish section in the school began to bubble over with patriotic fervour.

"The small Flemings went about provoking and insulting the youngsters of the French-speaking section; the latter retorted, and soon set about organising themselves. Meetings were held on both sides, and leaders chosen. It was decided that the battle

¹ Delassus, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

² *Pédagogie sociologique*, p. 87.

should take place on horseback, that is to say, that half the combatants in each clan should carry the other half on their backs. It was a dreadful affray. The knocking-about they received exasperated the fighters, and both sides were reinforced by fresh recruits. The fight was renewed the next day, and on succeeding days, with ever-growing fury.

"I noted that hatred of opponents grew on both sides, but with it developed at the same time a spirit of devotion and brotherhood among the members of the same group.

"The masters intervened energetically. But each time they relaxed their watchfulness, the fighting broke out again, either partially or generally. Following a snowball fight, which caused a serious accident, the head master had to take steps to expel two or three of the ringleaders".

This story will perhaps be symbolical, in the eyes of many pacifists. Without always taking it into account, schools do develop a liking for conflict in the child, through the teaching of history. They exalt martial virtues. One of my fellow-countrymen, M. Zollinger, head of the Normal School at Küsnacht, has gone so far as to ask whether schools are not responsible for the slow progress of pacifism, on account of the place they give to war stories.¹

This feeling was sufficiently widespread before the war to have exerted a marked influence on the editing of school-books. An American author, Mr. Bagley, demonstrated this in 1916. He took histories of the United States, written for schools at different periods of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and examined them to see what place they afforded to the various epochs in the development of the Republic. The table summing up his inquiry is significant. School-books published between 1865 and 1872 devote 51·5 per cent. of their text to military history; this proportion steadily decreases, the most recent school-books—1904-12—allowing only 28·4 per cent. of their space to the same events.²

Like observations might be made by the same method,

¹ *Schule und Friedensbewegung*, 1894, p. 12.

² Bagley and Rugg, *The Content of American History*, University of Illinois Bulletin, August, 1916.

elsewhere. The development of the pacifist ideal was tending, pretty well everywhere, if I am not mistaken, to reduce the space accorded to battle histories. It would be curious to use this procedure to measure roughly the progress of the pacifist education movement in the different countries of Europe, large and small.

Without taking account of books by the *enfants terribles* of the cause,¹ we should no doubt discover that France had gone much further in this direction than Germany.

Another inquiry enables us to see how strongly sympathetic with the method of silence are pacifist educationists.

In the *Pedagogical Seminary* for March, 1915, Mr. C. E. McCorkle summed up the results of a questionnaire addressed by him to city superintendents of education in the principal American cities.² He had asked them such questions as the following: "Shall the present European war be taught in the schools? How shall it be taught? . . . Do you permit any discussions of the war by pupils? If so, what special precaution do you take to insure neutral attitude? Do you believe it should be taught? Why?"

He received 109 replies from city superintendents, besides one from the United States Commissioner of Education and 12 from State Commissioners of Education. The total population of the cities represented by these replies was some 18,000,000. The great majority of the replies, namely, 87, did not consider it was possible to leave the child in ignorance of the great events going on at the time; and these 87 represented a population of some 14,000,000, and many of them came from the largest cities, e.g. New York, Chicago, Washington, Baltimore, San Francisco. In 62 cities, a definite time was put aside for the teaching of the war. But a strong minority of superintendents would not permit the war to be taught or discussed in school. This was the case in 22 cities, having a population of over 4,000,000, and including Boston, Philadelphia, St. Louis, St. Paul, and Salt Lake City.

It was even alleged that there were cities where all mention of the war was forbidden, and where, to make the observance of this order easier, the teaching of European geography was temporarily cut out of the curriculum. Various reasons were advanced in favour of this silence. These were very largely the wish to maintain absolute neutrality, and to avoid discussions between

¹ Cf. Gustave Hervé, *Histoire de la France et de l'Europe: L'enseignement pacifique par l'histoire*, Paris, n.d. (A book that strikes me as very well done.)

² *Instruction in City Schools Concerning the War.*

pupils of different racial origin. But the most characteristic reasons were formulas of pacifist inspiration. Some of these were quite instinctive. The war is "so cruel, so uncalled for, so barbarous, so heathenish. . . . Let us try to forget it".¹ Others were more or less rationalised: "I do not wish to foster the war spirit in our boys".² "War is the worst of all crime, and therefore ought not to be taught. To teach about any crime is to focus attention upon it, and therefore to stimulate its commission".³

To this, others replied that they saw no objection to allowing the war "to be a live topic" in schools; ⁴ and that the opportunity was too good to let slip, to inculcate ideas of tolerance in the child, and let him realise the beauties of peace; ⁵ to say nothing of the powerful incentive, which the events of the war provided, to the study of several subjects that would otherwise be of but remote interest.

Tenable strictly as a preventive measure, the method of silence is at fault in thinking that the child's taste for quarrelling comes to him from without. The method does not know the ways of the fighting instinct, thinking to starve this by depriving it of the food offered in history. This was well-nigh impracticable in the past, and will remain so; the method is condemned in every way to miss its goal. The fighting instinct is innate in the child, and is manifested before he knows anything of warfare or battles. Give up the attempt to starve it; set about lifting it to a higher level; and you will perceive that the teaching of history—not excluding battle stories—is a valuable means to that end. That, in any event, is how the matter has been understood by most of the pacifists, even by those who, in our opinion, have set too high a value on silence. "If children did not know about the past of mankind", writes Mme. Monod, "they would be incapable of working for its future of harmony and peace".

THE METHOD OF INVERSION.

We shall not be delayed long by pacifist education through *inversion* of the fighting instinct. It is as imprac-

¹ Supt. of McKeesport, Pa.

² Supt. of St. Paul, Minn.

³ Supt. of Norwood, Mass.

⁴ Supt. of Washington, D.C.

⁵ The phrase "Universal peace" is of constant occurrence.

ticable as the method of silence—at least at present, so soon after a war which, for all the ruin it caused, gave us so many examples of heroism. We mention this method, nevertheless, because it had its day, when the scandals of the Dreyfus case exasperated part of the French people against its army leaders; and because, psychologically, it calls attention to a phenomenon we have not yet had occasion to meet.¹ The great vogue enjoyed in pacifist circles by the formula *The War Against War*, together with the natural tendency to take popular formulas literally, will give it the chance some day or other of coming back into favour.

The method in question is less pacifist than anti-militarist. In order to suppress wars among nations, it offers a new object to the fighting instinct of the people, and to their feelings of hatred; this new object is nothing but the army itself, as an institution, and as a body of men.

Mme. Monod, in the article we have already quoted, mentions a children's Socialist newspaper, entitled *Le Jean-Pierre*, which saw the light about 1900. Its pacifism is a good illustration of the method.

"In the very first number, the editors displayed the authentic and dreadful history of a soldier in a military prison, a history that may give food for thought to men of mature age, but that is not exactly calculated to spare one's feelings. The miserable soldier, hunted by his superior officers like a stag driven to bay, ended by hanging himself from the cross-bar in the gymnasium. The document runs to several pages, illustrated; the N.C.O.'s and the pot-bellied colonel figure in these, and, incredible though it may seem, the corpse of the suicide, his cap flattened down over his eyes, swinging like an unhappy bundle of rags. . . ."

Mme. Monod protests against such proceedings. "Let us beware of blackening, in the eyes of our children, the good name of those who follow the career of arms. Be simply polite; call a general a general, and not a swashbuckler; a colonel a colonel, and not a *tight-breeches*. Do not let us turn our children into belligerent pacifists, who will include all army officers in one pile of injustice; as though we did not know some of these who are deeply convinced, thoroughly estimable, and sincere Christians,

¹ We alluded to it, p. 141 above, in connection with a page of Adler.

who consider the exercise of their functions as a mission, and who devote themselves to it, body and soul, in obscurity, and with no other incentive than the love of their country ”.

It would be worth while to probe into the psychological origins of this warlike anti-militarism, in an Urbain Gohier, for example, or a Gustave Hervé.¹ As compared with the peace of the true pacifists, of those whose fighting instinct has been entirely sublimated after the manner of the Quakers, a state of international peace, pursued by means of social war, appears to us as a fine ideal compounded with brutal instincts. It belongs to the type of what we called failures in sublimation.

THE METHOD OF DIVERSION.

No. The true method of pacifist education can only be one of *diversion*, recognising, not only the universal and permanent character of the fighting instinct in the human race, but also its grandeur, beauty, and potentiality for good.

This brings us back to the methods we advocated in our last chapter. We came across them there as methods of civic education ; Baden-Powell of course, did not attribute any pacifist import to them. And it will be one of the conclusions of this chapter that education, dominated by the ideal of peace among political states, is nothing but the moral, civic, and humanistic education of the whole man ; and that there is no need to search for a new procedure, in order to hasten the realisation of this ideal, but only to follow more resolutely and consistently the path traced by the great laws of man's spiritual development.

Up to the present, diversion of the fighting instinct has been advocated as a pacifist method only by William James, who, twice over in his later writings, undertook the search for what he called a *moral equivalent of war*, and who offered solutions to this problem that are fitted

¹ [Or among the stalwart workers in Clyde shipyards and the coal mines of South Wales.—TRANS.]

to stimulate both educationists and statesmen. Here is how the problem presented itself to him :

" War is a school of strenuous life and heroism ; and, being in the line of aboriginal instinct, is the only school that as yet is universally available. But when we gravely ask ourselves whether this wholesale organisation of irrationality and crime be our only bulwark against effeminacy, we stand aghast at the thought ".¹

James formulated two answers. In his Gifford lectures at Edinburgh on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, in 1902, he indicated the asceticism of the saints as a psychological equivalent of heroism. In 1910, he published an article, *The Moral Equivalent of War*,² in which he carried the problem—and its solution—over into the political and social sphere.

" Instead of military conscription ", he advocated " a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against Nature. . . . The military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be brought into the growing fibre of the people. . . . They would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the immemorial warfare against nature ; they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and teachers of the following generations ".³

Let us first say something on this article.

It is interesting to note that the social conscription James proposes had been claimed before him by individuals who, for conscience' sake, refused to let themselves be swept away by collective pugnacity. With it may be compared also certain projects to make use of permanent armies for industrial works in time of peace.⁴ It was advocated, too, a little before the war, by women, who wished to associate their sex with duties of State. (Once again we see the instinct of the fight and of conquest, converging with the instinct of love and self-

¹ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, revised edition, p. 367.

² Reprinted, posthumously, in *Memories and Studies*, 1911.

³ *The Moral Equivalent of War*, in *op. cit.*, pp. 290-1. Professor E. R. Seligman informs me that this theory of James's " was due to a hint thrown out by Patrick Geddes ".

⁴ W. Petavel, *Administrative Efficiency*, London, n.d., and, quite recently, Max Lazard, *The Civil Service in Bulgaria*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1922.

sacrifice ; this time, it is through the forms taken by them in sublimation.)

It may well be, then, that the proposal of the American philosopher is less Utopian than it must have appeared at first glance to most of his readers.

Nevertheless, the progress of our study compels us to enter a caveat to this solution put forward by James. To set up conscription, in the way he advocated, so as to deflect the aggressiveness of the individual towards positive goals, might very well not have the effect of suppressing war ; for war and the army are no longer products of the fighting instinct of the individual nowadays. We have already said, more than once, that modern warfare does not meet the demands of man's primitive fighting instincts, any better than many other forms of activity ; the fighting instinct is compounded in the army with tendencies so diverse from it, that the mere fact of the career of arms having been voluntarily chosen, does not imply a particularly belligerent temperament. The individuals who kill each other off to-day, felt no desire to fight. What we know about the wars of modern times connects them with the greed of some, more than with the pugnacity of all.

Thus, what we have said of social pugnacity imposes on pacifists a programme of education which embraces both the education of princes and the education of the people. Despite appearances to the contrary, the essential thing is to concern ourselves with the instincts of the governing classes, even more than with those of the masses ; yet the control of the former cannot be effectively exercised except by the sovereign people, and these, only too often, have so far been left too much in the dark for this.¹ And so the programme of pacifist

¹ [How far they must, by the very nature of things, remain always in the dark, is a question now much in debate. Cf. a brilliant discussion of this question by Walter Lippmann, in *Public Opinion*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1922. "The real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before

education necessarily includes one of democratic education. Kant was perhaps the first to lay this down with perfect clearness;¹ and the famous arbitration project of Charles Lemonnier² in 1873, by stipulating that peoples "have an inalienable and imprescriptible right to govern themselves", set a democratic stamp on the whole of the contemporary pacifist movement.

But do not let us neglect James's first answer to the problem raised by him. It leads us back to the plane of individual psychology and morality. He went in search of a life which, like the soldier's, should be in violent contrast to the comfortable existence of the *bourgeois*, and he found—poverty.

"May not voluntarily accepted poverty be 'the strenuous life', without the need of crushing weaker peoples? . . . One wonders whether a revival of the belief that poverty is a worthy religious vocation may not be 'the transformation of military courage', and the spiritual reform which our time stands most in need of. . . . We have lost the power even of imagining what the ancient idealisation of poverty could have meant: the liberation from material attachments, the unbribed soul, the manlier indifference, the paying our way by what we are and do and not by what we have, the right to fling away our life at any moment irresponsibly—the more athletic trim, in short, the moral fighting shape".³

By choosing poverty, from among the monastic virtues, because it was the most heroic and, so to speak, the most pugnacious, James, it would seem, was actuated above all by a wish to react against the tendencies of his own time and country. "When one sees", he cried, "when one sees the way in which wealth-getting enters as an ideal into the very bone and marrow of our generation!" But other considerations support his choice, especially the place taken by acquisitiveness at the root of a very large proportion of ancient and modern wars.

we can manage with it. To traverse the world men must have maps of the world. Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or some one else's need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia": *op. cit.*, p. 16.—TRANS.]

¹ *Zum ewigen Frieden*, 1795.

² International League of Peace and Liberty.

³ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 367-8.

This deliberate seeking after poverty, by which James expects the pacifist ideal to be realised, implies a complete transformation of the fighting instinct, which is henceforth subjected in the individual to a powerful moral inspiration. We saw that the moral attitude, *par excellence*, corresponded to a double *alteration* in the fight. And we find this again here. First, Platonisation: the champion of the Good makes appeal to all his warlike energies, but delivers no blow at anyone. He fights against the principle and spirit of Evil, rather than against wicked men. Then, subjectification: the principle of Evil is not merely in other people; it must be recognised and subdued above all within himself. The arms to be used in the fray vary, according to the appearance it takes. Greed, lechery, pride—each of these forms of selfishness suggests various deadly contrivances, various means to mortify the flesh.

It is thus that St. Benedict himself,¹ at the beginning of his rules, presents the monastic life to us.

"There is more than one kind of monk. First there are the coenobites, that is to say, those living in a monastery and contending, according to rule, under an abbot; secondly, there are anchorites or hermits; these are not novices, burning with ardour for a new way of life, but men who have been long proved in the monastery, who have first learned, there, to *fight* the devil with the co-operation of a large number of companions, and then, well inured to the struggle, have left the ranks of their brethren, to *wrestle* in the desert; henceforward they are not alone, despite the absence of external help, for they are able, with God's aid, to *fight*, with lone hand and arm, the vicious tendencies of the flesh and of the human mind".

This diversion of the fighting instinct towards a voluntary seeking after poverty, then, proposed to us in the name of the ideal of pacifism, is, like the former diversion, in perfect accord with the spirit of the highest moral education. It has nothing specifically pacifist, in the narrow sense of the word.

¹ Quoted by Quentin, "L'anachorète, le cénobite et le moine bénédictin", in *L'expérience religieuse dans le catholicisme*, i. 247.

PACIFISM AND RELIGION.

But the very virtue which William James chose, to incarnate the heroism of the moral life, will enable us to take yet another step forward in our study.

Poverty naturally calls up the image of the most illustrious of its lovers, the *poverello* of Assisi. This vision suggests two reflections.

The first only emphasises the remarks of James. The life of St. Francis is an anticipatory verification of the thesis. While no one has been more eager than he in the search after poverty, no one has been more pacific. "Peace was the fruit of St. Francis's heart". After the return to the primitive observances of the Gospel, what first characterised "the Franciscan soul", we are told by Father Ubald Alençon, was the spirit of peace. "The *ordo de Pœnitentia* had an immense and profound influence, and it specified this commandment: 'Let the brethren neither take nor carry weapons of death against any man'".¹

But a second remark has to be made. The love he had for poverty in no wise gave Saint Francis "the more athletic trim, the moral fighting shape". He did not *contend*, as did the Benedictine monks; he did not use his poverty as a weapon to be brandished against himself; he pressed it to his heart, like a dearly loved wife.

This example calls our attention to a state of the soul which we may perhaps be allowed to consider the religious state, *par excellence*; love in its highest form absorbs the other natural instincts so completely that they seem to be abolished. The pacifist radiance of souls of this type is intense, and, if educationists concerned with bringing about peace on earth knew any way by which such souls could be brought into being, nothing could be compared with this means of realising their ideal.

But the ripening of such souls is mysterious. For them, as for poets, we speak of an inspiration from On High. The wind bloweth where it listeth. They disconcert our pedagogy. They are no doubt made of human stuff; on the morning after the crises they have

¹ *L'expérience religieuse dans le catholicisme*, i. 27.

sometimes told us about, they flow, sparkling, as from a crucible into which imperceptible minerals must have been thrown; we speak of *transformations* and *conversions* in them, thereby implying that, in the new orientation they have taken up, and underneath the pure clothing they have donned, the *substance* of them has persisted in spite of everything. . . . But, for all that, we do not know the art of bringing them to birth.

Radical conversions such as these are not unknown within the history of pacifism; conversions where, in contradistinction to those we referred to in Chapters VIII and IX, nothing appears to survive of the old tastes for fighting, and where the organic resonance of the instinct is no longer to be discerned in either speech or attitude. There are cases which remain isolated, like that of Richard Weaver.¹ And there are cases which are infectious, like that of William Penn.

In envisaging the pacifist ideal in relation to the complete sublimation of pugnacity, we should be wrong to neglect the *holy experience* of Penn, the man who founded a state, with ill-defined frontiers, on the banks of the Delaware, in the midst of Indians feared for their savage customs, and quite close to other armed colonies; and who announced beforehand his intention of never making use of force against his neighbours.

It does not matter here how this pacific state maintained itself during seventy years, nor why it did not persevere in its principles beyond that period. Our concern is only to remember the source of this collective renunciation of fighting; it was in the conversion of Penn, to which we alluded earlier.² His natural tastes for the trade of arms gave place, after his adherence to the Society of Friends, to a gentleness wholly Franciscan. "On no account to fight, but to suffer, is the particular testimony of this people", he wrote.

The pacifism of Fox himself, the founder of the Society, was the direct result of his Christian conversion. We read in his *Journal*: "Now the time of my commitment to the House of Correction [in 1650] being very near out, and there being many new soldiers raised, the commissioners would have made me captain

¹ See James, *The Varieties, etc.*, pp. 281 ff. Weaver was a collier, a semi-professional pugilist, and a drunkard, whose conversion led him to practise non-resistance, in heroic fashion, in an episode in a mine.

² See p. 176 above.

over them; and the soldiers cried, they would have none but me. So the Keeper of the House of Correction was commanded to bring me before the commissioners and soldiers in the market place; and there they offered that preferment, as they called it, asking me if I would not take up arms for the Commonwealth against Charles Stuart? I told them, I knew from whence all wars did arise, even from the lust, according to James's doctrine; and *that I lived in the virtue of that life and power that took away the occasion of all wars*".¹

It was this reply of Fox which became the initial "testimony" of all Quakers.

Individual experiences like these, in that they were not brought about by any *education*, are perhaps, for all they contain of mystery and the unforeseeable, the best hope for men who aspire to see peace reigning on this earth.

On the whole, our study of methods of education, in relation to the pacifist ideal, leads us to the following conclusions. The pacifist ideal is in the line of human development, such as this is shown to be in individual and social psychology. It comes naturally to be inscribed in the programme of mankind. Its realisation implies a double progress of the individual and society, and so includes a double programme of education; on the one hand, a programme of political education rendering effective the control of the anti-social tendencies of the governing classes by the democratic masses; on the other hand, a programme of integral moral education, encouraging the alteration of dangerous forms of the fighting instinct into tendencies that shall be inoffensive (sports), social (civic and knightly service), or moral (monastic and heroic virtues), or the complete absorption of the fighting instinct within the instinct of love (religious conversion).

For those who adopt the ideal of pacifism, the procedure of pacifist education is one and the same with the procedure of integral education.

¹ Quoted by Thomas Hodgkin, *George Fox*, third edition, London, 1906, pp. 41 f.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCLUSION

I AM afraid this book contains many repetitions. The different subjects that I have passed in review are so closely bound up together, that well-nigh every chapter recapitulates in some way those that precede it. I shall therefore refrain from giving yet another summary here of the tentative conclusions to which I have been led.

But having recounted in my preface by what circumstances I was brought to take the subject up, perhaps I may be allowed now to transcribe the notes I jotted down at the outset of my study. They outline my working hypothesis.

"*Aggressiveness* is a part of human nature, but it is very variously expressed at different ages, and may be *sublimated*. Warlike sports are out of touch with modern war. Individuals are not more belligerent, for war to-day no longer satisfies the aggressiveness or initiative of most of them. It is not the pacifist education of individuals that has to be done, but that of the governing classes. In individuals, what we have to do is to destroy belligerent suggestions coming from tradition and from war pictures which do not correspond to reality. . . ."

In short, the study and discussion of the facts have confirmed, and, on several essential points, enriched, clarified, and differentiated my intuitions. One idea stands out from the book, which I hardly foresaw on setting to work, namely, the parallel that may be established between the fighting instinct and the sexual instinct, and the near kinship of these two tendencies. The facts which have constantly forced this comparison

on our notice raise problems of great interest. Some of these I have hardly had the opportunity to touch on. It would have been inexcusable in me not to have insisted upon them, had my design—not in the study itself, of course, but in the publication of this little book—not been less theoretical than practical.

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
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